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Abstract 
English social care for older people faces a funding crisis. After more than two decades of growth, 
public spending on residential and home care fell in the years of financial austerity that followed the 
Great Recession, leaving almost half a million fewer older people eligible for publicly funded care and 
support. Social care is a non-core welfare programme financed by a secondary area of the English 
state that has suffered significant reductions in spending over the past decade. Policymakers recognise 
that social care has a structural funding problem, and there is a broad consensus that an alternative 
sustainable funding approach is needed to deliver more appropriate and equitable levels of social care 
provision, but policymakers have consistently failed to reform how social care is funded. 
This thesis argues that two very different institutional poles have emerged in England that deliver 
sustainable welfare programme funding: legacy positive state institutions that joined the welfare state 
core in the golden age of welfare, and more recent non-core welfare institutions where policymakers 
have engineered devolved, non-taxation funding approaches. Public social care is a significant, mature 
and complex welfare institution that is supported by neither. Moving English social care towards the 
positive welfare state core has proved to be technically and politically unworkable, and less than fully 
engaged policymakers have been unable to agree on a bespoke, programme-specific funding solution 
designed to deliver greater sustainability. Elsewhere, it has been possible to enact successful 
sustainable funding reform in marginal policy areas, when policymakers have looked in the policy 
garbage can and found that an established, pre-existing institutional answer to the funding problem 
already exists, allowing the politics of organisational change to follow the structure. While English 
policymakers might express a desire for change, the existing funding approach has been undermined 
by a decade of austerity, and history has not left social care a clear route to an alternative de-centred 
funding solution.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. The policy garbage can 
Public spending on residential and home care for older people in England fell significantly in the years 
that followed the financial crash of 20081 while the need for care and per capita care costs both 
increased. Austerity driven care intensification left 460,000 fewer older people eligible for publicly 
funded care in 2018 than in 20092. The cuts in funding were focused on areas that already had the 
worst health outcomes, pushed public care payments below the fair cost of delivering care and put 
downward pressure on social care wages. While the past decade has seen falling care spending and 
declining care provision, public pension expenditure has increased by almost a third, and English 
pensioner incomes have increased significantly3. These very different funding outcomes within a single 
welfare state are driven by the nature of the institutions that finance pensions and social care. Rising 
pensioner incomes are underpinned by a universal taxation-funded state pension with legally 
guaranteed upward momentum, and publicly encouraged and guided, sustainably funded private 
pensions that are supported by fiscal and regulatory welfare, asset-backed and legally protected. 
Means-tested public social care has neither, enjoys few institutional protections and relies upon 
residual, fixed budget local government funding. 
English policymakers have failed to increase social care spending or to introduce a more robust 
funding approach, but this is not a new phenomenon. Numerous public consultations, green papers, 
white papers and independent commissions have considered social care policy and made detailed 
recommendations over the past twenty years, but the ways in which care is funded have changed 
little. The last significant variation in the social care funding regime was enacted more than thirty-five 
years ago when the scope of centrally funded supplementary benefit was extended to include 
payments for residential care. The change was introduced with little fanfare, consultation or strategic 
deliberation when the Conservative government escalated a local policy innovation nationwide. This 
garbage can (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) reform was enacted in a non-core policy area by 
 
1 Public social care in England is funded and mostly commissioned by local councils that are financed by central 
government grants, local taxation and other income. A decade of asymmetric austerity focused on councils has 
compromised the existing funding approach as real public spending on English social care fell by 6% (down 
£1.2bn) between 2009/10 and 2017/18 (NHS Digital, 2018, T4). 
2 In 2008/09, 1,215,575 older people received publicly commissioned or provided social care in England 
(Burchardt et al., 2015, p.28). The figure for 2017/18 was 752,936 care recipients (NHS Digital, 2018, p.8). 
3 Real terms public spending on the UK state pension rose by 31% (up £21.8bn) between 2008/09 and 2017/18 
(DWP, 2018b, SP3). Average real pensioner incomes rose by 15% between 2006/7 and 2016/17 (DWP, 2018c, 
2.1). 
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policymakers who were not particularly engaged, and it proved to be flawed and increasingly 
expensive. While popular with generously funded private residential care provider organisations and 
care recipients, the reform had little support within the Conservative administration or amongst care 
professionals and was dropped in the early 1990s when control of residential care budgets reverted 
to local government. 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) developed their garbage can model of organisational choice in the 
1970s, noting that change does not always begin with problems and that the decision-making process 
often starts with existing competences and solutions looking for new issues to address. They argue 
that when current problems, existing solutions, and high levels of decision maker energy come 
together, reform is possible even where there is a lack of policymaker engagement or agreement. 
Kingdon’s (1984) multiple streams framework builds on this non-linear, garbage can model to analyse 
how policymakers settle on a policy agenda and make choices, arguing that there are three situational 
‘streams’ (problem, policy and politics) that can arrive in any order but must converge (creating a 
‘window of opportunity’) along with sufficient levels of energy from policy entrepreneurs and wider 
policy networks before change is possible. Mucciaroni (1992, p.467) argues that the garbage can 
model and multiple streams approach are valuable and influential, but give too much weight to the 
situational aspects of policymaking and need to be combined with a consideration of the historical 
antecedents of change and the impact of institutional factors that mediate the problems and solutions 
under active consideration by policymakers (Mucciaroni, 1992, p.482). Spohr (2016, p.258) proposes 
a “framework for the explanation of path dependency and deviation” that seeks to do just this, 
combining historical institutional insights with Kingdon’s multiple streams framework. His approach 
considers the role played by policy communities4 and draws on punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgarten and Jones, 1993), historical institutionalism’s “default theory of change” (Thelen and 
Conran, 2016, p.54) that was inspired by the multiple streams framework (John, 2015) and is 
characterised by institutional stability punctuated by exogenous change enabling critical junctures5. 
Cairney and Jones (2016, p.43) argue that both frameworks conceptualise stability and instability, 
incremental change and major change, and can be used as alternative explanatory approaches or 
 
4 Kingdon (1984, p.118) notes that the structure of the policy communities he considers can range from focused, 
integrated policy communities to more fragmented issue networks (although he does not use that term). Spohr 
(2016, p.259) argues that radical path departure is less likely when focused, technocratic policy communities 
dominate the policy stream. 
5 Capoccia (2016, p.101) defines a critical juncture as a potential turning point where policy entrepreneurs 
(actors) have real options for radical, long lasting institutional change. Spohr’s analysis combines this historical 
institutional concept with the multiple streams approach, describing Kingdon’s windows of opportunity (policy 
windows) as “critical moments for path deviations” (Spohr, 2016, p.269). 
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combined. In common with Spohr, this thesis draws on both approaches to analyse and explain long-
run path dependency, periods of path deviating reform and failed attempts at reform. 
As funding problems have grown, English policymakers have returned to the garbage can looking for 
a more sustainable way to fund social care. Ideally the alternative funding solution should be popular, 
easily implementable, have a relatively low political cost and not require too much policymaker energy 
to make the change. No sustainable funding policy, approach or institution with anything like these 
characteristics currently exists for English social care. The alternative funding solutions and institutions 
that have historically developed are all technically or politically problematic, so the amount of 
policymaker energy and political capital needed to implement change is high and the likelihood of 
reform is diminished. Elsewhere, when policymakers looked in the garbage can for an alternative 
funding approach, the situation they found was much more favourable, the funding reforms 
introduced have been sustained and the long run policy outcomes are very different. To gain insights 
into the mechanisms that drive welfare programme reform / non-reform and illustrate the long-run 
benefits associated with more sustainable funding, this thesis employs qualitative historical 
comparison. We begin by exploring how the funding of English social care and two other welfare 
programmes for older people has developed over several decades. 
2. A tale of three institutions 
At the beginning of the 1980s, English social care, German social care and UK public earnings-related 
pensions were marginal, non-core welfare institutions funded by pooled local and central government 
taxation. In all three cases, where policymakers were engaged, they appreciated that the programmes 
would need to address increasing demand from an ageing population in the decades to come and 
perceived that the existing policy approach was not well suited to meet that demand. 
Social care provision in England and Germany was mostly informal and delivered by friends and family 
members. Where formal social care was required this was funded by the individuals requiring care. 
When personal funds were exhausted, provision in both countries was funded by general taxation, 
and managed locally. The ways in which publicly funded care was provided were however very 
different. Most non-family social care in England was provided by the state, in Germany formal social 
care was delivered by charitable and for-profit private organisations. Both care systems had evolved 
slowly over decades and there was widespread agreement that the level of funding, facilities and care 
quality provided in both countries was insufficient and inconsistent. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
14 
 
The historical development of UK earnings-related pensions had been quite different, but long run 
funding sustainability and gaps in coverage were also seen as a problem by policymakers. While non-
universal private occupational pensions were introduced in the late nineteenth century and a flat-rate 
public pension was enacted in 1908, no significant public earnings-related pension scheme was 
introduced by the UK state until the golden age of welfare6 was drawing to a close. The state pension 
was a key part of the core general taxation funded welfare state and private occupational pensions 
were well established, but policymakers had left a significant space in the pension savings regime. In 
the mid-1970s, a political consensus emerged on the need for a public scheme to complement existing 
occupational provision and the State Earnings-related Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced in 1978 
as an unfunded, centrally managed, pay-as-you-go scheme that drew mandatory contributions from 
employers and employees that lacked existing routes to pension saving. The consensus did not last. 
Programme reform 
All three welfare programmes were reformed by policymakers between 1983 and 1994. English care 
provision was re-engineered to promote a mixed economy of social care by the Conservative 
government elected in 1979. By the time the party left office in 1997, most residential care for older 
people, and a significant portion of formal home care had been outsourced and was delivered by 
thousands of private providers. The marginal nature of English social care meant that, unlike core 
welfare areas such as healthcare and education, policymaking was more reactive than strategic, public 
engagement was relatively low and there were few political constraints on market-based reform. In 
the late 1970s, individual social security offices started making emergency supplementary benefit 
payments to fund private residential care. This endogenous policy ‘accident’ was escalated by 
Conservative policymakers into a national funding approach that transformed the nature of social care 
provision. In 1983, the government rolled care benefit payments out nationwide with the number of 
publicly funded private care beds only limited by the number of residents meeting the means-tested 
financial criteria. A producer driven market structure (Gingrich, 2011, p.17) allowed private residential 
care operators to determine fee levels, and policymakers also introduced financial incentives to 
‘encourage’ local councils to outsource existing provision. Large numbers of new private care 
providers emerged, and there was a significant outsourcing shift by councils. By the early 1990s, the 
cost of centrally funded benefit payments for residential care was growing rapidly and care 
 
6 Taylor-Gooby (2002, p.597) notes commentators have argued that the welfare state enjoyed a ‘golden age’ of 
positive provider state growth between 1945 and the early 1970s. Wincott (2013, p.820) suggests that the notion 
of a golden age of welfare is a “share conventional wisdom” that has elements of truth but offers a “stylised 
account of … welfare state history”. 
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professionals and commentators were increasingly concerned about the paucity of local government 
funded home care which was not eligible for supplementary benefit funding. Policymakers capped 
spending and the commissioning and funding of all residential and home care reverted to local 
government control. The structure of English social care funding has remained broadly unchanged 
ever since. 
In Germany, social care funding reform was enacted in the 1990s. The degree of wider policymaker 
engagement with the reforms and the focus of changes introduced were however quite different to 
the English case. During the 1990 general election campaign, Norbert Blüm, Minister for Labour and 
Social Affairs (and policy entrepreneur), proposed a social care insurance scheme. After an extended 
debate, a consensus developed around the adoption of a social insurance funding approach, and a 
long-term care insurance scheme was introduced in 1994. The need to achieve political consensus and 
the German welfare state austerity agenda of the 1990s shaped the pay-as-you-go, hybrid public / 
private, defined contribution structure of the scheme. Making use of long-established health 
insurance funds and associated infrastructure to administer the scheme facilitated rapid 
implementation and allowed new de-centred funding institutions to be layered on top of existing local 
government funding. While policymakers wanted to transform the generosity of German social care, 
there was also a desire to pool social risks, support and encourage family and home care, encourage 
new providers to enter the market and to stimulate competition between existing providers. 
When the Labour government introduced pay-as-you-go public earnings-related pensions in the 
1970s, doubts were expressed about the long-run affordability of the scheme. With rising 
contributions and few benefits payable at first, SERPS was expected to be cash generative to the 
Treasury for the first two decades of operation but would then become increasingly expensive as 
accrued pension liabilities matured. In 1985, Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services, 
also operated as a policy entrepreneur, proposing that SERPS should be abolished and replaced with 
mandatory private pension saving. Following opposition from the Treasury, private pension providers, 
employers and trades unions, Conservative policymakers compromised and announced that SERPS 
would be reformed rather than replaced. The Social Security Act (1986) reduced the generosity of 
public earnings-related pensions while offering financial incentives to encourage individuals to switch 
their mandatory pension contributions into ring-fenced private personal pension funds rather than 
relying on the unfunded public scheme. 
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Successful implementation and increasing funding 
The welfare reforms introduced in the UK and Germany were built using pre-existing solutions and 
institutional structures, delivered the main reform objectives of the relevant policymakers7 in all three 
cases and unlocked significantly higher levels of medium-term programme funding. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s, the environment of profitable private residential care provision with minimal public 
regulation8 engineered by the Conservative government encouraged a boom in English publicly 
funded, privately delivered social care. The number of residential care and nursing home beds rose 
from 290,200 in 1980 to 563,100 in 1996, and the share of private residential care beds rose from a 
third of provision in 1980 to three quarters of provision by 1996 (Laing, 2017, pp.15-16). There was a 
pause in spending growth after the responsibility for all public social care funding was returned to 
local government in the mid-1990s and, following an increase in care sector regulation and cost-push 
pressures following the arrival of the Labour government in 1997, the number of care beds began to 
decline. As a response, the Labour administration increased local government commissioned social 
care spending by 5% a year (Simpson, 2017, p.4) between 2000 and 2010, and spending climbed to 
£18.6bn in 2008 (NHS Digital, 2018, T4) with 1.2m older people receiving publicly funded social care 
in that year (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.28). 
Earnings-related pension reform also delivered on the twin goals of Conservative policymakers who 
wanted to engineer a significant increase in the level of private pension saving and a reduction in the 
future cost of public pensions. The reforms introduced were targeted at the self-employed and 
workers in sectors with historically low levels of pension saving, but personal pensions were very 
popular, and five million employees switched to private individual pension plans between 1988 and 
1993. When combined with those who had opted-out of public earnings-related pensions through an 
occupational pension scheme, more than two-thirds of the working age population were saving 
privately for their pension by 1995. This move away from an unfunded public scheme to funded 
private pensions significantly reduced government pay-as-you-go pension receipts. In 1990, the 
National Audit Office predicted that the reform would reduce national insurance contributions by 
£9.3bn between 1988 and 1993 (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992, p.5) a figure that continued to build 
 
7 Those policymakers whose initial and continued support was required to deliver and embed welfare reforms 
are termed the ‘relevant policymakers’ here and elsewhere in the thesis. In the German social care (consensus 
reform) case the relevant policymakers were spread across most, if not all, political parties. In the UK earnings-
related pension and social care (majoritarian reform) cases the relevant policymakers were all within the 
Conservative Party. 
8 Gingrich (2011, p.179) terms this market structure a ‘pork barrel’ market with private social care providers 
enjoying a strong market position and rent-seeking from the state. 
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in the years that followed as contributions were diverted into private pension schemes. The reforms 
had relatively little impact on public earnings-related pensions paid up to 2011, but projected public 
spending on earnings-related pensions payable by 2031 was reduced by more than 70% (Budd and 
Campbell, 1998, p.111) as future pension costs were privatised. 
Prior to social insurance funding reform, German social care for older people had a history of residual 
care funding with relatively few citizens over the age of 65 receiving formal home or residential care. 
Following the introduction of a mandatory long-term care insurance scheme in 1994, the level of social 
care insurance funding jumped from €nil to €15.9bn in 1998. Four years after the scheme was 
introduced, payments were made to 1.8m care recipients, with most opting for cash ‘voucher’ 
payments to fund either informal or formal care. The introduction of social long-term care insurance 
also reduced the need for care recipients to turn to taxation funded means-tested payments, and 
these fell significantly from €6.6bn in 1994 to €2.7bn in 1998 with the number of recipients of 
stigmatised means-tested benefits also down from 450,000 to 284,000. Following introduction, the 
level of social care funding from the scheme rose as the wages enjoyed by German employees 
increased9 in the years up to the financial crisis of 2008 and stood at €19.1bn in that year (Federal 
Health Monitoring System, 2019). 
3. Divergent funding paths after the Great Recession 
In 2008, the financial crisis in the US led to the bankruptcy of several UK banks and precipitated the 
largest global recession since the Great Depression. The UK government proposed a £500bn rescue 
package for the banking sector, reduced interest rates, brought forward public investment spending 
and introduced temporary cuts in taxation. As a result of measures introduced and the impact of 
automatic economic stabilisers, the budget deficit rose from 2.9% of GDP (2008) to 10% of GDP (2010). 
The UK national debt rose from 39% of GDP in 2008 to 72% of GDP in 2011 and continued to rise in 
the years that followed10. 
Following the 2010 general election, the UK Coalition government announced a programme of 
financial austerity that aimed to reduce public spending and increase taxation over the next five years. 
The German economy fared better than many European countries after the financial crisis, but public 
spending growth there has also been constrained, with the share of national income spent by the state 
 
9 The long-term care insurance contribution rate (payable up to a contribution ceiling) was set at 1.7% of wages 
by German policymakers. 
10 The UK national debt continued to rise at a slower rate as a share of GDP from 2011 until 2017. It has now 
stabilised at around 85% of GDP (2018) (ONS, 2019a). 
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falling over the past twenty years and, following a large increase in the national debt between 2008 
and 2010, German policymakers have run a succession of government budget surpluses. 
The implementation of austerity funding cuts in England was asymmetric. Coalition policymakers 
limited the impact on core welfare state institutions with the National Health Service and education 
protected from reductions in spending, and also introduced a ‘triple-lock’ guarantee that ensured a 
rising state pension. Local government, the funding channel for public social care in England, was not 
protected by policymakers and was the area of public spending most impacted by central government 
austerity measures11. 
The period of post-reform expansion came to an end for English social care. All three programmes 
considered here address areas of growing welfare need and had enjoyed programme growth and 
increasing funding prior to the financial crisis, but the impact of post-2008 financial austerity was very 
different. German long-term care insurance payments and the UK public and private pension regime 
became increasingly generous, while English policymakers responded to rising care need at a time of 
constrained funding by restricting benefit eligibility and attempting to contain costs. 
Growing UK pensions 
Average pensioner incomes in the UK have risen much faster in recent years than average incomes for 
those of working age. This income growth is built on three robust, sustainable funding sources; 
employment, the state pension and payments received from private pension funds. As the retirement 
age for women and men has been aligned and raised, the number of older people in employment has 
increased. The state pension is a legacy universal, defined benefit welfare programme with path-
dependent upward momentum, part of the core general taxation funded welfare state and protected 
by a ‘triple-lock’ guarantee. As the number of pensioners, inflation or average wages rise, public 
pension spending increases automatically; real public spending on the UK state pension rose by 31% 
(up £21.8bn) between 2009 and 2018 (DWP, 2018b, SP3). Private pension schemes are structured12 
and regulated by the state, supported by fiscal welfare, asset-backed and legally protected. Like the 
state pension, they enjoy path-dependent funding growth; the average level of real private pension 
income received (from occupational and personal pensions) rose by 39% between 2007 and 2017 
(DWP, 2018c, 2.1). 
 
11 UK central government funding for local government fell by more than 50% between 2011 and 2016 (Gray 
and Barford, 2018, p.542). 
12 Mabbett (2013a) argues that the UK Pension Quality Mark scheme is an example of the government acting as 
a franchisor to the private welfare state. 
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Increasing German social care spending 
The years that followed the financial crisis of 2008 have also been a period of growing German social 
care expenditure. Between 2009 and 2017, real German long-term care insurance spending13 on social 
care rose by 72% (up from €22bn to €39bn) (Federal Health Monitoring System, 2019). Minimum 
benefit levels are dictated by the Federal government and these were increased in 2008, 2010, 2012 
and 2015. Provision levels were also enhanced by The First Long-Term Care Strengthening Act (PSG I, 
2014) and Second Long-Term Care Strengthening Act (PSG II, 2015) which improved dementia 
coverage, offered greater funding for respite care, enhanced rehabilitation payments and offered 
home modification grants. The significant increase in hypothecated social care spending was funded 
by rising wages and an increase in the mandatory long-term care insurance contribution rate that is 
automatically deducted from pensions paid and wages earned. This contribution rate was increased 
from 1.7% to 1.95% in 2008 and following two further increases currently stands at 2.55% of wages 
payable up to a contribution ceiling. 
Falling English social care spending 
In contrast to the growth in UK pensioner incomes and rising German social care expenditure, public 
funding for residential and home care in England fell by 6% in the eight years (2010 to 2018) that 
followed the Great Recession (NHS Digital, 2018, T4). Fees paid to providers by local councils have 
been allowed to fall below the ‘fair’ cost of care (Laing, 2008, p.5)14 and 460,000 fewer older people 
(down 38%) received publicly funded social care in 2018 than in 2009 (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.28; 
NHS Digital, 2018, p.8). Social care for older people remains a secondary objective of the English 
welfare state with few structural mechanisms to support funding during times of austerity. Provision 
is fragmented amongst thousands of relatively small and mostly private providers, commissioned by 
local authorities that are less well financed than core welfare state programmes and funded on a fixed-
budget basis from general taxation. As demand has risen the eligibility criteria for publicly funded care 
has been tightened and payments to care providers have been squeezed. The ensuing care funding 
crisis15 threatens the financial viability of care provider organisations and has contributed to increasing 
 
13 The figures quoted are in 2017 prices. 
14 While illustrating growing care fee pressures, Laing’s ‘fair’ cost of privately delivered social care includes a 
level of return on capital that has attracted criticism from some commentators (Hudson, 2016, p.19). 
15 In March 2019, an open letter to the Government from care charities, professional bodies, NHS organisations 
and the Local Government Association (Local Government Association, 2019) stated that “adult social care is at 
breaking point”, argued that retaining existing inadequate levels of care provision will require an extra £3.6bn 
each year by 2025 and called on the government to urgently invest in social care. 
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levels of unmet need and declining care quality16. When older people cannot secure a residential care 
place or be supported at home they are often admitted to or remain in publicly funded hospitals. This 
is more expensive, often delivers worse outcomes and many older people would prefer to be at home. 
Waiting for Godot – the sustainable funding debate 
There is broad agreement amongst English policymakers of all parties (Independent Age / COMRES, 
2017, p.4) that the current social care funding approach is inappropriate and inequitable. In November 
2017, Damian Green, First Secretary of State (and potential policy entrepreneur), announced that a 
green paper on social care reform would be published in 2018 (Green, 2017)17. He promised that the 
government would consult widely, not shy away from making difficult choices and attempt to build a 
broad policy consensus. 
 
The green paper is however much delayed and few working in or commenting on social care expect 
that sustainable institutional funding reform will result if and when it is eventually published. In the 
past twenty years, twelve public consultations, green papers, white papers and several independent 
commissions have considered social care policy. The Sutherland Report (1999) argued that personal 
social care should be free for all regardless of income, Wanless (2002) proposed changes to how 
funding needs were assessed, Building the National Care Service (2010) proposed free universal 
personal care for all, but deferred decisions on how this would be funded until after the 2010 general 
election, and the Dilnot Commission (2011) recommended a revised means-test and a cap on 
individual lifetime care spending that would partially pool care costs and encourage the development 
of a private care insurance market. All of the proposed changes were to be funded by general 
taxation18, and none of the key reforms proposed have been implemented. Having promised a Royal 
Commission on fair social care funding during the 1997 election, the incoming Labour government 
rejected the major proposal of the commission (free personal care). The first stage of introducing a 
 
16 There is significant variation in the level of public social care spending across the OECD, with the Netherlands 
committing 4.3% of GDP to social care while Italy spends just 0.6% (OECD, 2018). Oesterle and Rothgang (2010, 
p.379) note there is wide variation in stable levels of national social care provision and spending. This suggests 
that the English social care funding crisis is not driven by the absolute level of public care expenditure (currently 
1.2% of GDP), but by the rate of change in public care funding falling well below institutionally expected recent 
norms. Real social care spending rose by 5% per annum between 2000/01 and 2009/10 (Simpson, 2017, p.4), 
but has fallen in the post-2008 years of austerity that followed. 
17 The social care green paper has been delayed several times. In March 2019, Philip Hammond, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, announced that a review of social care spending would be pushed back until the summer. Paul 
Johnson, Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, suggested that waiting for the green paper was increasingly 
like Beckett’s play Waiting for Godot where Godot never arrives (Johnson, 2019). 
18 It was originally envisaged that the National Care Service would be funded by a new inheritance tax but this 
proposal was dropped. 
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National Care Service, which promised free homecare for those with the highest need, was enacted 
by the Labour administration in 2010, but not implemented by the incoming Coalition government. 
The Dilnot funding reform proposals became law in The Care Act (2014). In the following year, 
implementation was deferred to 2020, and in 2017 the Conservative government announced that the 
care cap would be dropped. 
Policymakers in England have failed to increase social care funding from general taxation or to 
introduce a sustainable public or private care financing solution that might deliver rising funding. Even 
when a social care funding crisis focuses minds, policymakers have been unable to agree on a more 
sustainable funding approach, one that pools catastrophic social care risks or encourages / requires 
citizens to take out public or private care insurance. There have been numerous social care funding 
reform proposals, but the residual, failing local government funding model remains. This inability to 
address “one of the greatest unresolved public policy issues of our time” (CQC, 2017, p.4) begs a 
question that is the focus of this thesis: 
If a robust funding approach has delivered sustainably funded benefits to UK pensioners and German 
social care recipients in a climate of on-going financial austerity, and there is widespread agreement 
that the current social care funding approach is inappropriate and inequitable, why have policymakers 
consistently failed to introduce a sustainable funding approach for English social care? 
4. The argument 
In an age of perpetual financial austerity, two very different institutional poles have emerged that 
deliver sustainable levels of welfare programme funding in England: legacy positive state welfare 
institutions that joined the general taxation funded welfare state core in the golden age, and more 
recent non-core welfare institutions where policymakers have engineered de-centred19, non-taxation 
funding approaches. Rising pensioner incomes in England are underpinned by both. The popular 
universal state pension sits at the core of the positive welfare state, and private pensions are funded 
by robust de-centred funding institutions. Social care for older people is not part of the more 
generously funded welfare state core and policymakers have failed to introduce a robust, de-centred 
funding approach. This lack of funding support underpins the English social care crisis. 
 
19 The thesis considers the rise of de-centred welfare funding in various forms. These includes policy approaches 
that ‘encourage’ individuals to save for their own welfare, the devolution of funding activities away from central 
government / general taxation and the privatisation of existing welfare benefits. All of these devolved 
approaches share a policymaker desire to move away from rowing (centrally funding and providing welfare) in 
favour of steering (guiding and regulating) the welfare effort. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
22 
 
The golden age of welfare saw the rise of taxation funded, publicly delivered welfare programmes. 
When faced with rising need, a centralising English provider state mostly chose to row20, and the 
funding for welfare was divorced from provision. Today, while policymakers have sought to contain 
benefit spending and the commitment to public provision has been diluted, funding for the 
established core of popular positive welfare state institutions persists and continues to grow. 
Spending on social security, health care and education has enjoyed a rising share of national income 
for decades, and now accounts for around a quarter of GDP, but taxation funded welfare expenditure 
is focussed on existing institutions and existing policy takers. 
New welfare needs that have emerged since the golden age have been addressed very differently by 
policymakers. As the state has increasingly opted to steer, welfare provider organisations are guided 
and regulated but not owned, and welfare policy initiatives and reforms are increasingly de-centred. 
These devolved, fragmented welfare approaches dilute central government accountability for 
delivering successful welfare outcomes and increasingly include a requirement for non-taxation 
funding sources. Where devolved post golden age funding institutions have been introduced by 
policymakers, they tend to be bespoke / institutionally specific and are often crafted by reaching into 
the policy garbage can and repurposing existing institutions and processes. Policymakers then use 
legislation and regulatory bureaucrats to steer the reimagined welfare funding institutions that they 
have created. 
 
The two successful funding reform cases analysed in chapter four demonstrate that when a robust 
alternative funding institution or market relationship already exists and is repurposed to finance the 
welfare provision desired by policymakers, this approach can deliver successful programme outcomes. 
In response to widespread unease about social care provision in Germany, mandatory long-term care 
insurance was introduced in 1994, and in the UK the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) 
was converted in the late 1980s from an unfunded positive state public scheme into a publicly 
regulated, predominantly privately funded, de-centred one. In both cases existing institutional 
structures and a regulatory state policy agenda drove the politics of reform. The problem, policy and 
political streams (Kingdon, 1984, p.20) coupled and the scope for institutional bricolage was strong 
allowing policy entrepreneurs to engineer reform. The relevant policymakers perceived that there was 
a problem with future funding, broadly agreed what should be done, and there was a relatively low 
 
20 Osbourne and Gaebler (1993, p.25) argue that governments should not deliver services (row) but should 
empower communities and focus on delivering desired outcomes (steer). Braithwaite (2011, p.217) similarly 
argues that states provide, distribute and regulate. For him regulation is the subset of overall public governance 
that steers networks of non-state providers rather than providing and distributing directly. 
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political cost attached to implementing reform. Policymakers still faced significant opposition from 
the respective policy communities and had to adapt the proposed reforms, but funding reform was 
made more likely and mediated by pre-existing widely respected alternative de-centred funding 
institutions that were a good fit for the agreed future programme objectives of the relevant 
policymakers and could be layered on top of existing institutional structures relatively quickly. In both 
cases the financial cost of reform was much higher than continued funding through existing channels, 
but this was not an obstacle to reform in either case. 
 
Where alternative institutional funding arrangements do not exist or are weak the policy stream is 
much diminished, introducing a new sustainable funding institution is more complicated and is likely 
to incur a higher political cost. This suggests that where existing welfare funding institutions are 
weakest and most needed, robust de-centred funding is less likely to be introduced as the political 
cost of reform inhibits policymaker action. In situations like this, marginal welfare programmes must 
rely on public funding alone. Which brings us to the English social care case. Despite a prolonged social 
care reform debate, English policymakers have failed to move away from residual general taxation 
funding towards a more sustainable care funding approach. Without recourse to a sustainable funding 
institution, public social care in England lacks path-dependent mechanisms that automatically 
increase funding over time. As demographic, socio-economic and cost pressures have risen, systemic 
underfunding has driven care intensification and a widening care gap. While there is broad agreement 
that England has a care funding problem, without an obvious alternative funding approach, the 
relevant policymakers remain torn between very different policy responses. Most English social care 
provision has been outsourced and increasingly regulated over time, but care funding has failed to 
move away from the underfunded non-core welfare state paradigm. Half-hearted attempts to 
promote a private market for social care insurance have failed, leaving individual citizens unable to 
provide against the risk of catastrophic care costs in old age. With the state reluctant to row, and no 
obvious existing funding institutions for policymakers to repurpose and steer, a significant market 
failure remains unaddressed. 
5. Thesis structure 
After more than two decades of growing social care provision, English policymakers have failed to 
increase public social care spending since the Great Recession or to introduce or encourage a 
sustainable public or private funding solution that might deliver rising care expenditure. This thesis 
employs detailed process tracing and an analytical framework that combines historical institutionalism 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
24 
 
with multiple streams analysis21 to chronicle the development of English publicly commissioned social 
care and to analyse the mechanisms that underpin path departing reform / path dependent non-
reform. To help interpret persistent funding policy inaction, the thesis also employs two relatively 
heterogeneous comparator cases. The four chapters that follow this introduction and the chapter 
discussing research design, analyse the creation, development, centralisation, maturing and more 
recent de-centreing of the UK welfare state that has delivered two sustainable funding poles (neither 
of which support English social care), compare public social care policy in England with two welfare 
programmes where sustainable funding reforms have been enacted by policymakers, explore why 
sustainable English social care funding has not developed historically, and consider English 
policymaker attempts to address social care funding policy failures today. The contents of these 
analytical chapters are outlined below. 
Welfare state development, maturity and the turn to de-centred welfare 
Chapter three maps the welfare state geography that mediates the policy and funding options 
available to social care policymakers, explores the historical development of English welfare 
institutions and analyses the impact of the post golden age turn towards publicly regulated de-centred 
welfare provision. Today’s welfare state is a mosaic of institutions that have coalesced over time, often 
with quite different conceptual and temporal underpinnings (Orren and Skowronek, 1994, p.323). 
Having developed and matured, the public welfare state is now a major part of the political landscape 
and existing taxation funded universal programmes tend to enjoy broad public support. In the golden 
age of welfare, English policymakers made unfunded welfare promises that have broadly been kept. 
The core legacy welfare state is predominantly funded by general taxation and enjoys an increasing 
share of public spending, but new post golden age taxation funded welfare programmes are rare. To 
fill gaps between existing core welfare programmes and the emerging welfare needs of citizens, 
policymakers have increasingly turned to a devolved, regulatory approach that guides the choices 
made by individuals and non-public provider organisations. With policymakers often unwilling to use 
general taxation to fund these non-core welfare activities, this de-centred welfare approach also 
involves introducing devolved funding institutions or encouraging and strengthening those that 
already exist. These alternative funding approaches are often bespoke, institutionally specific and built 
by repurposing existing relationships or institutional structures. Once in place the re-engineered 
 
21 The thesis also considers alternative explanations for institutional reform / non-reform and draws upon 
conceptual approaches and stylized facts that include the golden age of welfare, a maturing welfare state, the 
Baumol cost effect (Baumol, 2012, p.4), institutional and policy drift, institutional layering and retrenchment 
theory. The rationale for the research approach adopted is discussed in chapters two and three. 
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funding institutions then allow policymakers and regulators to guide non-public welfare outcomes 
without recourse to taxation. 
De-centred welfare with sustainable funding 
While the financing of English public social care remains unreformed, policymakers elsewhere have 
enacted sustainable welfare funding reform in relatively marginal policy areas. Chapter four explores 
two successful, but very different policy reforms that created new sustainable funding institutions to 
support the welfare needs of older people. The introduction of German long-term care insurance in 
1994, with broad cross-party support, saw the creation of a new predominantly public welfare state 
funding institution. By contrast, the Conservative dismantling of UK public earnings-related pensions 
in the late 1980s was a move towards greater private provision and opposed by opposition parties. 
What both cases shared was a relevant policymaker perception that there was a funding problem and 
a clear pre-reform path to a new devolved funding solution. This allowed policy entrepreneurs to drive 
reform in both cases. The funding reforms institutionalised sustainable, non-taxation, programme-
specific welfare funding and were built using hundreds of de-centred funding institutions which 
already existed and could be adapted by policymakers at low political cost. These alternative funding 
institutions were more consistent with the regulatory state policy preferences of the relevant 
policymakers than the existing positive state funding models, and higher expenditure was less of a 
concern than moving to a preferred, readily implementable funding approach. When a critical 
juncture22 emerged, policymakers employed a regulatory approach to policymaking, first repurposing 
and, in the decades that followed, steering the devolved funding institutions that they had engineered. 
Having analysed both cases, the chapter then employs process tracing and Mill’s method of agreement 
to generate a set of explanatory variables consistent with successful funding reform and to 
demonstrate how a de-centred funding institution, once established, can deliver enhanced welfare 
outcomes over an extended period. 
De-centred welfare without sustainable funding 
Chapter five considers how decades of policymaker disengagement, past ‘accidental’ reforms, a lack 
of strategic thinking on policy, and recent asymmetric local government austerity have left English 
social care fragmented and without a reliable institutional mechanism to sustainably fund care. The 
 
22 In the two sustainable funding reform cases analysed, policy entrepreneurs had viable policy options available 
that could deliver radical, long lasting institutional change. Historical institutionalism’s ‘critical juncture’ (the 
term employed here) and Kingdon’s ‘window of opportunity’ / ‘policy window’ deliver valuable, complementary 
insights into the dynamics of policy reform. Both terms are used in the thesis based on the historical / situational 
context being discussed. 
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chapter discusses the residual, stigmatised nineteenth-century workhouse, a failed golden age 
attempt to move social care towards the welfare state core, reforms introduced in the 1980s that 
‘encouraged’ a publicly commissioned, regulated and funded, privately provided care model, and cost 
containment and care intensification from the 1990s onwards that have morphed into austerity driven 
funding reductions in the past decade. 
Social care for older people is a marginal, local government managed, non-universal area of the English 
welfare state that is broad in scope but has a relatively narrow clientele and few mechanisms to 
increase funding over time. Central government policymaker attention tends to be relatively low and 
the social care landscape is fragmented. While the local government care funding approach today is 
much the same as it was forty years ago, formal care provision has seen a great deal of change. In the 
1980s, the Conservative government outsourced most formal care provision. The marginal nature of 
the sector allowed policymakers to encourage radical, market-based change to the ways in which care 
was delivered. While the reforms unlocked investment, policymakers did not address the need to 
secure sustainable long-term public or private funding. When care providers faced significant cost-
push funding pressures in the late 1990s, residential care provision started to contract. In response, 
the Blair administration increased public funding and slowed the rising regulatory burden but did not 
introduce a sustainable public funding mechanism or incentivise private care insurance. Following the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the on-going fiscal contraction that followed it, austerity policies reduced 
the level of formal, taxation funded, public care provision and damaged the local government funding 
channel that policymakers have historically relied upon when they want to address care funding 
problems. 
The political and institutional dynamics of English social care allowed policymakers to outsource care 
provision in the 1980s at little political or public financial cost. Marketisation offered them a ready-
made route to institutional development that had not previously been considered. When this 
ideational window of opportunity opened it offered an alternative delivery approach for English social 
care that allowed central government to remain disengaged and was more consistent with the policy 
preferences of Conservative policymakers than the status quo, so provision was outsourced. 
Sustainable de-centred funding reforms were not seriously entertained by policymakers as there was 
no obvious institutional route to a non-taxation, de-centred public or private funding approach. 
Decades of disengagement have left policymakers with few policy levers to steer devolved social care, 
so central government has employed a regulatory response to the care funding crisis, imposing duties 
on English local government to ensure appropriate levels of care are delivered, but the scope to raise 
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council taxes to fund care is limited by central government, areas of greatest need are often areas 
with the weakest local tax base and the private market for social care insurance in England has failed. 
Funding policy paralysis 
Chapter six builds on this historical analysis, chronicling growing demands for a more sustainable, long-
term funding solution for English social care in response to a persistent, systemic funding crisis. Having 
announced a green paper on care and support for older people, the Conservative government has 
repeatedly delayed publication with commentators arguing there are major political and institutional 
impediments to funding reform. The chapter explores the policy debate in advance of the elusive 
green paper and draws upon the set of explanatory variables generated in chapter four. English 
publicly commissioned social care falls within the domain of local government with central 
government policymakers intermittently involved when regulatory or funding problems arise. Where 
policymakers have engaged with social care, they find that a decade of austerity has exposed wicked 
institutional problems with local government funding and reduced public care spending while per 
capita costs and demand have both risen. Some of the resultant care gap has been filled by informal 
and private formal care, but there is a growing level of unmet need. England does not have a 
functioning private social care insurance market and public policy lacks strategic direction. Having 
reviewed the failing funding regime, the chapter employs Mill's method of difference to isolate 
explanatory variables common to the two successful funding reform cases, but not present in the non-
reforming English social care funding case. This comparison suggests that mature, well embedded 
existing institutions, a lack of relevant policymaker consensus on the most appropriate reform solution 
and no obvious alternative de-centred funding solution in the policy garbage can are key drivers of 
non-reform, so these linked variables are explored at length. 
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Chapter 2. Research design and outcomes 
This thesis is built around a qualitative analysis of the historical development of English social care 
institutions within a maturing welfare state, and an exploration of how past policy choices mediate 
current social care options, underfunding and policy inertia. A lack of policymaker action on funding 
reform, despite numerous policy reviews and recommendations, gives us reduced scope to analyse 
decisions that have been made, and suggests that adopting an institutional approach may deliver 
useful insights into non-reform and the mechanisms driving more gradual endogenous change. The 
analysis undertaken employs detailed process tracing to explore funding policy choices made and not 
made, how social care institutional structures have developed and failed to develop and how they 
constrain current policy choices. To interpret persistent funding policy inaction, the thesis utilises two 
relatively heterogeneous comparator cases where sustainable funding reforms were successfully 
implemented by policymakers, interviews, observation and document analysis. 
Chapter two sets out the rationale for the qualitative, comparative research approach adopted, 
discusses the data sources deployed, summarises the broad research outcomes generated and reflects 
on the research journey undertaken. 
1. A qualitative approach 
The desire for a deeper understanding of the drivers of social care development suggests a qualitative 
analysis of how care institutions have developed. The English welfare state is a complex of sometimes 
incoherent, overlapping institutions that have evolved over more than a century. Past decisions, path 
dependency and institutional intercurrence channel and constrain institutional and policymaker 
action. The need for welfare is global but national programmes that cater for older people can look 
very different. Society and culture shape the welfare state institutions that evolve. Once established 
the welfare state then plays a significant role in shaping society and culture. Causation operates in 
both directions and the processes involved are iterative and complicated. 
A wide variety of research techniques are employed by social science researchers. These fall into three 
broad functional categories: qualitative, quantitative and a ‘mixed methods’ combination of both 
approaches. Bryman (2012, p.35) discusses the merits of qualitative and quantitative research arguing 
that quantitative research often starts with a theory and tests it with hard empirical data, analysis 
tends to be static and often leads to generalisation. Qualitative research starts with data and grounded 
theories emerge from the empirical results. Qualitative data is considered over time, is rich, contextual 
and delivers a greater understanding of the processes at work. Hall (2016, p.31) similarly asserts that 
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quantitative approaches tend to ignore historical texture and often assume that politics is driven by 
timeless, relatively independent explanatory variables. Today’s increasingly mature, de-centering 
welfare state does, however, provide a very different policymaking setting to the golden age of post-
war centralised command-and-control welfare state development. The complexity, bidirectional 
causality and changing nature of the welfare state have led many political scientists to use a 
qualitative, historical and institutional approach to investigate developments in welfare provision over 
time (Lynch and Rhodes, 2016, p.417). 
Small-n institutional comparison 
In the past forty years English social care provision has been transformed. Despite much debate and 
many policy recommendations, today’s social care funding regime is, however, little different from 
the approach seen in the late 1970s. To explore the reasons for funding policy inertia the thesis 
compares policy drift in English social care funding with two cases of successful de-centred welfare 
funding reform elsewhere. 
Lijphart (1971, p.683) argues experimentation is the optimal research approach but that it is often not 
available to social scientists, who must rely on either statistical or comparative methods. Where 
statistical (quantitative) methods are not appropriate, as argued above, he suggests that the best 
route for analysis is the comparative method between cases. Lijphart acknowledges problems with 
this method but suggests that these can be addressed by the careful structuring of the research 
problem and using Mill’s comparative methods to isolate key explanatory variables. He goes on to 
outline a variety of case study types, ranging from descriptive studies to hypothesis generating case 
studies that seek to formulate grounded theoretical positions. With a research approach focused on 
achieving rich explanatory content and the creation of potentially generalisable outcomes, the 
institutional comparison that follows falls into the hypothesis-generating category. The desire to 
generate thick description, to have comparator cases to assess the relative performance of the English 
social care funding regime and to highlight potential explanatory variables, suggests a comparison 
between English welfare state programmes that cater for older people or an international comparison 
of social care programmes. This thesis utilises both comparative choices. Qualitative small-n 
comparison can deliver an intimacy of analysis that is not available with large-n statistical studies. 
Deep understanding of the cases is required to make the comparisons effective and the approach 
demands detailed process tracing rather than the dataset observations of regression analysis. 
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Case selection and Mill's joint method of agreement and difference 
To enhance the analytical leverage of the comparisons made, two relatively heterogeneous cases that 
feature sustainable funding reform in welfare programmes that cater for older people were sought. 
This approach to case selection allows Mill's comparative logic to be applied in two stages to control 
for most potential reform explanations and to isolate relatively few explanatory variables that are 
consistent with a failure to introduce sustainable funding in English social care and successful funding 
reform in the comparators. 
A number of international social care funding reform cases could have been chosen. The Netherlands 
introduced long-term care insurance in 1968 as did Germany in 1994, Japan in 2000 and South Korea 
in 2008. Within the UK, recent funding reforms that have improved welfare outcomes for older people 
include earnings-related pensions reform from the 1980s onwards, the ‘triple lock’ that guaranteed 
rising state pensions from 2011, and the introduction of universal general taxation funded personal 
care in Scotland in 2002. English social care is a case of long-run policy inaction where post golden age 
policymakers are actively (and unsuccessfully) looking for sustainable funding reforms. So, successful 
cases of sustainable, post golden age welfare funding reform were sought as comparators, 
benchmarks and potential reform implementation templates for English social care. It was also noted 
that more recent reforms would deliver fewer post-reform developmental insights. 
Having reflected on the case selection criteria, the introduction of German social long-term care 
insurance in the mid-1990s and funding reform of UK earnings-related pensions in the late 1980s were 
chosen23. All three welfare programmes (the comparators and English social care) were transformed 
in the post golden age 1980s and early 1990s. While English policymakers introduced reforms that 
outsourced most public care provision, they failed to institutionalise a sustainable funding approach. 
The two comparator cases where policymakers enacted sustainable funding allow us to explore how 
pre-existing alternative institutional arrangements and the situational aspects of policymaking 
mediate funding reform / non-reform, highlight mechanisms that have delivered sustainable 
programme funding and illustrate the long-term benefits of sustainable, predictable funding. Both 
comparator welfare programmes enjoyed successful, sustainable funding reform but they share 
relatively few common endogenous explanatory variables. The welfare cases operate in different 
countries (Germany / UK), political systems (consensus / majoritarian), public welfare funding 
 
23 The UK ‘triple lock’ pension guarantee and long-term care insurance in the Netherlands, while not selected as 
comparators, both feature mechanisms that automatically link future funding levels to future need / demand 
and are also discussed in the thesis. Free personal care in Scotland (from 2002) was a promised extension of 
future benefits that lacked an associated sustainable funding mechanism and was therefore not selected.  
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traditions (de-centred social insurance / centralised general taxation), welfare state types 
(conservative / liberal) and are focused on different welfare programmes (social care / earnings-
related pensions). 
Using process tracing and Mill's method of agreement allows us to highlight common explanatory 
variables that are consistent with sustainable funding reform in both of the comparators24. As the two 
welfare cases are quite different the common variables generated are focused on exogenous 
environmental factors (these include neoliberalism, population ageing and the rising relative cost of 
services over time – the Baumol effect (Baumol, 2012, p.4)), drawing on multiple streams analysis, 
political calculus variables around the reform decision itself (a problem that relevant policymakers 
perceive needs to be resolved, policy consensus amongst relevant policymakers and political 
opportunity) and an already available alternative funding institution consistent with the belief systems 
of the relevant policymakers and popular with citizens. 
Having generated a set of explanatory variables consistent with sustainable funding reform, the thesis 
then uses Mill's method of difference and process tracing to isolate explanatory variables that are 
common to the successful funding reform cases but are not present in the non-reforming English social 
care case. This approach focuses our analysis on reform event variables within the cases themselves 
and the availability of an alternative funding institution, as the exogenous explanatory variables 
(environmental factors like neoliberalism or population ageing) are common to all three cases so can't 
explain funding reform variation. 
We can define this approach as follows. 
Set A – explanatory variables consistent with German social care funding outcomes (1990s) 
Set B – explanatory variables consistent with UK pension funding outcomes (1980s) 
Set C – explanatory variables consistent with English social care funding outcomes (Today25) 
We are looking for explanatory variables that are common in Set A and Set B (i.e. variables that are 
consistent with funding reform) and different in Set C. 
Using Mill’s method of agreement and process tracing, we create a set of explanatory variables 
consistent with funding reform in the comparator cases. This is the intersection of sets A and B. 
 
24 This comparison between the two comparator cases is documented in chapter four. 
25 The thesis analyses English social care funding explanatory variables in 2019 and also considers how the 
variables have developed (and failed to develop) since the 1980s. 
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Counterfactual explanatory variables set = A ∩ B 
Then using Mill’s method of difference and process tracing, we isolate explanatory variables that are 
consistent with funding reform in the relatively heterogeneous comparator cases and are not present 
in the English social care funding case. This is the set difference of C in (A ∩ B) and is defined and 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. 
Drivers of funding reform explanatory variables set = (A ∩ B) \ C 
Figure 1. Drivers of funding reform explanatory variables 
 
 
2. Data sources 
The thesis employs three primary data collection approaches to better understand how the historical 
development of social care funding institutions and the wider welfare state mediate current policy 
choices, the fragmented nature of care funding and provision, the operational realities of social care 
funding by local government and ways in which local councils, care providers, the National Health 
Service and housing associations work with each other and with central government; these are elite 
interviews, observation (with engagement) and document analysis. 
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Tansey (2007, p.766) argues that elite interviews can be used to corroborate evidence from other 
sources, demonstrate how key individuals interpret processes and decisions made, and to fill gaps 
where documents are not available.  Here elite semi-structured interviews are used to support 
secondary and statistical data, explore relationships between care institutions and local and central 
government and better understand how ‘wicked’ problems with the English social care regime have 
helped perpetuate systemic underfunding and reduced the scope for funding reform. Interviews were 
conducted with senior staff working in care provision, local councils, care commentators interested in 
social care funding and provision, a former senior Department of Health civil servant and a Member 
of Parliament who is a member of the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select 
Committee. Interviewees were sourced using targeted non-probability (snowball) sampling. Each 
interviewee was sent a bespoke ‘agenda’ in advance, interviews were between one and two hours in 
length and in some cases extended over two or more meetings. Interview notes or recordings were 
generated and used to prepare detailed transcripts that were shared with interviewees and revised to 
include any follow up comments. This generated rich interview data and led to a variation in research 
approach which is discussed later in the chapter. 
The research programme also involved engagement with a Local Government Association fair funding 
event where council finance managers discussed the current and new local government funding 
models at length, a strategic forum for community assets and social enterprises and observing the 
Citizens’ Assembly on Social Care (Involve, 2018) which was convened as part of a joint inquiry into 
the funding of adult social care by the House of Commons Housing, Communities and Local 
Government Committee and the Health and Social Care Committee (House of Commons, 2018). 
Wesley (2014, p.142) argues qualitative document analysis delivers valuable research insights when 
the analysis undertaken accurately represents documents that are both useful and reliable. In January 
2018, the joint inquiry into the funding of adult social care generated a large number of potentially 
useful, reliable documents when written submissions were invited to propose how social care could 
be sustainably funded for the long-term and how a public and political consensus on funding policy 
change might best be achieved26. Submissions received by the inquiry were reviewed, aggregated and 
used to generate policy community summaries by organisational type. Social care funding discussions 
with a local councillor and former member of the council executive also centred on policy 
deliberations around the council budget reference document which was analysed in depth. Other 
 
26 The inquiry received 178 written policy community submissions from associations and trade bodies, care 
providers, carer and care staff organisations, individuals, local councils, interest groups and charities, 
professional bodies and public bodies. 
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primary sources include Labour and Conservative party manifestoes, UK government white and green 
papers, House of Commons and House of Lords committee reports, Royal Commission reports and 
policy papers published by various organisations. Statistical data has been drawn from the 
Department of Work and Pensions, German Federal Health Monitoring System, Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Laing Buisson, National Health Service Digital, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Office for National Statistics and the World Bank. Secondary sources include academic 
journal articles, books, working papers, conference papers, newspaper articles, PhD theses and 
conversations with academics and commentators with an interest in social care funding reform. 
3. Research outcomes 
Broad research themes that emerged from the interviews, observations and document analysis 
undertaken are detailed below27. These focus on how persistent policymaker inaction allowed a 
wicked funding policy problem to develop, analyse how austerity increased social care fragmentation 
and systemically damaged the existing local government funding channel (prompting a search for an 
alternative funding approach), the level of central government disengagement with how social care is 
commissioned and delivered (leaving the social care policy community driving the policy stream), and 
the lack of policymaker clarity about how English social care funding can best be reformed.  
The interview data gathered suggests that while there is widespread political support for doing 
‘something’ to make social care funding more sustainable in the long term, few working in and around 
social care expect that any significant reform is likely. A decade of austerity has damaged the ability 
of local government to improve care provision and highlighted the wicked funding problems that 
English policymakers face, but Whitehall struggles to manage or engage with those who commission 
and deliver fragmented publicly funded social care, leaving legislation and regulation as the major 
policy levers available to central government. Many of those operating in social care are wary of the 
National Health Service, suggesting that integrating health and social care budgets may not deliver 
improved social care outcomes. Observing (with engagement) a voluntary, community and social 
enterprise forum (Interviewee 028, 2018) and a ‘fair funding’ review session for local government 
finance staff (Interviewee 030, 2018) similarly demonstrated how remote central government is from 
local council strategy, spending decisions and (increasingly devolved) social care provision. On-going 
austerity has required local government to move from care provision to care commissioning to (where 
practicable) facilitating care by community assets. This transition has further fragmented provision 
 
27 Individual inquiry submissions and interviews are cited in the analysis of the development of English social 
care in chapters five and six. 
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and made it increasingly remote from central government. Local government is also keen to minimise 
funding hypothecation to maximise operational flexibility. This led to a “bonfire of ringfenced funding” 
(Interviewee 030, 2018) that gave councils greater scope to reallocate funding and further reduced 
central government influence over their spending decisions. 
To better understand how the social care policy community views the current social care environment, 
submissions to the joint inquiry into the funding of adult social care (House of Commons, 2018) were 
analysed and coded. It is clear that many of those who submitted are deeply concerned about 
persistent policymaker inaction, arguing there is a real disconnect between those operating within the 
care system, the concerns of policymakers (who are characterised by some as being more focused on 
the negative impact of higher taxes) and, often disengaged, citizens. Many also suggest that, if not 
consensus, reasonably broad political agreement and cross-party working is desirable to deliver the 
staged, systemic funding reform process that will be needed across more than one parliament (King’s 
Fund, 2018). The submissions highlight a growing care gap, per capita public funding levels that have 
fallen below the ‘fair’ cost of care (which undermines market sustainability, investment and 
innovation), a lack of support for family and friends who are carers, and care staff who are underpaid, 
marginalised and lacking development opportunities. There is a widespread desire for a sustainable, 
predictable, easy to understand and explain, long-term funding solution for social care that will link 
levels of future provision with demand, an appreciation (amongst those who have engaged with how 
reforms might be implemented) that the mechanisms to deliver such a system have yet to be created, 
and a feeling that policymakers need to have an honest and open debate with the public about the 
importance (and cost) of well-funded social care. 
4. The research journey 
The analytical approach employed in this thesis evolved as the research programme engaged with the 
three selected case studies. Initially the explanatory focus was historical institutionalism, drawing on 
punctuated equilibrium, critical junctures and retrenchment theory. With persistent policy inertia,  
despite a clear care funding problem and an expressed preference amongst English policymakers (and 
the wider policy community) for funding reform, it became apparent that combining an analytical 
framework that predicted path-dependent policy equilibrium with the situational decision making 
insights of the multiple streams approach (Spohr, 2016, p.257) could deliver valuable insights into why 
choosing care funding path departure has been so difficult for policymakers. 
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The research approach was also revised as the thesis developed. Having settled on historical 
institutionalism and scoped the project, qualitative case comparison and elite interviews were chosen 
as the primary research methods. The interviews began with members of the wider social care 
community to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the funding problem and then moved on 
to commentators and central government policymakers. Having interviewed two social care 
commentators (Interviewee 023, 2018; Interviewee 029, 2018), a former senior civil servant 
(Interviewee 026, 2018), an engaged MP (Interviewee 031, 2018) and presented to (and answered 
questions posed by) a group of engaged MPs (Glendinning and Wills, 2018b) it became increasingly 
apparent that those interviewed believe that sustainable social care funding reform is blocked in the 
policy stream. Solutions proposed by policymakers often fail to take account of the historically 
embedded complexities of the English social care system and the wicked dynamics of social care 
funding that their long-term disengagement has allowed to develop. This means that “there are no 
clear solutions and no quick fixes” (Interviewee 023, 2018). While partisan policymakers have failed 
to broker a cross-party compromise on social care funding, reforms are not being stymied by current 
non-engagement or low issue salience, but because years of past non-engagement and blame sharing 
have created a ‘wicked’ disengaged policy environment that prospective policy entrepreneurs and 
policymakers struggle to address. To engage with these reform blocking issues, a choice was made to 
turn to an analysis of documents submitted to the joint inquiry into the funding of adult social care to 
gain a broader understanding of the systemic problems English policymakers face in the social care 
policy stream28. 
  
 
28 Spohr (2016, pp.268-269) argues path deviating reform is contingent on four factors: a new policy approach 
needs to emerge in the policy stream, the grip of any technocratic policy community that dominates the policy 
stream needs to weaken, a window of opportunity has to open and policy entrepreneurs need to act. The 
(blocked) English social care policy stream is dominated by a well-embedded policy community. An analysis of 
178 funding inquiry submissions delivered valuable insights into the structure, goals and agendas of this 
community. 
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Chapter 3. Welfare state development, maturity and the turn to de-centred 
welfare 
Two successful funding poles have emerged in the UK that deliver the levels of sustainable, long-run 
funding many policymakers and commentators argue underpin a successful welfare programme. They 
are separated by time, and neither support social care in England. In the post war golden age of 
welfare, UK policymakers created a very visible, popular, taxation-funded positive welfare state core. 
More recently, when policymakers look to address emerging welfare problems, they increasingly turn 
to non-core welfare institutions supported by de-centred, non-taxation funding. In the first analytical 
chapter of the thesis, we explore the historical development of the UK welfare state, asking why a 
very different policy approach was deemed to be more appropriate in the past, why legacy approaches 
have persisted and how new devolved welfare funding and provision solutions have emerged. 
1. Introduction 
The welfare state (public and private, visible and hidden29) is the primary mechanism by which mixed 
economies redistribute resources from those that control them to those that need them. It is also one 
of the fundamental drivers of societal growth and development. Education for all, universal 
healthcare, social insurance (for the individual) and counter-cyclical benefit spending by governments 
(for the economy) can help deliver more stable lives and economies. An effective welfare state has 
the potential to make social citizens increasingly healthy, productive and prosperous. Societies also 
need mechanisms that provide for older citizens as they become less economically active. This 
requires resources to be transferred either between generations (pay-as-you-go pensions and 
taxation funded benefits) or across time within the same generation (funded pensions). 
Developed nations faced with the requirement to provide welfare resources to those in need have 
evolved a wide variety of service delivery and funding methods, and the approaches preferred by 
policymakers have changed significantly over time. The welfare goals of the state are not achieved 
through government spending alone, and the definition of need and the scope of wealth redistribution 
have expanded over time. Welfare states have always operated in partnership with individuals and 
non-state providers and utilised a variety of indirect policy methods. These ‘hidden’ methods include 
incentivising personal provision, regulatory approaches, and the re-engineering of existing market 
 
29 Howard (1997, p.3) distinguished between the directly funded and controlled visible welfare state and the 
hidden welfare state, arguing that the visible welfare state operates in conjunction with a hidden taxation-
funded (via tax deductions) welfare state that part funds private provision and wider welfare society. 
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relationships to make outcomes more equitable. This variable welfare landscape lends itself to 
comparative cross-national analysis, and the literature suggests that welfare state objectives, 
methods of delivery, funding and resource allocation decisions are shaped by long-standing national 
institutions and cultural preferences. Once public welfare states have grown and matured, they 
develop strong institutional characteristics that make them resistant although not impervious to 
change and retrenchment. Governments are also moving towards governance approaches that may 
inhibit policy flexibility and, in many countries, a more neoliberal agenda that prefers the state to 
spend and, where possible, do less. As society ages, family structures evolve, and more women enter 
the workplace, the core public welfare state struggles to remain aligned with emerging welfare 
requirements. 
There are various approaches that we might employ to help us to explore how welfare states have 
developed from humble beginnings to become the primary area of government activity. A 
developmental approach might emphasise the ways in which capitalism drives increasing welfare 
need while undermining traditional methods of meeting that need. Myles and Quadagno (2002, p.39), 
however, assert that; 
“industrialization is not destiny … politics and political institutions matter for welfare states”. 
This is the perspective taken here. The rise of capital transformed societies, but national political 
institutions have responded with very different welfare regimes. Welfare states are a mosaic of mostly 
mature, relatively stable institutions that have developed over time with often very different 
conceptual and temporal underpinnings. This “non-simultaneity of origin” (Dodd and Jillson, 1994, 
p.18) is inescapable, but reduces the overall coherence of welfare provision. The process of piecemeal 
institutional development has resulted in a hybrid UK welfare state that supports older people with 
Beveridgean universal public subsistence cash benefits (the flat-rate state pension), state-guided 
private cash benefits (personal and occupational pensions), Marshallian ‘reasonable maximum’ core 
public benefits-in-kind (the National Health Service) and marginalised ‘Poor Law’ public benefits-in-
kind delivered by local councils (means-tested social care). 
Welfare states are also a major part of the political landscape, and existing universal programmes tend 
to enjoy broad public support. While popular visible welfare institutions enjoy an increasing share of 
overall public spending, structural rigidities mean that as needs change welfare states can be slow to 
reallocate resources to those most in need. Past policy decisions constrain current policy options and 
inertia, policy drift and the strength of welfare state insiders limit institutional flexibility. Entrenched 
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welfare programmes from the past can crowd out newly emerging welfare needs as welfare state 
insiders dominate welfare provision to the detriment of new claimants. 
Bonoli (2000, p.30) asserts that the welfare state policymaking literature has long focused on two core 
developmental questions: why do we have welfare states and why are they so different? He explores 
ways in which the questions have been answered and how the relative importance given to each 
question has developed as the welfare state has matured and the economic, demographic, and social 
environment have changed. In the 1960s and 1970s, as visible public welfare states developed, the 
functionalist logic of industrialisation approach (Cutright, 1965, p.547) demonstrated that 
industrialisation was associated with increased social provision and asserted that economic 
development was the key driver of welfare state expansion. As welfare states matured, attention 
turned to the significant differences that have emerged between welfare states in industrialised 
countries with similar levels of economic development. The power resources (of labour) model (Korpi, 
1983, p.4) suggested that the structure and distribution of entitlement between classes and level of 
redistribution achieved were as important as the absolute level of welfare effort when attempting to 
explain welfare state development. This school argued (and demonstrated empirically) that a 
consistently strong labour movement and electorally successful left-wing parties are associated with 
greater levels of overall public welfare effort and labour de-commodification. 
Here we ask a third developmental question: why are welfare programmes within a single welfare 
state so different? In the past twenty-five years, a comprehensive programme of institutional welfare 
state research has emerged (Lynch and Rhodes, 2016, p.419) as scholars seek to interpret an 
environment of mature welfare states, attempted retrenchment, and the power of broad 
constituencies of existing policy takers. The rise of new institutional approaches in the 1980s brought 
the study of institutions back into the mainstream of political science. Schmidt (2009, p.126) suggests 
that four valuable methodological approaches have developed following the institutional turn and can 
be deployed to explore how existing institutions mediate policy choices: rational choice, historical, 
sociological and discursive institutionalism. She argues (Schmidt, 2009, p.138) that each of these 
approaches employs a different “logic of explanation”. For rational choice institutionalism this is 
rational calculation, for sociological institutionalism it is cultural appropriateness, for discursive 
institutionalism it is coordination and communication, and for historical institutionalism it is path 
dependency. Analysis of the English social care funding case suggests that the explanatory framework 
used needs to explain policy inertia, pockets of systemic underfunding and the seemingly 
dysfunctional logic of the UK welfare state. The current social care funding approach is difficult to 
characterise as rational, culturally appropriate or well communicated or coordinated, but 
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conceptualising care institutions and funding arrangements as historically determined structures, 
practices and rules that mediate current policy choices is consistent with the English research data. 
While also considering ideational and situational explanations for reform / non-reform, we therefore 
begin our analysis by drawing on the historical institutionalist welfare state scientific research program 
(Lynch and Rhodes, 2016, p.419) that seeks to interpret an environment of mature welfare states, 
attempted retrenchment and the power of broad constituencies of existing policy takers. 
In the next section, we explore why welfare states are needed and the various welfare state types that 
have evolved across Europe. This analysis demonstrates the breadth of welfare approaches and 
objectives that emerged during the golden age ascent of welfare. A historical review of the 
development of a hybrid social democratic / liberal welfare state in the UK then provides national 
context and explores long-standing institutional and cultural issues. The importance of ideas in the 
development of welfare provision is also considered with a focus on the continuing influence of 
Beveridge. Section three argues that the visible welfare states of Europe have matured and are 
dominated by existing policy takers and analyses the impacts of attempted welfare state 
retrenchment. Finally, the chapter discusses ways in which policymakers operating under financial 
constraints and employing neoliberal policy strategies (Majone, 1997, p.140) have attempted to keep 
the welfare state relevant beyond the taxation-funded positive state core by focusing on de-centred 
regulatory welfare, state-guided private markets and outsourced provision. 
2. The developing welfare state 
For much of human history markets and the profit motive were marginal to the daily lives of most 
people. In pre-capitalist societies, almost all resource allocation was organised within the family or by 
the community. Polanyi (1944, p.108) argues that in feudal societies welfare resources passed from 
those who could generate them to those in need without recourse to the market. While critics have 
argued that such societies were very far from ideal, being profoundly unequal and undemocratic, 
where communities were broadly self-sufficient, markets (and the state) played a marginal role. 
What are welfare states for and why are they so different? 
For Polanyi welfare within the family and community are natural human processes. The creation of a 
market society and ‘free’ markets, in contrast, required concerted government action, regulation and 
the introduction of regulatory institutions. To facilitate competition and market efficiency, capitalism 
also required land and labour to be transformed into commodities that could be bought and sold. To 
achieve this goal required political action to remove or marginalise existing non-market structures 
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that would limit the efficient working of the market. The removal of these long-established welfare 
mechanisms and social structures did not, however, remove the requirement to redistribute resources 
generated to those in need. The industrial revolution generated a huge increase in wealth, but market 
society required new non-family, non-feudal mechanisms to invest in human capital and ensure that 
wealth generated flowed to those with welfare needs. Market society needed the mechanisms of the 
welfare state. 
Across the industrialising world, welfare states gradually developed to meet similar needs in a wide 
variety of countries. Until relatively recently, with the advent of EU regulatory involvement in welfare 
provision (and much else), they had not been subject to significant supranational forces that might 
cause programme convergence, so very different welfare state types emerged. These national welfare 
state types have different organisational and cultural perspectives on what a welfare state should and 
shouldn’t do and how programme outcomes should be funded and delivered. Some welfare states 
focus more on the young and some more on the old, some have a more universal, egalitarian approach 
to benefits and care given while others focus more on means-tested residual methods. Some operate 
on the premise that the state should intervene where there has been market failure, while others 
argue for active de-commodification and labour market regulation to achieve social justice. And, some 
are predominantly funded by centralised, pooled general taxation while others have long relied on de-
centred, hypothecated social insurance. 
To better understand this variation in welfare provision and funding approaches we start with Esping-
Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare (1990). The work merited a special issue in 2015 of the Journal of 
European Social Policy on the 25th anniversary of publication (Emmenegger, Kvist and Marx, 2015, p.3). 
Esping-Andersen focuses on the “fictitious” commodification of work that Polanyi (1944, pp.71-80) 
suggests is an essential factor in the development of capitalism, arguing that labour power and the 
ability of workers to forge broad alliances dictate the nature and size of the welfare state that 
emerges. 
Welfare state types 
Esping-Andersen (1990, p.47-54) asserts that the primary role of the welfare state should be to 
ameliorate the excesses of the market by creating modern welfare mechanisms that can, at least in 
part, begin to de-commodify the lives of workers. He contends that the true test of a welfare state is 
that all citizens, and not just those with significant wealth, should be able to live without recourse to 
the market. 
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Marshall (1950, p.17) argues that citizenship has developed progressively over time to encompass first 
civil, then political and increasingly social rights for all citizens. For him, welfare forms part of the social 
contract between individuals and society where citizens give up some of their freedoms in exchange 
for the protection of their social rights. All should have the right to a level of income and welfare 
provision that keeps them fully engaged with wider society, healthy and educated. Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p.21) takes this notion of broad social rights for all citizens as the defining concept of a modern, 
progressive welfare state. Where such social rights are legally enforceable, the welfare state becomes 
an active agent of de-commodification, delivering broad universal benefits to all based on citizenship 
rather than residual benefits for the unfortunate few based on need. He argues that such a regime 
should deliver welfare publicly without recourse to the market and make full employment the focus 
of economic policy, as this significantly enhances the power of workers in the labour market (Kalecki, 
1943, p.326). 
While accepting that all welfare states are hybrids that feature a variety of ways of delivering welfare, 
Esping-Andersen (1990, pp.26-29) sought ways to categorise welfare states into broad national types. 
He created a weighted index of pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance for eighteen 
developed European countries to capture the level of de-commodification achieved and found that 
states coalesced into three groups. Esping-Andersen argued that his results demonstrate that the 
evolution of the welfare state has not simply been a ‘whiggish’ (Powell and Hewitt, 2002, p.173) linear 
improvement over time, but that three very different welfare state regime types have developed. He 
terms the regimes (in order of labour de-commodification) social democratic, conservative, and 
liberal. 
Social democratic, conservative and liberal welfare states 
The Three Worlds of Welfare argues that the primary motivation behind conservative regimes, which 
includes countries such as Germany and Italy, is to reinforce and protect pre-capitalist non-market 
social structures and hierarchies. With funding that is predominantly via devolved, mandatory 
occupational social insurance with some taxation30, countries that fall into this welfare state type 
traditionally employ de-centred, non-state, non-market, pre-capitalist institutions in the delivery of 
welfare (provider institutions include the church and charitable organisations). Regimes of this type 
are corporatist and resistant to social change. The total non-family welfare effort also tends to be 
 
30 German citizens benefit from five contributory insurance funds that reduce the social risks they face by pooling 
the cost of provision. These are managed by devolved (there were 109 public health funds in January 2019), but 
highly regulated, funding organisations. The funds cover unemployment, ill health, old age, disability and long-
term care. Italian social insurance provides similar contributory benefits, but this excludes health care which has 
been funded by general taxation since 1978 following scheme insolvency in the 1970s. 
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lower than in the other two types, and the family with a male breadwinner remains a key focus of care 
provision for children and older people (Warburton and Jeppsson-Grassman, 2011, p.182). 
In contrast to conservative welfare states, liberal and social democratic regimes are more aligned with 
gradual social change, but fundamentally different in the ways in which they deliver welfare above 
the basic requirements of citizens. Esping-Andersen (1990, p.26) argues that the role and welfare state 
clientele status of the middle class is a key factor in national welfare state development. In liberal 
residualist regimes, such as the USA and Australia, the middle class tends to look to the market to 
meet their welfare needs beyond the basic level. Where the regime is a universalist social democratic 
one, with public benefits that vary to take account of past earnings, the middle class are much more 
likely to look to the state. Indeed, Esping-Andersen (1990, p.103) suggests that social democratic 
regimes deliberately use political power to crowd out private provision, designing welfare 
programmes that consciously engineer higher levels of social solidarity. While differing in the ways in 
which welfare is delivered, the liberal and Scandinavian social democratic welfare states share various 
welfare outcome traits in common. On measures of total (public and private) welfare spending, labour 
participation rates and the level of welfare de-familialisation, the social democratic and liberal welfare 
models have much in common. The dimensions of welfare state analysis on which they differ are the 
level of income redistribution achieved and the mix between private and public welfare funding and 
provision beyond a residual minimalist safety net. 
Interestingly, and not particularly surprisingly, if we view minimising the level of commodification and 
retaining the importance of de-centred, pre-capitalist social welfare institutions like families, churches 
and occupational guilds as a key aim, the conservative, corporatist welfare model is most successful 
and achieves very different outcomes to the liberal and social democratic models. Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p.13) argues that the level of industrialisation, the political power of labour and the rise of 
capitalism itself had little impact on the type of welfare state that emerged in a nation, as all these 
variables are broadly similar across most of Western Europe. His explanation for different regime 
types is focused on the availability of broad, enduring political coalitions that consistently support the 
development of the welfare state over an extended period and the ways in which the structure of past 
reforms channelled the welfare needs of the middle class and built broad social solidarity. 
National typographies obscure programme-level variation 
The typography developed by Esping-Andersen has been criticised for being focused on cash benefits 
alone (the index included unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and pensions but no benefits-in-
kind) and ignoring non-European regime types. Welfare states are also a complex of sometimes 
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contradictory welfare programmes that have evolved over time and individually may not conform to 
regime type categorisation. When Scruggs and Allan (2006, p.69) replicated the research of Esping-
Andersen, they found “little evidence of national regime coherence across … (welfare) … programmes” 
within a single welfare state. Another telling critique is that the typography focuses on the status of 
welfare state insiders to the exclusion of newly emerging potential welfare recipients. Hacker (2009, 
pp.389-390) suggests that Esping-Andersen’s approach views the welfare state as a vehicle for male 
workers to secure greater levels of social protection from the market. He argues that focusing on class 
and de-commodification de-emphasises the ways in which the welfare state can also de-familialise, 
giving women (who may wish to be commodified) a greater choice in how they live their lives, the 
importance of education services in developing human capital and the ways in which the welfare state 
provides healthcare and other services for older people. Powell and Hewitt (2002, p.38) go further 
and suggest that, in the UK context at least, the primary focus of the welfare state has not been the 
de-commodification of labour. They argue that the rise of the welfare state in the 20th century, and 
the transition from residual local provision to universal national welfare saved citizens not from the 
market but from the Poor Laws and the stigmatisation that was attached to them. For Powell and 
Hewitt, the UK welfare state de-pauperised workers. 
Various welfare state typographies were proposed after Three Worlds of Welfare was published 
(Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Korpi and Palme, 1998). These were reviewed by Arts and Gelissen (2002, 
p.155), who argue that while Abrahamson (1999, p.412) asserted that when undertaking 
“comparative studies of welfare states … (typologies) … have proven to be a very robust and 
convincing tool”, they lack a firm theoretical foundation. They do however note that alternative 
categorisations have been based on a variety of indicators to represent the underlying welfare state 
ethos and positioning, these include the overall level of welfare expenditure, family welfare 
orientation, entitlement criteria applied and the accessibility of employment for women. All arrive at 
broadly similar welfare state groupings (an additional Southern European welfare state type being the 
major change) to those proposed by Esping-Andersen, suggesting there is substance to the 
categorisation that he developed. 
The UK welfare state centralised and stabilised early 
Esping-Andersen’s analysis did, however, suggest that the UK was a developmental outlier. Having 
calculated his de-commodification index in both 1950 and 1980, the relative position of most welfare 
states remained stable, but the positioning of the UK has changed over time (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p.53-54). Starting from a relatively social democratic model of welfare provision at the start of the 
1950s (when he calculates, it had the most de-commodificatory regime in the world) the UK failed to 
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develop significantly and had drifted slowly towards a more liberal relative position before the onset 
of Thatcherism. Esping-Andersen attributes the UK’s post war social democratic status to the 
implementation of the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services that was published in 
1942. Thane (1996, p.279) concurs with his analysis arguing that throughout the golden age of post 
war growth, welfare policy in the UK remained relatively consistent with a focus on the provision of 
core universal benefits-in-kind while retaining subsistence level cash benefits. She argues that the 
Poor Law tradition of self-help with the state providing a residual safety net as the benefit provider of 
last resort is a long-standing cultural and institutional positioning of UK society and the welfare state. 
By way of illustration, many continental countries introduced public past income-related pensions, 
unemployment, and other benefits from the 1960s onwards, but this was not considered appropriate 
in the UK, and a public earnings-related pension scheme was not introduced until 1978 (other public 
past income-related benefits were not introduced in the UK). It was reformed in 1986, replaced with 
a flat-rate second pension in 2002 and abolished in 2014, before it reached programme maturity31. 
While welfare regime typographies can give a flavour of the differences in welfare states that have 
evolved, they fail to take account of the diversity of provision that has emerged between and within 
individual programmes (Comas-Herrera, Wittenberg and Pickard, 2010, p.387). In the next section, we 
explore the UK welfare state as a sometimes incoherent “political artefact” (Goodin, 1988, p.3) that is 
a product of historical evolution and compromise over an extended period. With a focus on 
programmes that cater to the needs of older people, the analysis traces the evolution of provision 
from the Poor Laws to the Beveridgean welfare state. Emphasising continuity, this suggests that the 
UK welfare state is resistant to change and shows significant variation in the scope and methods of 
welfare provision across different welfare programmes. 
The Beveridgean welfare state 
Echoing the analysis of Goodin, Thane (1996, p.278) argues that to understand the UK welfare state 
requires an appreciation of how provision has evolved over an extended period. Welfare state 
programmes are an agglomeration of enhancements that have been introduced opportunistically as 
and when support for reform from a coalition of actors has been available. For her, the Beveridgean 
welfare state draws upon a long-standing cultural and institutional commitment to collective welfare 
that can be traced back to the old Poor Laws. 
 
31 Chapter four includes further discussion of the historical development of UK pension policy. 
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The Poor Laws 
Blaug (1964, p.229) suggests that the old English Poor Laws were a local, de-centred “welfare state in 
miniature”. They raised wages when they were below the level of subsistence, paid unemployment 
benefits and supported older people. The focus of the Poor Laws was not, however, universal, focusing 
only on the destitute. Benefits were stigmatised and only available where it could be demonstrated 
that other welfare institutions (family, charity and wider society) could not provide. Payments were 
means tested using funds collected and distributed at the local parish level. Voluntary agencies 
delivered the poor relief given, and the local nature of provision meant that the level of care was highly 
variable across the country. With the onset of the industrial revolution, the Poor Law became 
increasingly expensive and provision was curtailed significantly from 1834 onwards. 
While initially keen to repeal the Poor Laws and significantly reduce the stigma associated with 
welfare, the Liberal government (1905 to 1915) compromised and chose to adopt a more evolutionary 
approach. The scope of traditional pauperised provision was reduced by moving two key policy taker 
groups to alternative non-stigmatised centrally-controlled welfare programmes. Fraser (2009, p.185) 
argues that while the reforms introduced by the Liberals were relatively modest, they were a clear 
step towards more radical welfare reforms that would emerge in the future. A non-contributory state 
pension for those aged over seventy and mandatory national insurance against sickness and 
unemployment (with contributions made by workers, employers and the state) for poorer workers 
were both introduced. Concerns that these measures would crowd out existing provision and the lack 
of delivery infrastructure led the government to work with organisations that already delivered 
welfare, such as trades unions and friendly societies to make payments32. The Treasury also insisted 
that the state pension should be a modest flat rate, non-contributory scheme for all citizens to reduce 
administration costs. Lynch (2006, pp.55-69) argues that this decision reflects an approach to welfare 
that has had far-reaching consequences on the structural age bias of the UK welfare state. 
The Beveridge Report 
In 1942, at the request of the wartime coalition government, William Beveridge chaired a report into 
welfare provision in the UK. This proposed a national insurance scheme that would deliver free (at the 
point of use) health care, unemployment, sickness and incapacity benefits, state pensions and child 
allowances. He sought to harmonise existing provision that had developed over time and to integrate 
 
32 The welfare reforms introduced by the Liberal government were built by repurposing existing institutional 
structures that were already in place and operating successfully. In the two cases of more recent sustainable 
welfare funding reform explored in chapter four, policymakers employed a similar approach to deliver welfare 
funding reform. 
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services into a coherent system of cradle to grave welfare provision that would address the great social 
ills of “want, ignorance, disease, squalor and idleness”. The recommendations of the report were 
implemented by the Attlee administration between 1945 and 1951. While Beveridge asserted that his 
reforms were evolutionary (Marshall, 1970, p.84), the healthcare and benefits delivered were 
universal. This marked a significant break with pre-war provision that was residual and targeted at the 
working class. While his report argued that welfare was a social right and that healthcare and 
education should be free to all, it sought to address want rather than inequality. Beveridge proposed 
that financial transfers should be set at subsistence level to incentivise work. While Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p.53) attributed a high relative level of de-commodification to the UK in 1950, this was not the 
stated aim of the reforms. 
The structures and concepts introduced and codified by Beveridge have been remarkably resilient. 
The UK welfare state still features free education and healthcare for all and modest universal benefits 
that are publicly funded with eligibility based on social citizenship. As Beveridge intended, where 
additional services or insurance are required, and personal funding is available, the market often 
delivers enhanced welfare. This approach can be seen most clearly in pension income layering today 
where public pensions are augmented by (incentivised, encouraged and publicly regulated) additional 
private provision33. Writing later, Beveridge (1948, p.298) argued that while some welfare benefits-in-
kind should be subject to universal state provision, others should not. He suggested that residential 
care (as distinct from National Health Service nursing care) for older people should remain a sector 
delivered by voluntary action and not be universal in scope or free at the point of use. Again, this is a 
view that has persisted. Beveridge termed long-term residential care “hotels for the old”, and this 
distinction was also made in the Sutherland Report (1999) which proposed that while nursing (and 
personal) care delivered by care homes should be funded by the state, hotel costs should be means 
tested. 
Social and demographic changes 
While there has been significant institutional continuity, Thane (1996, p.4) discusses some major 
trends in the development of the welfare state in the UK. The first is the changing role of women. They 
have moved from being predominantly benefit recipients and policy takers to being recipients, 
policymakers and active paid agents in both the public and private welfare sectors. Cribb, Disney, and 
Sibieta (2014, p.18) note that the proportion of female workers in the public sector has grown 
consistently since the mid-1970s and reached two-thirds of the workforce in 2013. This trend has been 
 
33 In contrast to private pensions, the market for social care insurance has not been incentivised by UK 
policymakers and has failed to develop. 
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replicated in the private sector, and overall labour participation rates for men and women have begun 
to converge. 
As life expectancy has increased the nature and cost of retirement has also been transformed from a 
relatively minor area of public spending into a major focus. As the cost of caring for older people 
continues to rise, policy is now turning towards their partial re-commodification. This development is 
framed as emancipatory (Altman, 2015, p.3), but raising the age at which the state pension is payable, 
abolishing the default retirement age, protecting workers from age discrimination and encouraging 
older people to stay in work or to take phased retirement all raise the overall labour participation rate 
and reduce the level of means-tested benefits payable by the state to older people. 
Figure 2. UK labour market participation rate for those over 50 (1984 to 2014) 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018) 
Figure 2 above shows UK labour market participation for older people between 1984 and 2014. The labour 
market participation rate for those over fifty was broadly flat from 1984 until 2000. After that date, it began to 
rise for all age groups with a particularly high rate of increase for those over 65 (up from 3% to 8% of the age 
group between 2001 and 2014). The relative stability in the period to 2001 was driven by falling male 
participation rates and rising participation rates for women as the two trends cancelled each other out. 
Increasing female labour market participation has been particularly pronounced in the 55 to 64 age group as the 
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pension age has been equalised between the sexes (up from 36% to 56% of women in the 55 to 64 age group 
between 1984 and 2014). 
Welfare state expansion and centralisation 
Another trend highlighted by Thane (1996, p.204) is a gradual transition (with large changes during 
both wars) from localised non-state provision towards standardised and increasingly centralised 
welfare provision. The Poor Laws required parishes to collect a poor rate and to provide relief to the 
destitute. Concern about uneven levels of welfare coverage saw this role passed first to county 
councils and then in many cases to central government. The welfare provision that remains with local 
councils is now focused on education and social care. Minimum service levels in these areas are now 
mandated by central government and the quality of services are audited by national regulators. Local 
control over primary and secondary education has been diluted with the recent introduction of 
academy schools, leaving non-academy schools, declining numbers of council houses and social and 
residential care as the residual welfare areas managed by local government. 
Finally, Thane (1996, p.277) notes that in the UK and beyond, state expansion was one of the defining 
features of the 20th century and that the growth of multiple welfare programmes was one of the major 
drivers of this expansion. When the Liberal government introduced an old age pension in 1908 it was 
a non-contributory pay-as-you-go scheme that was targeted at those who had failed to save in the 
past; the expectation was that the current (in 1908) wealthier generation would save for their 
retirement and that future pension costs would fall. Similarly, when the National Health Service was 
created in 1948, the stated expectation was that there would be a high initial cost as the backlog of 
healthcare problems was cleared but that costs would then start to fall. The reality was, without the 
price mechanism to constrain demand, costs in both cases continued to rise inexorably. 
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Figure 3. UK welfare spending as a share of GDP (1954 to 2011) 
Sources: Office for National Statistics and HM Treasury 
Figure 3 above shows the share of GDP spent by the UK government on welfare, defence, and all other areas of 
expenditure between 1953-54 and 2010-11. In this period the share of national income spent by the state rose 
from 39% of GDP to 47%. Welfare spending (defined as programmes that address the great social ills detailed in 
the Beveridge Report – social security, health care and education) enjoyed a rising proportion of the increased 
share of national income that is spent by the state. Between 1953-54 and 2010-11 the share of overall 
government spending that was directed to welfare rose from 28% to 59%. In the same period, defence spending 
fell from 23% of government spending to 6% and all other government spending fell from 48% to 36% of 
government spending. Welfare expenditure has become the primary expenditure activity of the UK government. 
Defence spending is now roughly 2% of UK GDP and the government has committed to continue to meet the 
NATO pledge to spend at least 2% of UK GDP on defence (Ministry of Defence, 2018; Fallon, 2017). There is little 
scope to cut defence spending further to fund higher welfare spending in the future. 
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The hybrid UK public welfare state 
State expansion was one of the defining features of the 20th century, and the growth of a positive, 
taxation-funded core welfare state was one of the major drivers of this expansion. The first half of the 
twentieth century saw policymakers move the focus of the UK welfare state away from local, non-
state provision towards standardised, centralised public welfare. After decades of policy consensus 
and relative stability, the past forty years have seen the direction of travel start to reverse. The long 
policy journey from devolved, local welfare towards more centralised provision created a UK public 
welfare state that is a complex of institutions delivering a broad range of cash benefits along with 
professionalised, commodified, de-familialising education, health and social care. Powell and Hewitt 
(2002, p.35) argue that the core welfare state that has emerged in the UK is a combination of 
Beveridgean universal subsistence level cash benefits and a Marshallian ‘reasonable maximum’ of 
provision for the major benefits in kind (health and education). This hybrid welfare state structure is 
broadly aligned with UK public opinion. Free education, healthcare and subsistence pensions are 
almost universally held to be social rights. The payment of benefits to working-aged adults has a much 
more ambiguous place in the public perception. While core welfare state benefits-in-kind enjoy strong 
support from policy takers, more marginal areas of welfare (such as council housing or social care for 
older people) delivered by local councils, do not always achieve the ‘reasonable maximum’ level of 
funding. This marginalisation of locally controlled welfare reflects a long-standing welfare settlement 
with greater levels of funding for centralised core benefits and less generous settlements for de-
centred, ‘Poor Law’ areas of the public welfare state (Powell and Hewitt, 2002, pp.38-39). 
3. The core welfare state – popularity, secure funding and ossification 
The visible, core welfare state that has evolved in the UK is a collection of ageing institutions that 
provide a wide range of services to the young, those of working age and the old. Most of the 
programmes that make up the core welfare state have passed through sometimes very different life 
cycles of birth in the first half of the twentieth century, development underpinned by broad popular 
support, a golden age of post war welfare provision, attempts at retrenchment to dampen rising costs 
and burgeoning public expectations of programme receipts and on into relatively stable, mature, 
policy ‘equilibrium’. When considered collectively, welfare is the major area of government activity. It 
is also an area that has long been analysed in depth. 
Pierson (1994, p.7) argues that when European welfare states were expanding in the decades of post 
war growth and reconstruction, the power of organised labour was a major driver of that expansion. 
The Keynesian bargain of full employment, a growing welfare state and the scope that this benign 
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environment gave business to achieve profitable expansion underpinned broad public support and 
political consensus. Capitalism had failed in the Great Depression and the world had descended into 
economic chaos and war, central planning and a state-led mixed economy that rewarded labour were 
in the ascendant. 
As the welfare state developed after 1945, the attitude of society towards older people evolved. Bode 
(2008) discusses the collectivisation of provision for older people and argues that the rights of all 
citizens to pensions and care in old age increasingly became seen as the responsibility of the state. 
While this trend to institutionalise retirement has been criticised as the “welfarisation of old age” 
(Bode, 2008, p.101), increasing the cradle to grave scope of the welfare state was very popular. 
Baldwin (1990, p.3) argues that this support was built on intergenerational social solidarity and a broad 
expectation of programme receipts. Welfare benefits also tend to be targeted on groups clearly in 
favour of enhanced provision while funding costs are often diffuse and unclear. 
Retrenchment (mostly) repulsed 
Taylor-Gooby (2002, p.597) argues that the Keynesian welfare state that flourished in the golden age 
of welfare relied upon stable and moderate levels of demand for welfare services. When 
unemployment began to climb in the 1970s and governments jettisoned the commitment to full 
employment, the cost of welfare started to become unsustainable. The enhanced healthcare services 
that raised labour productivity and improved the quality of life for citizens also extended life 
expectancy and contributed to an ageing population. The demand for pensions and care services for 
older people began to grow. Similarly, Richards and Smith (2002, p.59) suggest that the limits of 
government expansion began to be reached in the 1970s. The broad post war policy consensus in 
favour of a state-managed economy, led parties of all hues to attempt to outbid each other to secure 
votes. The long-standing commitment to full employment also caused the balance of power between 
organised labour and capital to be skewed towards labour as Kalecki (1943, p.324) had predicted. 
Business profitability began to fall, and the policy consensus unravelled. With the de-legitimisation of 
the Keynesian welfare state a new orthodoxy was needed that repudiated the big government 
approach. 
With the election of a UK Conservative government in 1979 that promised to roll back the state, many 
commentators expected that societal relations would be reorganised, capital would achieve 
significant gains at the expense of labour and that the welfare state would be reduced in scope. Over 
time much of society was indeed transformed, the power of organised labour declined significantly, 
nationalised industries were privatised, the commitment to full employment was dropped and the 
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share of national income going to labour fell significantly. But, the size of the welfare state continued 
to grow. Pierson (1994, p.179) argues that the expected welfare state retrenchment failed to 
materialise, despite a political environment that most observers expected to deliver programme 
reduction, because such reductions are highly controversial and very hard to deliver in areas where 
there is social solidarity and a broad expectation of programme receipts. He suggested various factors 
that underpin this welfare state resilience. Firstly, risk and loss aversion are widespread. This leads to 
a welfare spending ‘ratchet effect’ that makes it far harder to reduce spending on existing 
programmes than it is to increase spending and deliver improved services. He also notes the 
asymmetry of impact on those that benefit and those who lose directly from welfare state 
retrenchment. Secondly, existing welfare state institutions create advocacy groups that strongly 
support existing welfare provision that is targeted on current welfare state insiders (Simmons, 2002, 
p.65). The benefits of lower taxation that retrenchment might deliver are vague and even when 
realised are unlikely to be linked by taxpayers to past welfare reductions. Losses are, however, often 
immediate and impact policy-takers such as pensioners and health care professionals that may be 
deemed to be worthy of care or that are more trusted than the policymakers that propose welfare 
reductions. Finally, Pierson (1994, p.44) suggests that path dependency limits the policy options 
available to policymakers. Past governments have made policy choices and promises to current and 
potential programme beneficiaries that have an impact long into the future. Path dependency theory 
argues that where the political or financial cost of reversing current policy is high, policy reversal for 
existing beneficiaries is unlikely (Pierson; 1994, p.43, 2000, p.10). Where past policymakers have made 
binding future promises these inflexible outcomes form part of the environment that constrains 
current policymakers and the presence or absence of such path-dependent programme features may 
result in very different long-run policy outcomes. 
Public pension programmes are an example where such promises have been made. Changing pension 
policies to deny pensions that have been earned over a lifetime is likely to be very unpopular (and 
legally problematic), so once made, pension promises are usually honoured and have an impact for 
decades. Those retiring today in the UK may have built up public, personal and occupational pensions 
between the 1970s and 2020, so any recent retrenchment will have a limited impact on current 
pensioner outcomes. This protection does not, however, extend to all welfare areas. While it can take 
decades for changes in pension policy to have a significant impact on the incomes of older people, 
changes to social care policies have a much more rapid impact on policy outcomes. Where 
retrenchment measures are introduced these are likely to have an immediate impact on investment 
and to constrain on-going service levels. 
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It has also been argued that the role of business in the development of the welfare state need not be 
adversarial. Swenson (2002, p.122) suggests that large companies, with strong political connections, 
tend to pay more generous remuneration packages than smaller companies. They may also enjoy 
significant scale economies. For companies such as these, welfare reforms that require industry-wide 
collective bargaining and extend employee benefits to the staff of lower cost domestic competitors 
will make them more competitive. In countries where large established companies are dominant, a 
corporatist model may emerge where the interests of insider labour and existing entrenched capital 
are broadly aligned. Attempts at welfare retrenchment in corporatist welfare states are, therefore, 
faced with deeply entrenched interests. 
For all these reasons, and despite their neoliberal rhetoric, Pierson (1994, p.131) demonstrates that 
attempts by parties of the right to significantly reduce core public welfare provision in the face of 
broad public opposition to welfare cuts failed. While asserting that overall welfare retrenchment is 
hard to achieve, Pierson does argue that there have been cases of individual programme 
retrenchment in the UK. He documents some of these cases, suggesting that the policies employed 
are very different and deliberately less ‘democratic’ than those associated with welfare state growth. 
Welfare retrenchment is not popular, so policy strategies seek to disguise the impact of policy changes 
and, where possible, deflect blame. One strategy is to enact changes that will have little immediate 
effect but a significant long-run impact. Changing pension indexation from an earnings basis to 
inflation basis (which tends to be lower) is such a policy change. Several countries, including the UK34, 
enacted this change with little initial impact. The policy did however significantly reduce the long-run 
cost of public pensions. 
A similar strategy is to enact retrenchment but to exempt existing claimants. The recent move in the 
UK to a less generous single-tier public pension scheme saw those that had accumulated unfunded 
second-tier earnings-related pension rights (SERPS) compensated in full in cash for the loss of those 
rights. The retrenchment became less contentious as future beneficiaries had yet to accumulate any 
of the rights that were removed. Such a strategy also required the second-tier pension scheme to be 
relatively immature as was the case with the UK SERPS scheme. If the earnings-related portion of the 
state pension had matured (as is the case in many other European countries) the cost of buying out 
accumulated pension rights would have been prohibitively high. Gingrich (2011, pp.181-187) also 
 
34 The indexation of the UK state pension to the higher of inflation and average earnings was abolished in 1980 
and pensions were indexed to inflation alone. The link to earnings was restored in 2011 with the introduction of 
the triple lock pension guarantee and legislation now requires the basic pension to rise by the higher of earnings, 
inflation and 2.5% each year. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
57 
 
documents a case of blame deflection in UK residential care for older people. Following rapid growth 
in provision in the 1980s and a broad policy review in the early 1990s, the responsibility (and 
accountability) for care funding was transferred from central to local government with financial 
incentives in place that drove local government to implement gradual reductions in public care 
funding. Costs were contained and the blame for retrenchment was devolved by policymakers to 
another tier of government. 
Pierson (1994, pp.19-22) argues that these attempts at obfuscation deliberately reduce the 
accountability of decision making and use strategies that make the decisions made more complicated 
and less easy for citizens to understand. For him, this is not an appropriate way for democratic 
institutions to operate. The argument that the politics of retrenchment is inherently less democratic 
than that of welfare state expansion does, however, not address the issue of inter-generational equity. 
A government that introduces popular welfare state policies that (taking pay-as-you-go pensions as 
an example) rely upon programme lock-in and path dependency to compel large scale 
intergenerational transfers long into the future might similarly be viewed as ‘undemocratic’. On a 
more functional level, obfuscation strategies that distribute blame also increase the number of veto 
points. While this may make an initial reduction in welfare spending less politically damaging, it is 
likely to make future attempts at reform more complicated and increases welfare state inertia. 
Twenty-five years after the responsibility for all public residential and domiciliary care funding was 
consolidated under local government control, the analysis of current policymaker procrastination in 
chapter six documents a fragmented care system with around 20,000 provider organisations, 152 
unitary and county councils driving local care policy and commissioning (Sandford, 2018, p.4) and a 
remote Department of Health and Social Care (Interviewee 026, 2018) with few policy levers available. 
Retrenchment reinterpreted and welfare state drift 
Levy (2010, section 4) outlines additions to the retrenchment literature that build on the ideas of 
Pierson, grouping them into areas of disagreement and clarification. Those that disagree with 
Pierson’s analysis, argue that retrenchment has been quite large. While government spending on 
welfare has continued to rise as a share of total GDP it may not be growing sufficiently on a per capita 
basis to meet growing social spending needs. Hacker (2002, p.6), writing from a US perspective, 
persuasively argues that while overall public welfare spending may still be stable or growing, private 
and occupational welfare, which lack the broad universal nature of many public welfare programmes, 
have experienced higher levels of retrenchment. A further critique suggests that while overall 
retrenchment may have been modest, a dynamic that combines ever-growing demand for welfare 
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with constraints on welfare spending has created winners (large, popular, universal insider welfare 
programmes like pensions and healthcare) and losers (smaller, niche programmes without a broad 
current / prospective clientele that lack broad popular support such as social care for older people). 
Clayton and Pontusson (1998, p.95) argue that the popular support that underpins existing provision 
is focused on cash benefits leading to an “anti-service bias of welfare retrenchment”. 
Pierson (2011, p.22) returned to his analysis of retrenchment to consider welfare state drift. While 
noting that overall welfare spending continues to rise, and the level of core programme generosity 
and universality has remained relatively stable (Béland, Blomqvist, Andersen, Palme and Waddan, 
2014, p.752), he argues that this policy stability allied with significant levels of societal change is 
consistent with a transformation of the impact of the welfare state. Pierson suggests that existing, 
popular welfare programmes crowd out emerging welfare needs as existing welfare policy takers 
dominate provision and limit the opportunities for newly emerging, and potentially more worthy 
claimants. In this analysis the resilience of existing welfare programmes is not just a seemingly 
insurmountable problem for those that would reduce the size of the public welfare state, it is also a 
problem for those that would make it more flexible and relevant to modern welfare needs. 
Older people and the ossified welfare state 
This analysis of core welfare state maturity and inertia has focused on the unintended impacts of failed 
retrenchment. A lack of welfare state flexibility does, however, pre-date the period of welfare state 
funding constraint that began in the 1980s. Constrained funding may have highlighted welfare state 
inertia, but public welfare has long lacked the mechanisms of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 
1942, p.81) that might redirect existing welfare programme spending towards new areas of emergent 
need. In the golden age of welfare, growing levels of funding and benign demography allowed 
additional provision to be layered on top of existing provision giving an impression of welfare state 
dynamism. 
To explore longstanding public welfare state inertia we can consider the case of welfare provision for 
older people. Lynch (2006, p.15) notes that there is a wide variation in the proportion of welfare 
spending that different welfare states allocate to older people. At the most prosaic level, the variation 
in total welfare spending is driven by the proportion of the population over retirement age (Adema, 
Fron and Ladaique, 2014, p.3). While total spending on older people varies with the size of the retired 
population, it also varies significantly on a per capita basis. Lynch (2006, p.19) investigates why welfare 
spending on older people varies significantly per head (when compared to spending on younger 
people) between countries. Her cross-national comparison shows that where welfare states account 
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for a larger share of GDP they tend to have less of a per capita bias towards older people, suggesting 
that when welfare funding is limited, resources are more likely to be applied to the needs of the old. 
In the UK, the notion that older people are seen as most deserving of publicly funded benefits is 
supported by research into UK social attitudes. The 32nd British Social Attitudes study (Ormston and 
Curtice, 2015, p.74) reports that while support for taxation-funded welfare spending is in long-term 
decline (down from 63% of respondents in 2002 to 37% in 2014) and despite concern amongst 
policymakers and commentators about the intergenerational fairness of rising relative pensioner 
incomes (Corlett, 2017, pp. 3-6), when asked which benefits should be a priority retirement pensions 
remain consistently the top choice35. Having considered and discounted contemporary explanations 
(grey power, levels of family orientation, the cohesiveness of extended families and power resource 
approaches) to explain relative per capita spending differences, Lynch (2006, p.55) focuses on a 
historical path-dependent institutional explanation for the way in which intergenerational allocation 
conflicts are resolved. When early welfare states first introduced pension schemes these were either 
universal (based on citizenship) or segmented by occupational status. She finds that this original 
structure still broadly determines resource allocation between the young and old today. The research 
shows that the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the social democratic Nordic states (which all 
introduced citizen-based schemes) have the most youth orientated public welfare systems. The rest 
of Europe, Japan and the USA (where occupational schemes were introduced) have spending patterns 
that favour older citizens. 
The (lack of) evolution of the UK state retirement age reinforces the view that core features of public 
welfare provision are often historically determined and, once introduced, subject to a policy taker 
driven ratchet effect. The UK male pension age has long been resistant to change, after falling from 
70 to 65 in 1925 it remained at the same age for almost one hundred years and is scheduled to rise to 
66 in 202036. During this period expected male life expectancy at birth rose from below 60 to over 80. 
When Esping-Andersen (1990, pp.88-92) considered the early history of pensions, he noted that in the 
19th century few working men lived to be 65. Pension provision was relatively marginal and early 
schemes were not designed to replace employment, as older people continued to work after they 
reached 65, but to compensate for the reduced productivity of the old. Employers would provide 
sheltered work for older people and family would provide supplementary income and wealthier 
workers joined private friendly societies. The world of work and retirement today are radically 
 
35 While pensions (and benefits for disabled people) are popular welfare programmes with the British public, 
unemployment benefit and benefits for single parents are not seen as spending priorities (Ormston and Curtice, 
2015, p.81). 
36 The state pension age for men and women will rise from 65 to 66 between December 2018 and October 2020. 
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different. Despite huge changes to the nature of retirement, the retirement age has remained a long-
standing constant. 
Sustainable taxation-funded welfare for the past 
Public welfare state retrenchment in the UK since 1980 has been more modest than many 
commentators expected. Welfare state funding constraints exist, but major taxation-funded benefit 
programmes, particularly those that are universal in nature, continue to enjoy broad popular support 
from current and potential programme beneficiaries, and policymakers are often unable to 
significantly reduce their scope. This welfare ratchet effect means that existing core public benefit 
outcomes tend to be secure, although protections are lower for niche programmes that lack broad 
popular support or a significant clientele. We also no longer live in 1980. The labour market, family 
relationships and the number of old and very old people have changed significantly in the past four 
decades. Popular support for existing welfare state institutions and benefits can block attempts to 
reduce current provision but also, when changes are needed, welfare inertia inhibits policy flexibility. 
While neoliberal policymakers have mostly failed to reverse golden age welfare policy outcomes, they 
have often been able to block the evolution of new general taxation funded welfare state programmes 
that might increase the relevance, scope, scale and cost of public welfare. 
This dynamic leaves us with the prospect of an ossified welfare state ‘equilibrium’ where public 
welfare institutions and policies match the needs of the past but fail to evolve to address the needs of 
today. While popular support for existing programmes makes welfare retrenchment hard for 
governments to achieve, the strength of support does not always extend to how programmes are 
delivered. This suggests that there is scope for supply-side reforms that change how welfare outcomes 
are provided and funded. Overall societal welfare effort is also about more than just public provision. 
In the next section we consider the growing role of markets in the public welfare state and how 
policymakers have ameliorated the financial constraints they face by first repurposing and then 
steering pre-existing, non-public provision and funding institutions to deliver the welfare flexibility 
that the positive provider state is unwilling or unable to achieve directly. 
4. The hidden de-centred rescue of the core welfare state 
In the previous section of the chapter we considered the welfare state retrenchment literature and 
argued that over time, while spending on visible public welfare has continued to rise, the existing 
taxation-funded welfare state lacks mechanisms to pivot spending towards areas of growing need that 
sit outside the delineated core. To address policy drift and remain relevant, the welfare state needs 
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alternative policy instruments that allow the national welfare effort to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Here we consider strategies that policymakers have employed to address this lack of 
adaptability and to manage on-going welfare state cost pressures (Baumol, 2012, p.4). These hidden, 
non-public / non-taxation welfare approaches seek to repurpose, manage and regulate the welfare 
decision making of individuals, communities and private organisations and make use of structured 
partnerships between the public and private sectors. 
After decades of UK public welfare state growth and increasing centralisation, Gilbert (2002, p.4) 
argues that the welfare state is starting to move away from universal welfare provision towards 
becoming an “enabling state” where subsidies, regulation and the re-engineering of welfare incentive 
structures are used by policymakers to ‘encourage’ citizens into purchasing welfare products. In the 
pages that follow, we discuss the role played by the non-public welfare state, moves towards a welfare 
state that makes greater use of regulation and publicly managed private provision and ways in which 
policymakers have employed structured internal markets in an attempt to make public welfare more 
relevant and cost-effective. 
Non-public welfare 
The ways in which private welfare provision and social rights that are met publicly are interwoven is a 
defining feature of national welfare regimes. When Esping-Andersen (1990, p.87) analysed public and 
occupational pension systems in eighteen developed countries, he found that all bar one (the UK was 
again a hybrid outlier) conform to one of three public-private pension mix models: a conservative state 
dominated group focused around devolved public provision, residual state pensions in liberal regime 
countries where devolved private pensions prevail and universal, centralised state dominated 
provision in social democratic regimes. In this analysis, UK pension provision combines a Beveridgean 
universal flat-rate state pension with a significant level of devolved private provision. With the UK 
situated between Esping-Andresen’s liberal and social democratic regimes, a pluralist public / private 
pension funding mix is a long-standing institutional feature in the UK with strong growth in private 
occupational pension plans occurring between the First and Second World Wars. 
While the public welfare state grew hugely in size and scope in the twentieth century, in all welfare 
regimes it remains one element in the mix of societal welfare delivery. Despite the continued 
importance of non-public welfare, Hacker (2002, p.7) asserts that much of the literature relating to 
welfare spending is focused on public welfare. He notes that the private welfare state is a large and 
growing part of the total welfare effort, and argues that where we ignore private provision we miss a 
key area of welfare activity. Similarly, Rose and Shiratori (1986, p.13) discuss welfare pluralism, 
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arguing that despite the growth of public welfare provision, the state is not a monopoly provider and 
the individual and family remain a major focal point of welfare decision making. Welfare delivery is 
provided and funded by a combination of actors. These include the individual, family, third sector 
groups, private and occupational sources as well as the state. The mix of public and private welfare 
provision employed also varies considerably across countries and between programmes. While US 
healthcare is delivered and mostly funded privately, in the UK it is universal in scope, predominantly 
delivered by the state and funded by general taxation. English social care is however very different, 
mostly being delivered and often funded privately. The public / private mix variation has a major 
impact on how programmes are designed, their redistributive effect and the degree of universality of 
welfare coverage that is achieved within individual programmes. While much of the discussion in the 
literature is focused on welfare at the national or institutional level, Rose and Shiratori (1986, p.16) 
discuss welfare provision from the individual perspective. They argue that the variation in mix 
experienced by individuals is also driven by cultural factors, the availability of welfare programmes 
that they might utilise, household (and state) finances and the age of the individual involved. Drawing 
on the experience of Japan, where formal welfare expenditure is relatively low, they also suggest that 
the level of overall public spending is not always a good guide to the quality of welfare outcomes that 
are achieved. 
Adema et al. (2014, p.7) agree with Hacker (2002, p.12) that focusing on public welfare spending as a 
share of GDP is a misleading measure of the national welfare effort as this ignores private welfare 
provision and the impact of fiscal welfare. While private social spending amounted to 3.2% of GDP 
across all OECD countries in 2009, such provision is not evenly distributed with the US relying much 
more heavily on private social spending, particularly in healthcare. A second key area they highlight is 
taxation policy, noting that the level of direct and indirect taxation paid by benefit recipients varies 
significantly between welfare state regimes. More liberal countries such as the US and UK collect 
relatively low levels of such taxes from benefit recipients while social democratic regime states such 
as Sweden and Denmark collect significantly higher levels. Once account has been taken of private 
welfare spending and the cost of fiscal welfare, we see a convergence of welfare spending levels. 
Adema et al. (2014, pp.14-15) rank thirty OECD countries by gross public social expenditure and by 
total net social expenditure (which includes private social spending and the net impact of fiscal 
welfare). These calculations suggest that while the US has relatively low public social spending as a 
percentage of GDP (23rd out of 30 nations), in overall societal welfare spend it is second only to France. 
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Regulatory welfare 
Having noted the continued importance of non-public welfare spending, we turn to an analysis of ways 
in which policymakers have sought to re-purpose, manage and regulate the non-public welfare choices 
made by individuals, families and private organisations to achieve desired outcomes. When 
investigating welfare state policymaking, the focus is often on visible public areas of welfare provision 
such as cash transfer payments and the direct provision of welfare services. Both these traditional 
welfare channels redistribute wealth after it has been generated and, in the UK, are funded via current 
tax revenues. Here we consider a second group of policy instruments that are less clearly identified as 
welfare state mechanisms. These include regulation and pre-distribution policies that target specific 
welfare issues, directly impact the workings of the private economy and alter the resource share that 
it generates (such as legislating for a minimum wage, requiring employers to offer and fund auto-
enrolment pensions, equalising the retirement age for men and women and actively promoting age 
diversity) and fiscal welfare that incentivises private individuals to make their own welfare provision 
rather than relying on the state (such as tax incentives that encourage individuals to save for their 
retirement). 
Mabbett (2013b, pp.216-218) argues that a significant portion of the overall welfare effort is achieved 
via such non-public approaches. Labour market regulation is an area where the state uses legal 
mechanisms to achieve welfare objectives by managing the scope of private sector action. Such a 
regulatory approach is not a new phenomenon. Regulations prohibiting child labour and requiring 
children to attend school have long sought to address the inability of markets to develop human 
capital. A regulatory approach can also be used to ‘privatise’ existing welfare expenditures incurred 
by the state. The Conservative government recently reduced working tax credits while raising the 
minimum wage, a move that effectively transferred a portion of the cost of existing benefit payments 
from the public to the private sphere (Giles, 2015). The regulatory welfare mechanisms employed by 
policymakers are often linked to employment, which provides a ready, sustainable funding source, 
and involve the state incentivising the decision making of individuals and re-engineering existing 
market relationships to achieve welfare state goals during the wealth generation process. Once 
markets structures have been reformed, they can then be steered by regulators37. 
 
37 Mabbett (2013b, p.216) notes that the privatisation of UK public utilities required the creation of agencies 
staffed by technocrats to ensure privatised companies did not abuse their market dominance. When welfare 
states began to contract out services this pre-existing market managing bureaucracy was used to facilitate the 
introduction of regulated markets within the welfare state. In England, this remains a contested move away 
from the state funding and delivering welfare, but in countries such as Germany health and social care have long 
been provided by (usually non-profit) third-party organisations. 
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In the late 1990s, Majone (1997) developed an influential regulatory state conceptualisation to 
interpret governance changes in European nation states. He argued that decades of increasing 
competition and economic integration had significantly reduced the scope for national policymakers 
to use fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy to steer and fund policy outcomes (Majone, 1997, 
p.140). Majone made a clear distinction between the traditional tax-and-spend, positive state where 
the focus of policymaking was economic stability and wealth redistribution, and the emerging 
European regulatory state where the governance role of individual states was much diminished, and 
the policy focus was limited to correcting market failure (Majone, 1997, p.143). Moran (2003, pp.2-5) 
and Levi-Faur (2011, pp. 27-29) agree that Majone’s regulatory state analysis has significant 
explanatory power but argue that the concept can be employed more widely to analyse policy 
responses to constraints on policymaker agency in an era of globalisation, increased demand for public 
services and a neoliberal impulse to contain the size of the state. They suggest that the regulatory 
state need not be a neoliberal construct, a position consistent with the pre-distribution agenda that 
argues for regulation to directly address the causes of inequality rather than using the welfare state 
to treat symptoms (Chwalisz and Diamond, 2015, p.1). Moran also argues that far from diminishing 
the role of government, the rise of a UK regulatory state has broadened democratic accountability, 
modernised / replaced private self-regulation and increased the domain of state control. 
Managed welfare markets 
Having explored how policymakers have embraced regulation to guide private welfare institutions and 
individual behaviours and outcomes, we complete the chapter by considering approaches that 
policymakers have employed to structure non-public welfare markets to deliver their objectives. The 
regulatory state described by Majone, Moran and Levi-Faur promotes public regulation of individual 
action and private provision. Policymakers in the UK have gone beyond regulation, developing 
alternative funding approaches that are bespoke, institutionally specific and built by repurposing 
existing market relationships and institutional structures. Once in place these re-engineered markets, 
funding sources and regulatory institutions give policymakers and their regulators significant levers 
that they can use to guide future welfare outcomes. 
Gingrich (2011, pp.3-7) argues that these managed welfare markets can be designed by policymakers 
in strategic ways to achieve very different goals (depending on the objectives of policymakers) by 
manipulating the degree of market power held by service users, service providers and the state itself. 
She suggests that engineered markets can reduce the power of existing public service providers, make 
welfare delivery more efficient, raise service quality, increase consumer choice, control costs and 
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deliver more appropriate services (although not all objectives can be achieved at once). Markets also 
offer scope to transfer both funding and provision from the public to the private sphere. Perhaps the 
clearest example of the rise of managed non-public welfare markets in the UK is pension policy. In the 
past thirty years there has been a significant shift towards private pension saving in the UK (Mabbett, 
2013a). A radical change in the public / private welfare mix was a major policy goal of the Thatcher 
administration (Jacobs, 2008) and the results of policy changes made in the 1980s can be seen today 
in a rising proportion of pensioner income that comes from private sources. Despite the Conservative 
goal of reducing state control, attempts by successive governments to promote secure pension 
layering amongst citizens have led to increasing levels of public regulation of private pension markets. 
There are a variety of ways in which the state can move from predominantly state originated, funded 
and delivered welfare provision towards more mixed provision, but all tend to require an extension of 
state regulatory and legal powers. Possible approaches include the outsourcing of existing publicly 
delivered welfare services with external provision monitored and regulated by the state, the 
regulation (or extension of the regulation) of existing private providers and the contracting out or 
franchising of welfare provision. Mabbett suggests that the UK Kitemark pension scheme (now the 
Pension Quality Mark that guarantees high ‘quality’ pensions with relatively low charges) was an 
example of the UK government acting as a franchisor to the private welfare state. The state was deeply 
involved in the creation of a private sector pension product and the product itself was backed by 
government guarantees. Hacker (2002, p.10) similarly argues that while corporate benefits and direct 
individual welfare spending are deemed to be private, in an analysis that echoes Polanyi’s (1944, p.71) 
view that the creation of a market society requires concerted government action and regulation, 
governments are usually deeply involved in private welfare provision and private welfare markets are 
often created and managed by government policies. 
Mabbett (2012, p.125) also notes that behavioural economics offers “a new set of public policy options 
in liberal market economies”. While auto-enrolment in the USA, saw policymakers nudging citizens 
towards greater pension saving, she suggests that UK auto-enrolment pensions are publicly driven and 
are “more of a shove”. While UK employers are legally obliged to enrol their employees in a workplace 
pension scheme and must make matching employer contributions, employees can opt out. The default 
choice is however scheme membership and employees must make an active choice not to save for 
their retirement every three years. The scheme is popular and the opt-out provisions, while exercised 
by fewer than 10% of eligible employees (Espadinha, 2018), allow the scheme to be framed as an 
‘encouraged’, individual choice (NEST, 2015, pp.16-26). As a large proportion of future pensioners in 
the UK are likely to receive means-tested benefits on top of the basic state pension, this approach 
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sees policymakers engineering a move away from taxation funded benefits towards publicly managed 
private pension markets. 
Achieving welfare state goals during the wealth generation process 
Policymakers have long used fiscal welfare and public regulation of individual behaviour and private 
markets to bridge gaps between core welfare state provision and the welfare needs of citizens38. The 
use of these non-public welfare policy instruments has however increased significantly in recent 
decades. When Mann (2006, p.77) explores the development of welfare marketisation, he argues that 
UK pensioners are being ‘encouraged’ to move from being “passive welfare dependents” to consumer-
citizens that actively manage their own retirement. In policy areas such as pensions and the statutory 
minimum wage, the UK government has employed a regulatory approach to transfer part of the cost 
of current and future income support from the state to individuals and the private sector. The 
introduction of markets into existing state provision has also been used to reduce the per capita cost 
of welfare by outsourcing and to ‘share’ the welfare burden with individuals and the private sector. 
There are, however, UK welfare programmes which fall outside the core welfare state and where this 
combination of marketisation, regulation and fiscal welfare have either not been attempted by 
policymakers or have proved to be ineffective. While policy areas like pension saving lend themselves 
to layered private provision on top of a public basic state pension, other parts of the welfare state, 
such as social care do not. In such areas, where the public welfare state fails to deliver sustainable 
programme funding and non-public welfare policy options are not seen as a viable option by 
policymakers, funding and policy outcomes are likely to be less favourable. 
5. All welfare programmes are not created equal 
The hybrid liberal for most cash benefits / social-democratic for most services, apart from residual 
‘Poor Law’ elements like social care, (Powell and Hewitt, 2002, p.182; Esping-Anderson, 1990) UK 
welfare state is a mosaic of sometimes contradictory institutions that have evolved over more than a 
century to meet the welfare and human capital development needs of society. All societies need 
mechanisms to allocate resources to those in need, and this allocation is not something that non-
guided markets can readily achieve. While the welfare state was shaped by pre-existing society, 
culture and institutions, society has been comprehensively transformed by services delivered by the 
 
38 A former Department of Health Civil Servant (Interviewee 026, 2018) argues the divide between local and 
central government is wide and that central government also uses a regulatory state approach to ‘guide’ council 
activity. 
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welfare state. Historically, the core public welfare state was also a centralising, standardising force in 
the UK, with most welfare provision moving from parish to council to central government. While this 
process improved welfare coverage, it required growing levels of taxation-funded public expenditure, 
reduced local flexibility and marginalised those welfare areas that remained within local government 
control39. 
In the golden post-war age of welfare, UK policymakers made often unfunded welfare state promises 
that have, despite the expectations of many commentators, broadly been kept. The visible, popular, 
taxation-funded UK core welfare state is resilient, and despite attempted retrenchment the ideas and 
institutional structures codified and espoused by Beveridge (1942) remain strong, and the contours of 
the core public welfare state are aligned with his thinking. The resonance of past policy decisions does, 
however, limit current policy options, and inertia, policy drift and the strength of welfare state insiders 
limit institutional flexibility. Once institutions are created and embedded in the fabric of the welfare 
state, they are hard to reform. 
As the welfare state has matured and policymakers have adopted neoliberal policy strategies, growing 
financial constraints on publicly funded welfare and broad popular support for existing provision have 
limited the opportunities for deserving welfare state outsider programmes to achieve increased levels 
of public welfare provision as entrenched programmes from the past crowd out newly emerging 
welfare needs. New post golden age taxation-funded welfare programmes have been vanishingly rare, 
so policymakers have increasingly turned to de-centred, non-public policies that employ regulation, 
fiscal welfare, and the ideas of behavioural economics to fill the gaps that open between core welfare 
programmes and the emerging welfare needs of citizens. Welfare goals have never been achieved by 
governments alone, and policymakers increasingly look to improve welfare outcomes by guiding the 
choices made by individuals and non-state providers. 
The direction of travel for the welfare state may have changed, but a complex of legacy welfare 
programmes with very different objectives, founding missions and funding approaches remain 
embedded in the fabric of the welfare state. Once created, programme change tends to be rare and 
slow, so once reforms have been secured, they tend to persist. The public welfare state has settled on 
 
39 UK social care for older people is a marginal welfare institution that never made the move to the centrally 
funded welfare state core. 
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a relatively stable, little punctuated40, collection of welfare institutions41 leaving non-public welfare to 
fill emergent gaps, a dynamic that has left the UK with some quite distinct welfare state funding 
approaches. Some institutions never really escaped the marginal, de-centred, local council funded 
Poor Law tradition (social care), more reside in the more generously funded, legacy positive welfare 
state (the basic state pension and the National Health Service) and others have been created in the 
post golden age of regulatory welfare where the state prefers to steer third party activity rather than 
row (minimum wage, student loans and private auto-enrolment pensions)42. 
The legacy core public welfare state and more recent devolved, non-core welfare approaches 
discussed in this chapter are both underpinned by sustainable funding approaches. Programmes that 
fall within these two welfare funding poles have fared relatively well during the period of austerity 
that followed the Great Recession. Social care in the UK is funded by local government which lacks 
structural funding supports and has been badly impacted by austerity leading to calls for a more 
sustainable financing approach. With a move towards the welfare state core politically and technically 
problematic, policymakers have discussed new sustainable, de-centred regulatory funding approaches 
but no reforms have been introduced. Elsewhere such approaches have been enacted in marginal 
policy areas where new funding institutions were politically feasible and where alternative 
institutional structures already existed. To better understand how sustainable funding reform was 
achieved, in the next chapter we analyse two cases (one predominantly public and the other mostly 
private) where devolved, non-taxation funding reforms were successfully introduced by policymakers. 
In both cases there were significant antecedent conditions that made reform more likely. 
  
 
40 While institutions within the welfare state core have tended to suffer lower retrenchment than those outside, 
there have been cases of core benefit retrenchment. Examples include the 1980s transition from universal NHS 
geriatric beds to means-tested private care provision (discussed in chapter five) and reductions in the value / 
scope of some (non-pension) cash benefits. These cases suggest that the retrenchability of core welfare 
programmes does vary with institutional (and other) factors and programme salience (Ormston and Curtice, 
2015, p.81). There have also been periods where non-core institutions have enjoyed sustained funding growth 
(the Labour government increased English local government commissioned social care spending by 5% a year 
throughout the 2000s (Simpson, 2017, p.4)). 
41 Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p.22) predict long-run policy stability, but argue that “much of the political 
world is never at equilibrium” with the multiple, different ‘points of stability’ seen in the UK welfare state 
“created and (potentially) destroyed during (infrequent) critical junctures” as new issues develop. 
42 Over more than a century, the direction of travel for the UK welfare state transitioned from conservative, 
local, devolved welfare in the 19th century towards centralised, state provided social democratic welfare in the 
golden age and has increasingly turned towards liberal devolved (with central regulation) welfare today. The 
German conservative welfare state has retained a conservative devolved (with central regulation) approach 
throughout. 
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Chapter 4. De-centred welfare with sustainable funding 
The first analytical chapter of the thesis argued that the UK welfare state has added vanishingly few 
new taxation-funded welfare programmes in recent decades and is focused on existing policy takers. 
Where new welfare needs emerge, policymakers have increasingly employed neoliberal policy 
strategies and turned to non-core, de-centred welfare approaches to fill welfare gaps. Demand for 
significant levels of formal, non-family social care emerged relatively recently in England, and this 
increased need has not been adequately addressed by the core welfare state. While the privatisation 
ideology of the 1980s facilitated the marketisation of social care delivery and the development of a 
policy community around care providers and commissioning organisations, alternative devolved 
public or private funding institutions were not introduced or encouraged, and social care lacks 
sustainable funding. To better understand why alternative care funding approaches have not been 
introduced, chapter four starts by analysing two welfare programmes for older people where 
sustainable funding has been successfully enacted. The chapter also charts how sustainable funding 
can develop over time and isolates explanatory variables consistent with funding reform, arguing that 
change was possible in the comparator cases because ready-made, popular, preferred funding 
institutions were available and guided the politics of organisational change when a critical juncture 
opened and the relevant policymakers were looking for an alternative, devolved and sustainable 
funding approach. 
1. Solutions looking for problems 
As the debate around the long-promised social care green paper has developed there have been 
numerous calls for a sustainable funding approach. There is, however, a lack of agreement about 
what this means and how sustainable funding might best be achieved. In chapter four, we explore 
two successful, but very different welfare reform cases where policymakers engineered new, 
sustainable funding institutions designed to support the long-run welfare needs of older people. 
The introduction of German long-term care insurance in 1994, with broad cross-party support, 
saw the creation of a sustainable mostly public welfare funding institution that complemented 
the existing regional government, taxation-funded approach. By contrast, the Conservative partial 
dismantling of UK public earnings-related pensions in the late 1980s was a move towards greater 
private provision and strongly opposed by opposition parties. What both reforms shared was a 
clear path to a new devolved funding solution built using existing institutional solutions that was 
better aligned with a de-centred approach to welfare than the existing, relatively underdeveloped, 
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“point of stability” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, p.22). Both reforms institutionalised sustainable, 
non-taxation, programme-specific welfare funding. These two relatively heterogeneous comparator 
cases contribute to the research project in various ways. Firstly, the chapter explores the 
development of two social care funding reform options (German-style public social insurance and 
UK private auto-enrolment pensions) that are being considered by policymakers in England 
(Espadinha, 2018; Malnick, 2018; HC 2017-18, HC768, pp.3-5). Secondly, the cases allow us to use 
process tracing and Mill’s method of agreement to generate a set of explanatory variables 
consistent with successful funding reform in two heterogeneous comparators. Finally, they 
demonstrate the ways in which a focal funding institution, once established, can deliver enhanced 
welfare programme outcomes over time. 
The chapter argues that in both cases the relevant policymakers perceived that there was a long-
term funding problem and broadly agreed on what needed to be done. Existing institutional 
structures and approaches guided the policy debate and the reforms introduced drew heavily on 
trusted, alternative funding institutions that were already in place. In both cases, these alternative 
funding institutions were more consistent with the policy preferences of the relevant 
policymakers than the existing funding models and higher expenditure was less of a concern than 
moving to a preferred, readily implementable new funding approach. When a reform opportunity 
emerged, policymakers employed a regulatory approach to policymaking, first repurposing and, in the 
decades that followed, steering the funding institutions that they had engineered. Funding reforms 
were built using hundreds of de-centred funding institutions which already existed and could be 
adapted by policymakers at low political cost. 
In the first analytical section of the chapter, we explore the introduction and post-reform 
development of the German long-term care insurance system. This is followed by a similar review 
of UK earnings-related pension reform and long-run institutional development. The chapter 
concludes by developing a set of common explanatory variables that were shared by both 
sustainable funding cases when funding reforms were enacted. In chapter six, this set of reform 
case variables is then employed, along with elite interviews, document analysis and observation 
to analyse the current English social care policy environment. 
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2. De-centred sustainable funding reform in Germany 
In the early 1990s, German policymakers were faced with a long-term care environment that had 
significant parallels with that faced by England today. Care provision was mostly informal in nature 
and delivered by friends and family members. Where formal domiciliary or residential care provision 
was required this was predominantly delivered by charitable and for-profit private organisations and, 
unlike universal public healthcare in both countries, this was funded by the individuals requiring care 
and their families. Where they were unable to fund care, financing was provided by local government 
on a stigmatised, means-tested basis. There was widespread unease that citizens with a full 
employment history throughout their working lives should have to rely on such benefits and 
widespread agreement that the level of municipal funding and the quality of care were insufficient 
and inconsistent. 
While the German long-term care policy environment shared similarities with the current English 
situation, the governance structures of the German political system, the wider welfare state and a 
scalable funding tradition built around de-centred, hypothecated social insurance are all very 
different. Following decades of discussion about the desirability of Federally mandated care funding 
and four years of legislative debate about the best way in which such funding might be enacted, the 
Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union, CDU) led coalition government achieved 
a broad consensus for the reform of social care funding. A mandatory, pay-as-you-go social long-term 
care insurance scheme was introduced in 1994. This delivered a new, nationwide social insurance layer 
of finance that transformed the funding landscape and significantly reduced the financial pressures 
on middle-income older people and on municipal and state governments. Unlike the broad expansion 
of the welfare state that accompanied the German post-war economic miracle (wirtschaftswunder), 
this welfare state expansion came in an era of lacklustre, post-reunification economic growth and 
attempted retrenchment elsewhere in the German welfare state. Path-dependent cost containment 
measures, the desire to create a precedent for reform elsewhere and modelling the chosen funding 
solution on the existing health insurance model gave policymakers the opportunity to create a new 
welfare institution with modestly positive funding momentum in an age of welfare state austerity. 
Before the reform, the conservative, corporatist (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27) German welfare state 
had four social insurance schemes, introduced by Bismarck and during the Weimar Republic, which 
pooled social risks and were managed by regional, guild and industry funds. In the early 1990s, there 
were around 500 statutory health funds which had the staff, processes and procedures required to 
manage wage deductions, assess individual eligibility for healthcare (and long-term care) insurance 
benefits and make insurance payments where appropriate. These organisational structures were used 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
72 
 
by policymakers to engineer a fifth, mostly public, social insurance pillar of the German welfare state. 
Led by a respected policy entrepreneur, policymakers coalesced around social insurance because that 
is how the German welfare state manages social risk. Social insurance is long established, widely 
understood and enjoys broad popular support. 
In the pages that follow, we document and analyse the detail of the German social care funding 
reforms that were undertaken in the mid-1990s. We then consider the national and institutional 
environment that preceded the reform and how existing institutional structures channelled choices 
and legitimised some of the potential reform options available to policymakers. This leads us to the 
political process of institutional renegotiation and the search for a broad consensus on the form that 
the reform should take. Finally, we consider the nature and institutional momentum of the social 
insurance fund that emerged from the renegotiation and how the processes and deliberation required 
to secure a broad reform consensus led to the creation of a financially sustainable, largely uncontested 
institution. 
Mandatory long-term care insurance 
After more than twenty years of debate that focused on the familial and financial implications of the 
state assuming greater responsibility for long-term care risks, the political discourse turned in the late 
1980s to how the state might best fund care. A bill introducing social long-term care insurance was 
passed by the Bundestag in April 1994 (Götting et al., 1994, p.285) and pay-as-you-go long-term care 
insurance was introduced in 1995 as the fifth pillar of the German social security system. While legally 
distinct, the scheme was administered by the existing health insurance funds. Private for-profit and 
charitable healthcare providers were encouraged to expand their existing operations and to enter the 
care sector to increase provision levels and choice. The reform was designed to support both informal 
care by family and friends, reflecting a desire to incentivise such provision, and to fund formal home-
based and residential care when this was required. There was widespread unease that increasing 
numbers of citizens that had contributed a full working life to society were becoming reliant on means-
tested social assistance payments in old age. Reducing the number of long-term care recipients reliant 
on social assistance was, therefore, an important policy goal. Financial pressures, retrenchment 
elsewhere in the German welfare state and the need to forge a broad policy consensus did, however, 
require that once the reform was introduced the contribution rate for current workers should remain 
stable for an extended period. 
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In this section, we review the nature of social care benefits and eligibility criteria, how the reforms fit 
within the existing social insurance system and cost containment measures that were designed to 
ensure the financial viability of the scheme. 
Universal eligibility for social care funding 
Eligibility for care is assessed by pre-existing health fund medical staff based on the level of physical 
impairment of potential recipients. Benefit assessments are not means tested and three levels of care 
were funded under the original long-term care insurance regime. These range from level I 
(‘considerable need for care’) where care is required daily and for an average of 90 minutes per day 
to level III (‘extreme need for care’) where care needs are constant. Funding is provided to support 
informal family care, formal domiciliary care and nursing home care for all three care funding levels 
and is available as benefits-in-kind or as cash payments. Where benefits are made available in-kind 
the level of expenditure is greater. The major care types are shown in Figure 4 below. Recipients in all 
benefit types rose rapidly between 1994 and 1997 as the long-term care insurance scheme was rolled 
out. Following the phased introduction of benefits, the largest recipient group has always been those 
receiving cash benefits to pay for self-organised care (which can be informal or formal) followed by 
those who are resident in nursing homes. From 1998 until 2008 (when a second care reform act made 
provision more generous and increased funding levels) the number of beneficiaries remained broadly 
constant for most recipient types, although the number of people in nursing homes rose consistently 
throughout the period. 
Figure 4. Recipients of benefits of German social long-term care insurance by care type 
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Source: Federal Health Monitoring System (from accounts of the Social Long-term Care Insurance 
Fund, German Federal Ministry of Health) 
Integration with the existing social insurance system 
German citizens enjoy the benefits of five contributory, public insurance funds that are designed to 
reduce the social risks that they face by pooling the cost of provision. Social insurance covers 
unemployment, ill health, old age, disability and, from 1995, long-term care at whatever age it is 
required. Mandatory insurance premiums are deducted from earned income. Overall social insurance 
contribution rates for an average employee are currently around 40% of gross income (contribution 
rates for 2015 are outlined in Table 1 below)43. Salary deductions and funding payments were made 
available for domiciliary care in the first year of operation, and this was extended to nursing homes in 
1996. As with existing social insurance funds, contributions are made jointly by employers and 
employees on earnings up to a contribution ceiling. The ceiling for health and long-term care 
contributions is significantly lower than for unemployment and old age pension contributions. Non-
working family members of those who contribute are also covered by the scheme and benefits are 
payable based on clinical need without means testing. 
The social long-term care insurance scheme is legally distinct but administered by one of the roughly 
five hundred (Geraedts et al., 2000, p.381) existing health insurance funds to minimise the duplication 
of management costs (the number of public social insurance funds has since been rationalized by 
policymakers and had reduced to 109 by January 2019). All care insurance funds are pooled, and they 
are required to offer their members identical benefits. While this means that there is no competition 
on provision levels, risks are pooled, and the self-employed and wealthier workers can choose a 
mandatory private insurance option. 
  
 
43  In the UK payroll deductions (April 2019) include Employers National Insurance (13.8%), Employees National 
Insurance (12%), ‘encouraged’ auto-enrollment pensions (8%) and student loan deductions (9% where the 
employee has recently graduated). Total – 42.8%. Unlike German social insurance, UK National Insurance is not 
hypothecated. The funding for pensions and student loans is not pooled. 
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Table 1. German Social Security Contribution Rates – 2015 
 
Disbursements from the pay-as-you-go insurance scheme helped to reduce means-tested state and 
municipal expenditure on long-term care by more than 50% between 1994 and 1998 as the 
responsibility for funding those unable to pay for their own care was shared. The individual risk of old 
age was also reduced significantly as much of the cost of care had been funded by recipients and their 
families previously. The pay-as-you-go nature of the scheme allowed benefits to be paid to recipients 
immediately rather than being deferred while contributions accumulated as would be the case had a 
capital-based fund been introduced44. This approach delivered horizontal income redistribution from 
the working population to those in need of social care. German long-term care insurance does not, 
however, deliver significant levels of vertical redistribution as those on higher incomes can opt to join 
private schemes (which can offer lower contribution rates) and contributions are subject to a payment 
ceiling. Riedel (2003, p.277) notes that where citizens previously opted for private health insurance, 
they have a choice between mandatory public and private long-term care insurance. Where they 
choose funded private insurance, they make individual mandatory payments into an insurance fund. 
The maximum premium payable is set by the state and younger scheme members are required to 
make a transfer contribution to older scheme members. 
 
44 The SERPS privatisation case discussed later in the chapter involved moving from an unfunded public pay-as-
you-go pension scheme to a funded private scheme. This was popular but had a negative impact on short-run 
public revenues as mandatory pension contributions made were used to buy private pension assets rather than 
accruing to the UK Treasury. 
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Cost containment and financial stability 
When German policymakers were designing the new social long-term care insurance scheme, they 
drew on decades of experience with existing social insurance schemes that enjoy widespread popular 
support. They sought to address public concerns about the underfunding of care and disquiet about 
the stigmatised nature of means-tested social benefits payments for older people. These concerns 
were, however, tempered by a desire to minimise deduction levels, ensure the financial stability of 
the scheme and to engineer a modern social insurance scheme that could be a template for reform 
within existing schemes. To contain costs the fund was designed with clear definitions of insurance 
payment eligibility, clearly defined (and priced) benefits and a cap on the level of overall and individual 
benefits payable. Benefit payments were not indexed to inflation and were not designed to meet all 
long-term care costs, but rather to make a universal contribution to care expenditures based on need 
rather than financial circumstances. Overall long-term care expenditures were also legally capped at 
the total current and accumulated past contribution income from scheme members (Geraedts et al., 
2000, p.387). 
After a large increase in overall public funding at programme launch, the social insurance approach 
delivered a decade of stable, path dependent funding for long-term care. Funding increased gradually 
with growing average incomes and overall expenditure also rose as more scheme members became 
eligible for care. The rising absolute and relative cost of care delivery was not, however, adequately 
covered by the initial terms of the insurance scheme as the level of payments remained constant in 
nominal terms between 1995 and 2008. This programme feature caused an on-going decline in the 
real value of long-term care insurance payments and became an issue of growing political importance. 
Policymakers returned to this issue in 2008. 
Summary – a positive policy development 
The introduction of social long-term care insurance in Germany is widely viewed as a positive policy 
development (Frisina-Doetter and Rothgang, 2015, pp.16-17). Membership of a long-term care 
insurance scheme is compulsory for all those in work. The schemes cover those who make 
contributions and their families and is legally distinct from, but administered by, the statutory health 
insurance funds. Most citizens are covered by pay-as-you-go public insurance, but a funded private 
scheme is also an option for those on higher incomes. Three levels of care were stipulated when the 
scheme was first introduced, and all funds are required to offer identical benefits. Contributions are 
subject to a payment ceiling, limiting the redistributive effect of social insurance and all funds are 
pooled. No competition is permitted between funds on the level of benefits receivable, although 
contribution rates can vary. 
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Before the reform 
This thesis employs a “framework for the explanation of path dependency and deviation” Spohr (2016, 
p.258) that combines the insights of historical institutionalism with Kingdon’s multiple streams 
analysis. Historical institutional explanations of organisational change and institutional formation, in 
common with multiple streams, often focus on the role of individual agency during windows of 
opportunity or crisis (Capoccia, 2016, p.89). While Slater and Simmons (2010, p.911) accept the value 
of this analysis, they argue that the choices available to policy entrepreneurs during these “critical 
moments for path deviation” (Spohr, 2016, p.269) are structured and constrained by causal factors 
that develop before critical junctures open. They assert that these critical antecedent variables 
combine with choices made during critical junctures to determine policy outcomes. In this section, we 
review critical antecedents, exploring the national and institutional environment that channelled the 
policy options and choices available to German policymakers in the 1990s. 
National environment 
While accepting that all welfare states are hybrids that feature a variety of ways of delivering welfare, 
Esping-Andersen (1990, p.21) used the level of labour de-commodification achieved to categorize 
welfare states into broad national types. He argued that the evolution of the welfare state has not 
simply been a whiggish (Powell and Hewitt, 2002, p.173) linear improvement over time, but that three 
very different welfare state regime types have developed: social democratic, conservative and liberal. 
For Esping-Andersen, Germany is a conservative, corporatist welfare state and the primary motivation 
of policymakers has been to reinforce and protect existing social structures and hierarchies. Welfare 
state funding is predominantly via mandatory social insurance, provision involves private, often not-
for-profit institutions in welfare delivery and the traditional nuclear family remains a key focus of 
welfare. 
While social insurance schemes that pooled the risks of unemployment, old age and ill-health had 
been in place for decades, long-term care was historically deemed to be a marginal, individual risk, 
impacting few and falling within the domain of the family. Broad federal programmes would not be 
able to tailor care to local circumstances, so care management by municipalities and Länder was more 
appropriate. 
Demographic, social and economic change 
German society, in common with much of Europe, has experienced three long-run socio-economic 
trends that have combined to increase the profile and societal impact of the long-term care needs of 
older people. The localised effects of these trends were exacerbated by the post-reunification 
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migration of younger people away from the Neue Länder as unemployment rose rapidly in the former 
DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) from 1991 onwards. Firstly, rising life expectancy and falling 
birth rates have caused an increase in the German old-age dependency rate (the proportion of the 
population that are aged over sixty-five) from 11.5% in 1960 to 15.4% in 1995 (when social long-term 
care insurance was introduced) and 21.5% in 2017 (World Bank, 2018). The equivalent rate in the UK 
was 18.5% in 2017 (World Bank, 2018). As the dependency rate rises, the ratio of people needing long-
term care to those in work is likely to increase. Secondly, the female labour force participation rate in 
Germany rose from 45.5% in 1970 to 60.9% in 1994 and 73.1% in 2015 (OECD, 2016). Most informal 
long-term care is provided by a spouse, daughter or daughter-in-law. As the level of female 
employment has increased, the availability of non-spouse, informal family carers has reduced and the 
opportunity cost of family care for older relatives has risen. Finally, the cost of health and social care, 
where labour productivity gains have been modest compared to non-service sectors of the economy, 
has been rising relative to other societal goods for decades (Baumol, 2012, p.4). This trend means that 
even if the old age dependency rate were stable (which is not the case) per capita expenditure on 
social care would need to rise by more than the rate of inflation to retain existing levels of care 
provision. 
There are policy choices and demographic trends that can help to mitigate these factors. These include 
moves to raise the retirement age, improvements in preventative healthcare leading to later 
incapacity for older people and rising relative male life expectancy making it more likely that a male 
spouse can deliver care for longer, but the overall trend is towards rising care needs and a decline in 
the ability of the family to provide care. 
Political structures 
Germany is a federal republic of sixteen Länder. The political system features the formal separation of 
powers between federal and state government. There is a bicameral parliamentary system, with a 
directly elected lower house (Bundestag) and an upper house (Bundesrat) made up of Länder 
appointees. The upper house has the power of veto over any legislation that impacts the interests of 
the Länder. More than half of legislation passed in the 1990s was deemed to fall into this category (St. 
Louis (2011, p.175). This governance structure gives significant power to local and state governments. 
Representatives in the lower house are selected via a combination of Länder party lists and individual 
elected members for local districts. Beyond the bicameral parliamentary structure, political, social 
(unions and employers), legal and financial (Bundesbank) institutions also enjoy multiple formal and 
informal veto points and there are numerous structural impediments to non-incremental change. This 
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governance structure has engendered a political culture where major decisions relating to the welfare 
state (and beyond) are usually taken by consensus. 
St. Louis (2011, p.167) notes that the CDU and SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) are 
mass people’s parties (volkspartei) with quite distinct business and social (labour, women and youth) 
wings. She argues that in the decade preceding the vote to introduce social long-term care insurance 
the social wings of both parties shared many social policy preferences. The business wing of the CDU 
was, however, more closely aligned with the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) with whom the 
CDU and the Bavarian CSU (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) were in coalition between 1982 and 
1998. The relative strength of the business and social wings of the coalition parties and within the SPD 
influenced the direction in which the long-term care debate would be resolved. 
Pre-existing institutional arrangements 
Germany has four popular, established social insurance schemes that long pre-date the introduction 
of social long-term care insurance. These funds pool social risk, are built on the concept of social 
solidarity and are funded by wage deductions. The pre-existing health insurance scheme was made 
up of around 500 statutory health funds grouped into seven broad associations based on region, guild 
or industry type (Geraedts et al., 2000, p.381). While there are funds that serve individual companies, 
most scheme members are part of large region-level schemes and all are free to move between funds. 
The health funds have processes, procedures and institutional structures in place that allow them to 
manage contribution deductions from wages, assess individual eligibility for healthcare (and long-term 
care) insurance benefits and to make insurance payments where appropriate. Funding and provision 
are distinct. Social insurance funds have always been separated from the organisations that deliver in-
kind services although historically there were close links between organisations and little role for the 
market. The earned rights and universal social insurance model is also widely preferred to stigmatised, 
means-tested benefits by potential and current recipients. 
In the 1990s, with unemployment rising and the cost of reunification growing, the level of non-wage 
labour costs became an increasingly important issue. Employers, the business wings of the CDU/CSU 
and the FDP argued that the high (and rising) cost of labour relative to capital was driving joblessness 
by incentivising labour substitution. The existing social insurance funds were under significant financial 
pressure. To ensure that they remained solvent, policymakers raised contribution rates and made on-
going attempts to retrench provision levels. Health insurance reforms were introduced in 1989, 1992 
and 1995 to move away from the existing defined benefit focus toward one where policymakers 
targeted a contribution level (defined contribution) and then implemented on-going provision 
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‘adjustments’ to manage contribution growth. While the contribution rate rose throughout the 1990s 
(see Table 2 below), social insurance contribution rates have since fallen as cost reduction measures 
have developed, and by 2015 were below the psychologically significant rate of 40% (St. Louis (2011, 
p.240) that was targeted by policymakers (see Table 1 above). 
Table 2. Growth in German Social Security Contribution Rates – 1990 to 1998 
 
An underdeveloped care sector 
Before the phased introduction of social long-term care insurance between 1994 and 1996, formal 
domiciliary and residential care in Germany was paid for by those in care and their families. When 
‘self-insurance’ funds were exhausted, care recipients would turn to the means-tested social 
assistance system that was managed and funded by local government taxation. Funding and provision 
levels were widely seen as being underdeveloped and insufficient. Most social care was unfunded and 
delivered informally by family and friends. In such cases, care was predominantly carried out by a 
spouse, daughter or daughter-in-law. Private long-term care insurance policies had been available 
since the mid-1980s, but policy take up had been very low. Growing demand and the failure of the 
private insurance market to achieve significant coverage combined to increase the number of older 
people who were reliant on social assistance to fund their long-term care. This was particularly the 
case for those who entered nursing homes. The lack of universal public funding left the care sector 
underdeveloped in comparison with other European countries, including the UK, and staffing levels 
were low. Pavolini and Ranci (2008, p.247) reviewed the structure of care in the mid-1990s and 
categorised countries based on the percentage of those aged over 65 receiving formal domiciliary or 
residential care. Sweden (21%) and the Netherlands (17%) were high, the UK (14%) and France (12%) 
medium and Germany (7%) and Italy (3%) had low levels of formal provision. They placed European 
long-term care approaches on a continuum (see Figure 5 below) from Sweden, with an in-kind service-
led approach to Italy with a strong tradition of care being part of the family domain. Before the 
introduction of social insurance, the German social care system was relatively underdeveloped. 
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Figure 5. Long-term care policy continuum 
 
 
Source: Pavolini and Ranci (2008, p.249) 
Summary – reform required a broad consensus 
The German political system has multiple veto points, so major institutional reform usually requires a 
broad cross-party consensus. Germany also has a conservative, corporatist welfare state tradition with 
de-centred provision and funding, benefit payment differentials that reflect past employment status 
and income, and a structure designed to pool social risks and support traditional welfare institutions 
such as church and family. Where social welfare provision is deemed appropriate, pay-as-you-go social 
insurance has long been the preferred funding method. This insurance-based approach traditionally 
relied on defined benefit models that came under growing financial strain in the 1990s. Demographic, 
social and economic changes increased the demand for and cost of formal long-term care provision in 
the 1990s at a time when the supply of informal (family) care was declining. 
The institutional renegotiation 
Two months before the 1990 general election, Norbert Blüm, of the CDU labour wing and Minister for 
Labour and Social Affairs (1982-1998) announced that a new social insurance scheme for older people 
would be introduced during the next parliament. He argued it was the duty of the CDU to guarantee 
that older people were cared for appropriately and, acting as a political entrepreneur (Götting et al., 
1994, p.292), he started the institutional renegotiation that culminated in domiciliary care (1995) and 
nursing care (1996) being supported financially by a new pillar of the German social insurance system. 
This was the first new social insurance pillar to be introduced since the 1930s. For Götting et al., the 
introduction of long-term care insurance was a remarkable development. The expansion of care 
funding was implemented at a time when other areas of the welfare state were under considerable 
strain and the major focus of policy making was programmatic retrenchment. They also note that the 
introduction of a new universal social insurance scheme with mandatory45 contributions deducted 
from wages is unparalleled in the post-golden-age welfare state era in Europe. Frisina-Doetter and 
 
45 The thesis argues that the UK auto-enrolment pension scheme introduced in 2012 (and discussed later in this 
chapter) has used fiscal welfare, regulatory welfare and behavioral economics to deliver a similar quasi-
mandatory contribution outcome. 
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Rothgang (2015, p.45) argue that two complimentary discourses facilitated the introduction of social 
long-term care insurance in the retrenchment era. Social solidarity concerns suggested it was 
inappropriate that German workers with a full working life behind them had to rely on means-tested 
welfare to pay for long-term care in old age. This was contrary to the social insurance approach 
adopted by much of the German welfare state which focuses on ensuring individual status 
maintenance in the face of the “standard risks of life” (Götting et al., 1994, p.295). A second, fiscal 
discourse was focused on the rising municipal costs of funding residential care for older people across 
Germany. 
While discussion about the desirability of long-term care reform lasted more than two decades and 
encompassed a variety of potential funding approaches, the final debate was focused on two models 
of compulsory care insurance: public pay-as-you-go social insurance and private funded insurance. A 
variety of alternative approaches had been considered and discarded. These included retaining the 
existing locally managed and funded approach, transferring the responsibility for taxation funded care 
to the federal level and transferring responsibility for funded care to the existing health insurance 
funds. In the section that follows we explore the political processes around the institutional 
renegotiation, the ways in which pre-existing institutions mediated policymaker decision making, and 
the financial implications of the choices made. 
Building a political consensus 
When Blüm announced his social long-term care insurance plan in 1990, he could rely on the social 
solidarity-based support of the social wing of the CDU and the financially driven support of the CSU 
who were keen to reduce the cost of long-term care provision to Bavaria. The SPD were advocates for 
increased Federal spending on long-term care for older people to relieve care recipients and the 
Länder of care costs but, unlike the Green party who were strongly in favour of taxation funding, were 
undecided on whether this should be funded via general taxation or social insurance. The party was, 
however, keen to ensure that funding was progressive and, if the social insurance route were taken, 
not subject to the low contribution ceiling of the existing health insurance scheme that focused 
contribution costs on those with average incomes. For the SPD, the introduction of long-term care 
insurance was an opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of a social insurance scheme with high / no 
ceilings, a much broader funding base and greater levels of redistribution (Götting et al., 1994, p.307) 
which would allow a lower contribution rate. The liberal FDP (coalition partners with the CDU/CSU 
from 1982-1998) and the business wing of the CDU were firmly opposed to social insurance and 
argued for a fiscal welfare approach that incentivised non-mandatory private provision using the tax 
system. 
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Following the general election in December 1990 that returned the CDU/CSU/FDP to power, two 
opposing positions championing public and private insurance emerged from the social and business 
wings of the governing coalition. The SPD proposed a Bundestag social insurance bill in the summer 
of 1991 that embodied their progressive funding approach. This was defeated but cross-party 
negotiations continued with the SPD making clear that the party would veto any proposals that did 
not major on public social insurance in the Bundesrat where the party had a majority. The eventual 
outcome of extended coalition / SPD negotiations was a compromise that gave citizens a choice 
between a pay-as-you-go public insurance solution that incorporated the contribution ceilings of the 
existing health insurance scheme (and was, therefore, much less progressive than initially demanded 
by the SPD) and a funded private insurance option, as proposed by the FDP. Scheme membership was, 
however, mandatory. To further accommodate the business wing of the CDU and the FDP, the bill also 
dictated that employees should lose a day of paid holiday to fund the initial employer contribution to 
long-term care insurance. Strict cost control measures were also enacted to ensure that the 
contribution rate would remain stable for a decade. 
Pre-existing institutions guide policy choices 
The hybrid funding approach adopted in 1994, after extended political negotiations, moved the focus 
of care funding away from societally unacceptable, regionally variable, means-tested benefits towards 
a much more popular universal approach that was derived from a combination of existing social and 
private insurance norms and pre-existing institutions. When institutional change is required, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983, p.147) argue that three processes drive policymakers to change institutions in ways 
that make them more homogeneous: Formal and informal influences on new institutional structures 
including legal, regulatory and cultural requirements that restrict potential choices, the desire to 
model new institutions on existing ones that are perceived as being successful and legitimate and the 
drive to standardise institutional management practices. Social insurance-based financing was a major 
national policy change that transformed and stabilised the funding environment for long-term care. 
As predicted by DiMaggio and Powell, the chosen policy option was congruent with the conservative 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.27) welfare regime, enjoyed significant legitimacy with policymakers and 
the wider public from experience with social insurance structures in other welfare areas and reduced 
launch and running costs by using existing health insurance medical staff and administrative systems. 
It also facilitated reduced expenditure by local government and reduced the reliance of older people 
with a lifetime of work behind them on stigmatised, means-tested benefits. 
While the SPD saw the introduction of social long-term care insurance as an opportunity to 
demonstrate the benefits of a more redistributive approach to welfare funding, the institutional 
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calibration and forward momentum that emerged from the process of building a consensus around 
reform had a very different focus. A policymaking environment focused on wider welfare state 
retrenchment in the existing social insurance pillars and a belief that market solutions should be 
embraced limited the initial scope of the new fifth pillar. A new, relatively less generous pillar could 
be framed as a precedent for reform elsewhere. While the introduction of long-term care insurance 
saw a large increase in welfare state expenditure on social care, Frisina-Doetter and Rothgang (2015, 
p.46) argue that this was a reshaping of the welfare state and not an expansion. The introduction of 
care insurance was accompanied by retrenchment elsewhere and the system was conceived as being 
a defined (fixed percentage of salary) contribution scheme in the medium term, although there was 
an expectation that contributions would have to rise in the longer term, rather than a defined benefit 
scheme. Benefits payable were fixed (with discretionary adjustments for inflation) and eligibility 
criteria was strictly defined. 
Long-term care expenditure change 
The reforms enacted in 1994 caused a large increase in non-family financing of long-term care 
expenditure. Between 1994 and 1998, the level of pay-as-you-go social insurance spending on care 
rose from €nil to €15.9bn (see Figure 6 below). Insurance payments were made to 1,794,665 recipients 
in 1998 with most opting for pure cash payments. These ‘voucher’ payments can be used to fund both 
informal and formal care. Prior to the funding reform, long-term care was paid for by care recipients 
and their families. Where funds were insufficient, local government stepped in with means-tested 
support and this support mechanism remained in place. The introduction of social long-term care 
insurance payments did, however, introduce an additional layer of universal funding that reduced the 
need for care recipients to turn to stigmatised means-tested social support. Zuchandke et al. (2011. 
p.225) note that such locally funded means-tested payments decreased significantly with the 
introduction of care insurance, from €6.6bn in 1994 to €2.7bn in 1998 and that the number of 
recipients of means-tested benefits fell from more than 450,000 to 284,000 over the same period. 
Overall public spending on long-term care rose from €6.6bn in 1994 to €18.6bn in 1998 (an increase 
of 181%) and 85% of care funding in 1998 was paid as social insurance payments and not means-tested 
benefits. 
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Figure 6. Income and expenditure of the German social long-term care insurance fund (1995 to 2017) 
 
Source: Federal Health Monitoring System (from accounts of the Social Long-term Care Insurance 
Fund, German Federal Ministry of Health) 
Summary – critical antecedents and compromise mediated institutional form 
The hybrid social / private long-term care insurance structure introduced in Germany in the 1990s, 
after an extended period of institutional renegotiation, was mediated by the wider retrenchment 
agenda, pre-existing institutional and political structures and coalition dynamics. A desire for broad 
consensus guided how the institution was calibrated and would develop over the following decade. 
Cost containment measures led to modestly rising expenditure and the low contribution ceiling was 
designed to align the financial interests of those on average incomes with the focus on cost control. 
While the introduction of social long-term care insurance led to a significant increase in overall welfare 
spending, non-indexed benefits and a defined contribution focus were consistent with attempted 
retrenchment in the four existing social insurance pillars. This allowed policymakers to frame a 
significant extension in welfare effort as a new, less generous social insurance pillar that could act as 
a precedent for reform elsewhere. 
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Institutional momentum after the reform 
The introduction of social long-term care insurance precipitated a dramatic fall in means-tested social 
assistance payments made by states and municipalities in the years that followed. With social 
insurance benefit payable for informal family and formal domiciliary care, more care recipients could 
stay in their own homes for longer. Social long-term care insurance also increased the sense of 
financial security amongst those that needed, or were likely to require, long-term care (Zuchandke et 
al., 2010, p.641). This trend was particularly pronounced amongst those on middle incomes who 
would not have qualified for means-tested social assistance. These developments were widely 
welcomed by state governments, care recipients and their families. Despite the professed desire of 
policymakers to support informal family provision, the presence of long-term care insurance has 
influenced the balance between informal and formal care choices made by German families. The 
number of claimants has risen over time as has the propensity of older people to choose formal, 
residential care. While rising demand for formal nursing home care was predictable, cost control 
measures that were introduced as part of the institutional renegotiation process meant that stable, 
defined contribution funding would fail to keep pace with claimant growth and rising care costs. 
Cost control measures were unsustainable 
Combined employee and employer contributions to the social long-term care insurance fund were 
initially fixed at 1.7% of gross wages up to a contribution ceiling. This gave the insurance fund a path 
dependent funding solution where overall funding was likely to rise over time as average incomes 
increased. This fixed (as a share of individual income) contribution regime saw annual contributions 
rise over ten years from €16bn (1998) to €18bn (2007). 
Benefit payments were not designed to meet the full cost of care at programme inception, and there 
was no automatic mechanism to increase fixed per capita care payments over time. Insurance benefit 
payments would contribute to the informal care costs of families and form part of layered funding for 
those entering a nursing home along with pension payments and other sources of income. Following 
the introduction of long-term care insurance, the nominal value of individual care payments did not 
rise between 1995 and 2008. Cumulative inflation significantly reduced the value of care insurance 
payments over that time, the number of care recipients receiving social assistance payments rose, and 
the sense of financial insecurity amongst older people began to fall back to pre-1994 levels (Zuchandke 
et al., 2011, p.226). While this non-indexed approach to funding, was defensible (and relatively 
uncontested) where relatively new, universal cash payments were being made on a pay-as-you-go 
basis to recipients with minimal lifetime contributions to fund informal family care or formal 
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domiciliary provision, the fixed and relatively low level of funding was less appropriate when paid to 
care recipients in a nursing home context. Doetter and Rothgang (2015. p.14) reviewed the average 
amount paid for nursing home care in 2013, breaking it down into nursing costs, ‘hotel’ (room and 
board) costs and capital investment costs. For all three levels of care provision, they note that the level 
of uninsured costs, payable either by the care recipient, their family or by social assistance, were 
greater than insurance payments and that the insurance payments failed to even cover the nursing 
care costs. 
Hypothecation reduced funding flexibility 
When long-term care funding options were being considered by policymakers the legally protected, 
hypothecated nature of a separate insurance fund was deemed to be a virtue. As cumulative member 
contributions built over time, near property rights to future insurance payments would protect 
funding in straightened times in a way that would not be possible where care was funded via direct 
taxation. The problem (as articulated by those that favoured a taxation funded solution) with such an 
approach is that once the path dependent institution is in place, this lack of policymaking flexibility 
makes varying contribution and benefit rules more problematic. The need to achieve consensus in the 
negotiations to create the welfare programme led to a stable deduction rate from salaries and fixed 
nominal benefit payments. It was clear at launch that this funding approach would be insufficient to 
deal with both a rising old-age dependency ratio and rising relative care costs (Baumol, 2012, p.4). 
While care insurance funding was configured to allow payments to increasing numbers of recipients 
over time, the risk of rising costs was not pooled and remained with care recipients and their families. 
The structure of social long-term care insurance made it very likely that contribution and provision 
levels would need to be revisited regularly. As care costs rise the need for funding renegotiation also 
opens the door for a consideration of how the overall scheme might be improved. As anticipated at 
launch, this dynamic has delivered periods where institutional momentum has been stable 
interspersed with step changes in the level of funding and provision. These step changes occurred in 
2008 and 2014-2015. 
Institutional reconfiguration in 2008 and 2014-2015 
The chosen calibration of social long-term care insurance programme features achieved the twin goals 
of reducing the need for Länder funded means-tested benefits and contribution stability for more than 
a decade (1994-2007). The new pay-as-you-go fund made universal, non-stigmatised social care 
payments to policy taking recipients who had paid minimal contributions. Growing institutional 
legitimacy was also engendered by high levels of policy taker satisfaction.  
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Over time the social insurance fund matured, and the levels of accumulated contributions began to 
build. Policy takers grew more vociferous, and the nationwide trade association of social long-term 
care insurance bodies gave them a focus. Cost control mechanisms, mirroring those introduced in 
other areas of social insurance in the 1990s, led to a gradual growth in spending that failed to match 
rising care costs. To bridge this gap, significant changes to the long-term care insurance programme 
were introduced in 2008 and between 2014 and 2015. These remained consistent with the original 
reform and were designed to address continuing claimant growth (that had been anticipated when 
the scheme was launched), to incorporate care funding needs (such as dementia where a new ‘Level 
0’ was introduced) that were not adequately addressed by the original settlement, and to reverse 
some of the fall in the real terms value of insurance benefits caused by the lack of indexing. 
The Long-term Care Further Development Act (Pflege-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz) was passed in 2008. 
Rothgang (2011, p.91) notes that the primary focus of the 2008 reforms was to improve the care 
provision infrastructure. The reform drew upon more than a decade of experience with the new 
insurance system, introducing rehabilitation incentives payable when residents moved to a lower care 
level, enhanced quality assurance measures and the introduction of care support centres for families. 
Benefits were also increased in 2008, 2010 and 2012. The increases were relatively modest, more 
generous for those receiving home care benefits-in-kind and least generous for those in a nursing 
home. Rothgang argues that these reforms did little to address the decline in the real value of care 
insurance payments between 1994 and 2008. The reform mandated the government to review 
benefits every three years and to adjust where appropriate. Cost containment remained a theme as 
the adjustment mechanism remained non-automatic. The contribution rate from wages was increased 
by 0.25% (from 1.7% to 1.95%) from 2008 onwards, delivering an additional €2.6bn in funding per 
annum. The impact of these reforms can be seen in Figure 6 above, which shows the impact of an 
increased contribution rate and higher benefits after slow growth in both between 1997 and 2007. 
Rothgang notes that the increased contribution rate would only ensure fund solvency until 2014. 
To meet this further funding shortfall, additional reforms were introduced in 2015 by The First Long-
Term Care Strengthening Act (PSG I, 2014). This continued the theme of catch-up payments for past 
inflation (a 4% benefit uplift), enhanced provision (improved dementia coverage, greater funding for 
respite care, enhanced rehabilitation payments and home modification grants), improved quality 
assurance / a requirement that all care staff be paid in accordance with collective pay agreements and 
higher contribution levels (the contribution rate increased by 0.3%) (Federal Ministry of Health, 2014). 
The Second Long-Term Care Strengthening Act (PSG II, 2015) added to these reforms in the following 
year. This revised the ways in which care needs are assessed with five categories of need replacing the 
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existing four and the definition of care need being extended to include mental and psychological 
impairment as well as the initial focus on physical need (Bäcker, 2016, p.2). All current recipients 
continued to receive at least the same level of benefit that they received previously and many, 
particularly those with dementia, receive significantly more. To fund the reform, the base contribution 
rate rose again by 0.2% of wages in 2017. 
Figure 7. Granted applications for the assessment of need of care in Germany (1995 to 2015) 
 
Source: Federal Health Monitoring System (from accounts of the Social Long-term Care Insurance 
Fund, German Federal Ministry of Health) 
 
Figure 7 above shows the number of new applications for care funding granted in each year between 
1995 and 2015. This shows a trend away from the two higher care levels towards the lowest level of 
care (Level I – ‘considerable need for care’) and an increasing number of care recipients in Level 0 
(dementia care) from 2009 onwards. 
Summary - cost control, institutional legitimisation and rising contributions 
The initial institutional design for German social care insurance, arrived at by consensus, engineered 
using popular, pre-existing organisations and costed in detail, delivered a decade of funding stability 
that built legitimacy levels, but saw a decline in per capita benefits in real terms. Long-term care 
insurance was not widely contested initially, despite flaws in the ways in which it was implemented, 
but over time it became clear that greater funding was required. The institutional reconfiguration that 
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was enacted in 2008 made modest changes to the social long-term care insurance system and 
increased contributions by 0.2%, More recent reforms, passed in 2014 and 2015, have been more 
radical and required a greater increase in the overall level of funding. When changes were introduced, 
they were long overdue (Rothgang, 2011, p.95). Having been relatively stable between 1997 and 2007 
(rising at less than 2% per annum) income and expenditure have since accelerated, growing at 7% per 
annum between 2007 and 201546. 
Welfare state expansion by consensus using established funding institutions 
The introduction of nationwide, mandatory, social long-term care insurance in the mid-1990s was a 
major milestone in the development of the German welfare state. Formal social care provision in 
Germany was underdeveloped in comparison with many European countries; the reforms 
acknowledged that non-acute care was a social risk and coverage (both public and private) was 
universal. The new social insurance scheme delivered an additional layer of de-centred funding that 
had a significant impact on the financial position of German Länder and municipalities. While overall 
public long-term care spending rose from €6.6bn (1994) to €18.6bn (1998) as the reform was 
implemented, locally funded care expenditure fell by more than half to €2.7bn in the same period as 
stigmatised, means-tested benefits were replaced / complemented by an additional layer of social 
insurance payments. This universal, pay-as-you-go reform rapidly improved the financial position of 
older middle-income citizens in need of long-term care (who had not made significant contributions 
into the scheme) and reduced the likelihood that they would be bankrupted by catastrophic care costs 
in old age. 
 
46 The Netherlands has also seen rising levels of social insurance spending on care over an extended period. 
Public social care insurance was introduced in 1968, and the country now spends a comparatively high 
proportion of GDP on social care for older people (Costa-Font and Courbage, 2011, p.5). Hypothecated, 
universal, mandatory public long-term care insurance covers most care needs and minimum levels of care are 
guaranteed by law. Care provision in the 1960s was minimal and fragmented, there was no obvious private 
funding solution available and, when policymakers were looking for a new approach, institutional tradition 
dictated public insurance rather than funding via general taxation. The defined benefit scheme has three funding 
sources: an earnings deduction, state funding from general taxation and co-payments by service users. As the 
care needs of citizens and per capita cost of care grow, funding increases automatically, making Dutch social 
care a generous, path-dependent public programme with in-built upward momentum that has crowded out 
formal private provision and reduced informal care. Publicly financed care is delivered formally or by family and 
friends, and funding is receivable as cash or in-kind and covers personal care, nursing care, housing costs and 
medical treatment. As the population ages, policymakers have expressed increasing concern about the financial 
sustainability of the model. When first introduced, public social care spending in the Netherlands was relatively 
marginal (0.8% of GDP), but this has since risen to 4.3% of GDP in 2014 (OECD, 2018). The payroll deduction 
required to fund the scheme rose from 5.4% of wages in 1990 to 13.25% in 2004, with a predicted rate without 
changes of 20.7% by 2020 (Gingrich, 2011, p.207). After extended negotiations, programme reforms were 
introduced in 2015, with expenditure reduced, access to funded residential care restricted and some non-
intensive elements of care transferred to means-tested local government control. 
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The bicameral German political system, with a directly elected Bundestag and Bundesrat, made up of 
Länder appointees, gives significant veto power to state governments. Regional policymakers were 
(and remain) strongly in favour of Federal policies that reduce Länder and municipality level exposure 
to long-term care costs. While mandatory, funded, private long-term care insurance was proposed as 
a financing solution by the FDP and the business wing of the CDU, the desire to meet current care 
costs (which would not be possible with a funded solution) and to build a broad consensus around 
reforms led to a predominantly pay-as-you-go, public long-term care funding solution. Support for this 
approach encompassed much of the SPD, the social wing of the CDU and the CSU, who were all keen 
to implement public care funding reform. The drive for consensus did, however, dictate that a funded 
private insurance option was also made available for higher earners and a contribution ceiling limited 
the redistributive impact of the reform. 
As populations grow older, European governments have introduced very different post golden age 
long-term care funding policies. Other than the Netherlands, this pooled, predominantly public social 
insurance approach has not been widely adopted beyond Germany. To understand why policymaker 
support coalesced around this model, we turn to existing German approaches to the management of 
social risks. Social insurance has been established in the country for more than a century and is a 
widely understood welfare funding norm that enjoys broad popular support. Public long-term care 
insurance also drew upon established institutional systems: the scheme is administered by pre-
existing health insurance funds to minimise costs. Long-term care insurance was configured with cost 
containment elements that were designed, after the initial step change in launch funding, to ensure a 
stable, sustainable contribution rate rather than maintaining benefit levels and to set precedents for 
the reform of existing, more generous health and old age insurance schemes. This approach allowed 
policymakers to frame a significant increase in the scope of German social insurance as a measure that 
would both deliver more appropriate, non-stigmatised universal long-term care funding and be 
consistent with attempted cost containment elsewhere. 
Frisina-Doetter and Rothgang (2015, p.17) assert that the German social insurance approach is well 
regarded among long-term care commentators, arguing that public and private hypothecation and 
legal guarantees that are harder to reverse in times of austerity than taxation funded provision have 
delivered the consistent, dependable funding that encourages investment in the sector. They also 
note that where social insurance contributions have been paid, and benefits have been ‘earned’ they 
are unlikely to be reversed, so any risk of a funding shortfall is borne by the publicly underwritten fund 
and not the individuals insured. These structural benefits of social insurance are reinforced by the 
contribution that long-term care insurance has made to reducing the social care obligations of the 
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Länder and municipalities. There is strong resistance from these tiers of government to any measures 
that might reduce care benefits and increase the means-tested costs that they incur. The success of 
cost containment measures that restrained the growth of long-term care spending between 1998 and 
2007 also built institutional legitimacy while policy networks developed around social care funding 
and cumulative contributions grew. This created a platform for accelerating provision and funding 
momentum in the second decade of operation from 2008 to date. 
3. De-centred sustainable funding reform in the UK 
Having analysed the introduction and post-reform development of German long-term care insurance, 
we turn to a second funding comparator. The case focuses on the reform of UK public earnings-related 
pension saving in the 1980s, which has evolved over time into a ‘new pension policy consensus’ (Berry 
and Stanley, 2013, p.17) that combines an increasingly generous flat-rate state pension, a phased 
increase in the state pension age and automatic employee enrolment into private earnings-related 
pension schemes. The case provides a sustainable UK welfare funding reform comparator to English 
social care and allows us to explore the drivers of improving pensioner incomes over the past thirty 
years. 
In the 1980s, the Conservative government introduced ideologically inspired welfare reforms in 
several non-core areas of the welfare state where lower political salience made radical welfare 
reforms less contentious. The changes used financial incentives to encourage a switch from public to 
private / market provision, transforming welfare programmes in areas such as council housing, social 
care for older people47 and earnings-related pension saving. Policy changes introduced, while initially 
controversial, proved to be popular and were followed by a long period of political consensus on the 
direction of policy. In the pages that follow, we explore the gradual privatisation of public earnings-
related pension saving that began with the Social Security Act (1986) and contrast long-run 
programme outcomes with those that followed the marketisation of social care provision in the same 
decade. While providing social care services to older people and the payment of pensions to those 
that have retired are very different activities, the funding requirements of both programmes are 
similar. As individuals grow old, it is probable that financial provision will be needed for a pension and 
possible that social care will be required. In both areas, it is not possible to know how long benefit 
funding will last. These are both welfare areas that lend themselves to the pooling of risk. While social 
 
47 While the political salience of English social care was relatively low in the 1980s, this situation has changed in 
recent years. In chapter six the thesis explores how the importance of social care policy, and associated levels 
of policymaker attention, have risen as the care funding crisis has developed. 
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care provision improved initially, a post-reform trend towards care ‘intensification’48 accelerated after 
the 2008 financial crash and the sector now faces a funding crisis. Pension policy changes introduced 
had the opposite impact. Short-run outcomes worsened as the Conservative government broke the 
link between wage growth and the basic state pension. At the time of the reform, many predicted 
long-run pension retrenchment, but actual outcomes have seen the incomes of pensioners rise 
significantly. 
From state-provided to state-guided earnings-related pensions 
In the post-war golden age of welfare, a growing consensus developed around Keynesian demand 
management and full employment policies. Favourable demography and consistently high levels of 
economic growth left a long standing policy window open (Myles and Pierson, 2001, p.330) allowing 
increasingly generous welfare states to develop across the world. Contributory public earnings-related 
pension schemes were established in the late 1950s and 1960s in European countries such as Germany 
(1957) and Sweden (1960). Despite the favourable economic and political environment, no significant 
public earnings-related pension scheme was introduced in the UK until the end of the golden age, 
when a political consensus finally emerged on the need for a scheme to complement existing 
occupational plans (Schulze and Moran, 2006, p.59)49. The Social Security Pensions Act (1975) 
introduced the State Earnings-related Pension Scheme (SERPS), and it began operation in April 1978. 
Where the employed did not have access to an existing private scheme, SERPS was a mandatory, 
contributory scheme with co-funding by the state, employers and the employees themselves. 
Organisations with existing occupational, defined benefit schemes could opt-out of SERPS and would 
pay lower National Insurance contributions as a result. Individual and occupational defined 
contribution pensions were excluded from the opt-out provisions. While the scheme was justified on 
a pension policy basis, it also had significant financial and political benefits for the government. 
Policymakers, in common with public systems elsewhere, implemented SERPS on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. The benefits accruing to contributors were not just unfunded; the scheme was cash generative 
for the Treasury for the first two decades of operation. At a time when governments had introduced 
unpopular incomes policies to restrain domestic consumption and inflationary pressures, public 
earnings-related pensions offered a popular route to higher short-run public income and lower 
domestic consumption that would help address persistent balance of payments problems. 
 
48 The intensification of English social care has seen a tightening of eligibility criteria, concentrating services and 
spending on those assessed as having the greatest need (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.34). 
49 Hills (1994, p.352) argues that SERPS was launched “twenty years too late” and the UK failed to embed a public 
earning-related pension scheme delivering income replacement for higher income groups before the end of the 
golden age of welfare. 
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After SERPS began operation, doubts were expressed about the long-run affordability of the scheme. 
The election of 1979 heralded the arrival of a Conservative administration with an ideological focus 
on reducing the size of the state. Between 1975 and 1979, the Labour government had increased the 
basic state pension by the higher of average earnings growth and inflation. This relatively new link 
between increases in the basic pension and wage growth was broken in 1980, and earnings-related 
pensions were reformed in the Conservative second term (1983 to 1987). The Social Security Act 
(1986) reversed the post-war trend of pension policymaking towards increasing levels of public 
provision, aiming to reduce the long-term cost of SERPS and increase the take-up of private pensions. 
While the objective of policy was to reduce public spending, the goal was not to reduce overall 
retirement saving, which would still be required (Reddin, 1984, p.11), but an ideologically driven desire 
to shift provision from the public sector to the private (Walker, 1990, p.377). 
The 1986 reform extended existing SERPS opt-out provisions to include individual, defined 
contribution pensions, using fiscal welfare, financial incentives and, as unfunded public benefits lacked 
legal protections, reduced generosity of future public pensions, to encourage individuals to switch to 
private provision. Personal pensions were engineered to be more portable and flexible than existing 
private occupational pensions, making them attractive savings products. Unsurprisingly, the new 
personal pensions were very popular. The government expected that 500,000 people would switch to 
personal pensions in the first five years of operation. Actual take up was 3.2m in the first year (Booth 
and Niemietz, 2014, p.142). Privatisation of earnings-related pensions was facilitated by the lack of 
financial, legal or political protections that might block the retrenchment of public provision. Public 
funding hypothecation and the broader contributory principle had failed to become institutionalised 
in the fabric of the UK welfare state. This lack of hypothecation and relative pension fund immaturity 
in the mid-1980s, left public, earnings-related pension provision unable to withstand retrenchment 
pressures. The failure to index the basic state pension to rising real incomes caused pensioner poverty 
to rise significantly between 1984 and 1989, but privatisation did not precipitate a long run collapse 
in the incomes of older people. While the basic state pension, and public pension spending, remain 
low compared to many developed countries, UK pensioners today enjoy higher mean and median 
incomes than the working-age population (Belfield et al., 2015, p.35), and the number of pensioners 
in poverty has fallen significantly since the reform of SERPS. 
Two key mechanisms have delivered improving long-run pensioner incomes in the UK. Firstly, the 
universal, basic state pension is protected by the high levels of public support embodied in the triple 
lock pension guarantee (legislation requires the basic pension to rise by the higher of earnings, 
inflation and 2.5% each year). Reducing the relative value of the basic state pension was not 
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sustainable over time, and the policy path was changed in 2011. Secondly, the 1986 pension reforms 
created a hybrid funding regime with mandatory contributions inherited from public SERPS and an 
incentivised option for individuals to divert their savings into hypothecated private schemes giving 
strong legal protections against benefit retrenchment. While public earnings-related pensions became 
a failed Bismarckian attempt at public hypothecation, ‘encouraged’ private earnings-related pensions 
have become an increasingly important pillar of saving. While Pierson originally argued that UK 
pensions had suffered significant levels of retrenchment in the 1980s (Pierson, 1994, p.53), he later 
revised his analysis suggesting that while privatised earnings-related pension schemes may deliver 
similar or greater levels of future pensioner income than public pay-as-you-go schemes, distribution 
is likely to be less equal (Myles and Pierson, 2001, p.331). 
Pre-existing institutions and organised interests 
Current pension institutions and programmes have evolved over more than a century. Pension 
benefits received today are driven by funding decisions, institutional structures and legal guarantees 
introduced, reformed and, perhaps, abolished over decades by numerous private employers and 
public policymakers within the Liberal, Conservative and Labour Parties. An historical institutional 
approach gives us the tools we need to explore the development of policymaking over an extended 
timeframe. While the direction of travel for public pension policy had previously seen increasing levels 
of public provision, the Social Security Act (1986) was a critical juncture in the development of UK 
pension policy; the Act reversed the direction of travel and began the long road to private earnings-
related pensions. 
In the pages that follow, we analyse policy changes and institutional choices made by the Conservative 
administration in the 1980s, focusing on the conditions that preceded the reform, the nature of the 
institutional renegotiation and ways in which pre-existing funding and provision structures shaped 
institutional momentum and protected pensioner incomes in the decades after the reform. Lasswell 
(1936) asserted that the purpose of politics is to decide “who gets what, when and how”. Drawing on 
this functional definition, Jacobs (2008, p.196) argues that while much political analysis focuses on the 
dynamics of short-run resource distribution, there are significant policy actors with an interest in the 
long-term (Jacobs, 2008, p. 194). Organised interests are “much more attentive to distant outcomes 
than the average voter” and have high levels of understanding of the issues involved. They are, 
therefore, a significant constraint on policymakers when they make long-term policy choices. For 
Jacobs, policy communities and network theories best explain pension policy reforms as policy choices 
made tend to impact outcomes far into the future domain of organised interests. The analysis below 
blends this insight with a historical approach. The process of pension reform in the 1980s was 
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informed and built around established and trusted (by policymakers and the wider public) self-funding 
private institutions. These institutions gave policymakers an existing private investment framework of 
organisations (the City of London, banks, existing pension funds and employers operating 
occupational pension funds) into which reforms could be directed. 
Before the reform 
Historical institutionalism considers welfare state institutions to be accumulations of past policy 
choices into enduring organisational rules and structures (Ebbinghaus and Gronwald, 2011, p.24). 
Institutional momentum tends to follow a predictable path until a critical moment for path deviation 
during which policymakers have greater scope to change direction by exercising individual or collective 
agency (Capoccia, 2016, p.89). As discussed above in the analysis of German long-term care insurance 
reform, Slater and Simmons (2010, p.911) argue that the range of choices available to agents during 
such junctures is constrained by environmental factors in place before reform happens. In the section 
that follows, we discuss the ideational environment at the time of SERPS reform and consider the 
existing pension institutions that channelled the policy options and choices that were made by 
Conservative policymakers in the years after the 1983 general election. 
Beveridge and the New Right 
During World War II, William Beveridge reviewed the system of welfare provision in the UK. In a break 
with pre-war means-tested welfare, the Beveridge Report (1942) proposed a national insurance 
scheme that would fund universal, ‘cradle to grave’ care and benefits. While his report argued that 
welfare was a social right and that healthcare and education should be free to all, it sought to address 
‘want’ rather than inequality. Beveridge proposed that financial transfers should be set at subsistence 
level (and not be related to past earnings) to incentivise work and personal welfare provision. Many 
of the structures and concepts suggested and codified by Beveridge were implemented by the post-
war Labour administration. The Beveridgean welfare state formed part of a broad political consensus 
that developed around state-led Keynesian demand management, full employment policies and a 
growing level of public welfare effort. While Keynesian economics has fallen from favour, the ideas of 
Beveridge have been remarkably resilient. The core welfare state provides free education and 
healthcare for all and modest, publicly funded universal benefits with eligibility based on social 
citizenship and need. As Beveridge intended, where additional services or insurance are required, and 
personal funding is available, the market is expected to deliver enhanced welfare. A pension regime 
built upon a flat rate public pension augmented by optional, fiscal welfare encouraged, private 
provision is very much a Beveridgean approach. The 1970s were a period of political upheaval and 
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economic failure for the UK economy. Established levers of economic management by the state began 
to fail. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed in 1971, and the oil crises led to 
on-going balance of payments problems. Commentators began to question the leading role of the 
state in managing the economy (Brittan, 1975) and the New Right argued that the state, far from being 
the answer to economic problems, had become part of the problem. The Conservative government 
elected in 1979 was determined to roll back the state. 
Pre-existing institutions 
The first pensions were introduced in the late nineteenth century by enlightened private companies 
and by the state for key civil servants (Hunter, 2015). A means-tested, non-contributory state old age 
pension was introduced by the Liberal government in 1908 (Bozio et al., 2010, p.7). Fiscal welfare also 
has a long history in the UK. The Finance Act (1921) granted tax relief for pension contributions that 
met certain minimum standards dictated by the state. Using tax relief as a financial incentive to guide 
and regulate the development of private pension provision is a long-established policymaking 
approach. The UK also enjoys a long-standing, highly developed private investment infrastructure. The 
City of London is the major financial centre in Europe and, along with New York, is one of the two 
largest financial centres in the world. The country is also home to the London Stock Exchange and 
Lloyd’s insurance market. These institutions allow UK policymakers to consider policy solutions that 
draw upon deep capital markets and significant levels of investment expertise. 
Within the UK public sector, the power of the Treasury is very significant. The Treasury has a long-
standing aversion to public hypothecation and contributory benefits (Hills, 2004, p. 352). Hills also 
argues that policymakers tend to focus on inclusionary policies that soften the contributory principle, 
benefiting those on low incomes, and means-testing benefits to focus scarce resources. This lack of 
funding hypothecation and a Treasury desire to maximise financial flexibility and control create a 
system where sources of public income and expenditure are divorced50. Where hypothecated taxation 
or contributory public schemes with associated benefits have been introduced (these include National 
Insurance, Vehicle Excise Duty and Graduated Retirement Benefit) over time the link has been broken 
and the generosity of promised benefits payable reduced. 
Public pension immaturity and generosity 
A mandatory, contributory second-tier public pension, Graduated Retirement Benefit (GRB), operated 
from 1961 until 1978 when it was replaced by SERPS. Employees bought graduated pension units that 
 
50 This welfare funding approach is very different to the German social insurance approach that hypothecates 
funding and encourages middle-class social solidarity by linking benefits paid to past income. 
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promised additional public pension income upon retirement. The scheme was modest in scope, and 
the value of the units was not indexed to inflation, so benefit generosity declined significantly over 
time (Bozio et al., 2010, p.9). SERPS was introduced by the Social Security Pensions Act (1975) and 
came into operation in 1978 (Bozio et al., 2010, p.9). When compared to other OECD countries, this 
was a relatively late introduction for a public earnings-related pension scheme, so the programme had 
yet to mature in the mid-1980s, and accrued benefits were relatively small. Where unfunded pay-as-
you-go schemes have a significant amount of accrued benefits, transition to a funded scheme requires 
a period of, often prohibitively expensive, ‘double payments’ to meet existing accrued but unfunded 
benefits as they fall due while also contributing to the new funded scheme. SERPS immaturity meant 
that any reform that moved to funded, private provision would have more manageable double costs 
(Pierson, 1994, p. 56), although the structure of SERPS and the demography of the 1980s and 1990s 
had been expected to generate net annual receipts for the state from inception until the late 1990s. 
GRB had also generated net current receipts for the Treasury from 1961 to 1986. This income would 
be lost. 
When introduced, SERPS was generous compared to existing private pension schemes (Nesbitt, 1995, 
p.20). The scheme offered complete portability, was based on the best twenty years of work (which 
was helpful to those with interrupted working lives), offered a saving option to the self-employed and 
part-time workers who had few options previously and was inherited in full by a surviving spouse and 
indexed to inflation. There were, however, significant weaknesses (Nesbitt, 1995, p.21). The Labour 
government significantly underestimated both the level of SERPS take up, and the likely cost, earnings-
related pensions reinforce income inequality and contributions were not hypothecated so the 
government of the day could vary the level of future benefits. 
Occupational pension inflexibility 
Occupational pension schemes have long been the major recipients of private pension saving in the 
UK. The Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (formerly the National Association of Pension 
Funds) represents the occupational pension sector and has a membership that includes 1,300 pension 
schemes with 20m members and £1tn in assets under management (Pensions and Lifetime Savings 
Association, 2019). With minimal levels of mostly self-regulation in place, most occupational pension 
schemes operating in the early 1980s were designed by employers to encourage potential employees 
to join them and to discourage existing employees from leaving. When employees changed jobs, 
accumulated contributions were often returned less an administration fee in cash to the individual or 
accrued pension rights were locked when an employee moved, often with little or no inflation 
indexation. Pension portability was low and transferring accumulated pension contributions to the 
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scheme of a new employer often relied on goodwill from both the former and new employer. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, employee mobility was relatively low, so the loss of accrued pension rights when 
changing jobs (the ‘early leaver’ problem) was not a major issue. During the 1970s, employment 
patterns began to change, and as levels of unemployment rose significantly in the early 1980s, the 
problems with occupational pensions became a matter of concern for policymakers. With the arrival 
of SERPS in 1978, an option to opt back into SERPS for the period of a former employment became 
available, but the existing occupational pension system was not well suited to a society with 
significantly greater labour mobility. 
Unlike public pay-as-you-go pensions, most occupational pension schemes were run on a funded basis 
with contributions from the employer and employees (for contributory schemes) held and invested 
by a separate pension trust. Schemes acquired fund assets and were liable to pay accrued pension 
benefits in the future. Pension rights were calculated on a defined benefit basis where years of service 
and final salary (and not the performance of assets held by the scheme) would dictate the pension 
payable upon retirement. Such schemes usually offered a guaranteed minimum pension on 
retirement. Where pension provision was relatively generous and included features dictated by 
regulators, employers were permitted to opt-out of the public SERPS scheme and so enjoy lower rates 
of employers and employees National Insurance. 
Private personal pensions 
Private personal pensions were first introduced in 1956. While originally designed for the self-
employed, some employed workers also used them to top up contributions to occupational schemes 
or, from 1978 onwards, in addition to SERPS (Nesbitt, 1995, p.30). Rights were accrued on a defined 
contribution basis and not defined benefit (based on final salary) as was the norm for most 
occupational pension schemes in the early 1980s. On retirement, an annuity was purchased using the 
accrued investment fund. A key feature of personal pensions, and one that was not shared by SERPS 
or defined benefit occupational pension schemes, was that pension income receivable upon 
retirement was driven by the performance of scheme investments, linking earnings in retirement 
directly to the performance of the stock market. Ideologically this connection was one that 
Conservative policymakers were keen to make. 
The focus of pension policy in the 1970s had been to deliver clearly defined future benefits, with 
communal risk pooling at the national (public pensions) and organisational (occupational pensions) 
level. Individual private, defined contribution pensions did not meet the original fiscal welfare criteria 
dictated by government and were excluded from the opt-out provisions of the original SERPS regime. 
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This meant that personal pensions were marginal in the 1970s and during the first phase of SERPS 
(1978 – 1986). They did, however, become the institutional model upon which pension reform would 
be launched in the mid-1980s. 
Summary – Path departing forces 
As the golden-age Keynesian demand management and welfare state consensus started to break 
down, the Conservative government argued that an unfunded SERPS was not sustainable and that 
existing occupational schemes were failing to adapt to changing social and economic circumstances. 
While contributory earnings-related public pensions were long established and financially mature in 
many European countries, the concept had failed to become embedded in the fabric of the UK welfare 
state (Hills, 2004, p.349). Proposed changes to earnings-related pensions were consistent with the 
ideas of Beveridge, SERPS was relatively immature (as benefits had accumulated for less than a 
decade), occupational pensions were inflexible, and the UK had a highly developed private investment 
infrastructure into which reforms could be channelled. All these path-departing forces (Brooks, 2008, 
p.311) made public (and private occupational) pension reform more likely. 
The modification of SERPS 
In the late 1970s, there was a widespread sense that the state-led approach to managing the UK 
economy was failing (Nesbitt, 1995, p.33). Economic stagflation had become entrenched, and the 
Winter of Discontent saw the number of days lost to strike action rise to the highest annual level since 
the General Strike of 1926 (ONS, 2016). The Conservative party won the election in May 1979, 
promising to address the problems facing the country in a manifesto outlining the strategic goals of 
the incoming government. These focused on restoring the “health of our economic and social life” by 
controlling inflation, reducing trade union power, enhancing work incentives and supporting the 
family (Conservative Party, 1979). Pensions were not a focus of policymaking, and pension reform was 
not a priority. Nesbitt (1995, p.32) argues that the first-term focus of the Conservative government 
was reducing public expenditure, and this was the approach applied to pension policy. The previous 
Labour government had linked the old age pension to the higher of price inflation and wage increases. 
The earnings link was reversed by the Social Security Act (1980), and pensions were indexed to 
inflation alone which tends to be lower. This retrenchment measure significantly reduced expected 
future public pension expenditure. Deflationary monetary and fiscal policies brought inflation under 
control, but unemployment soared, and policy choices were strongly criticised by the economic 
establishment (Neild, 2012, pp.11-14) and deeply unpopular amongst the electorate. Despite 
presiding over the biggest recession since the Great Depression (from 1980 Q1 to 1981 Q1), the 
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subsequent economic recovery, boost in popularity that followed victory in the Falklands War and a 
deeply divided opposition led to the Conservative Party being re-elected in 1983 with an increased 
majority. The party election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1983) made no mention of SERPS, but the 
government stated it had no plans to reform the scheme (Pierson, 1994, p.60; Schulze and Moran, 
2006, p.71) before and during the election. 
After the election, with a weak opposition and a large parliamentary majority, Conservative 
policymakers felt able to consider radical policy choices that might have a negative short-term impact. 
In this environment, Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services (1981 to 1987) and policy 
entrepreneur, instituted an Inquiry into provision for retirement that met between December 1983 
and January 1985 (Nesbitt, 1995, p.67-87). He set up the inquiry with the aim of abolishing SERPS and 
introducing mandatory private pensions (Nesbitt, 1995, p.87). In the face of opposition from the 
Treasury and an expectation from inquiry participants that SERPS would be reformed rather than 
abolished, when a green paper was published in June 1985 (DHSS, 1985b) complete abolition was 
proposed. Despite support for abolition from Margaret Thatcher, when the subsequent white paper 
was published in December 1985, abolition had been dropped, and it was proposed that SERPS be 
modified. The Social Security Act (1986) was, however, a fundamental change in the direction of travel 
of UK pension policy. In the years that followed, the accumulation of public earnings-related pension 
liabilities slowed significantly, and private provision was incentivised. 
From policy imposition to broader consensus 
Comparative studies exploring pension reform often start with Lijphart’s (1984) characterisation of 
the UK political system as majoritarian in nature (Bonoli, 2000, p.53; Schulze and Moran, 2006, p.52). 
These studies argue that the first-past-the-post electoral system delivers exaggerated majorities to 
any party with a plurality of support, reduces the need for policymakers to form broad coalitions and 
makes change more likely. The primacy of Parliament under the Westminster model and the lack of a 
written constitution also suggests that political power is centralised on Westminster (Bonolio, 2000, 
p.53-56) and the strength of government whips reinforces the power of the executive. As predicted 
by the majoritarian model, there has been only one full coalition administration in the UK since the 
war (the Conservative and Liberal Coalition from 2010 to 2015). 
Majoritarian interpretations of the British political tradition focus on the concentration of power and 
a history of policy imposition (Jordan and Cairney, 2013, p.234). Such analysis suggests that when a 
UK government enjoys a large parliamentary majority, policymakers should be able to implement their 
preferred policy choices, as there are few institutional checks on their actions. Having focused on the 
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majoritarian features of the UK political system, such studies struggle to explain why the Conservative 
Government, with a large majority and weak opposition, backed away from the full abolition of SERPS 
and chose to reduce the generosity of public earnings-related pension provision while making private 
provision more appealing. Norman Fowler’s initial proposals (Fowler, 1991, p.213) were consistent 
with a majoritarian approach, with little attempt made to secure political consensus and low 
consultation amongst actors likely to be impacted by the reforms. The green paper policy proposals 
were, however, widely contested by a variety of interested parties and the final white paper published 
in December 1985 was much less radical. Jordan and Cairney (2013) discuss the dominant model of 
post-war policymaking in the UK and note that a small number of contested policies have been 
imposed by central government, often in times of economic crisis (Jordan and Cairney, 2013, p.254). 
For them, there is, however, significant political value in achieving wide acceptance, if not consensus, 
in policymaking and the usual approach for most policy decisions is to attempt to achieve a consensus 
with interested, informed parties. Baumgarten and Jones’s discussion of “venue shopping” (1993, 
p.233) does, however, suggest that the policy community consulted may vary based on the dominant 
political party of the day. Jordan and Cairney (2013, p.255) also argue that the majoritarian view of UK 
policymaking is still widely held internationally and this misses much of the recent work on governance 
and policy networks that emphasises consensus. In the following pages, we explore the limits of 
executive authority in a polity characterised as majoritarian and the ways in which pre-existing 
institutional arrangements and a desire to achieve policy acceptance mediate the nature of reforms 
introduced. 
The green paper 
Pension policymaking in the UK had traditionally been technocratic in nature, and the introduction of 
SERPS in the late 1970s was preceded by widespread consultation with those who might be impacted 
by policy change. Schulze and Moran (2006, p.71) argue that this approach changed under the 
Conservatives, particularly after the 1983 election that gave the government a “sense of immortality” 
(Nesbitt, 1995, p.57). The style of pension policymaking became more ideological with policy driven 
by a managerial executive. Rising public expenditure on pensions and the inflexibility of private 
occupational schemes were issues that the government sought to address via market solutions. The 
Treasury also saw pension reform as a route to reducing medium-term government spending. In 1983, 
Norman Fowler announced the creation of an inquiry into provision for retirement. Fowler headed 
the inquiry and asserted that, while pension experts would be involved and consulted, conclusions 
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drawn would be a matter for him and the Conservative government51. The terms of reference stated 
that the inquiry would (Nesbitt, 1995, p.57); 
“study the future development, adequacy and cost of state, occupational and private provision for 
retirement … including the portability of pension rights and … consider possible changes in those 
arrangements”. 
The Treasury was originally in favour of the abolition of SERPS. When it became clear that abolition 
and replacement with mandatory funded private pensions would reduce pay-as-you-go pension 
receipts and significantly increase the cost of fiscal welfare this position reversed. Private occupational 
pension interests also argued that greater pension freedoms would undermine company defined 
benefit schemes where younger savers cross-subsidised older savers. When the inquiry concluded, no 
report was produced. While Fowler asserted that no policy consensus had been achieved, many 
members of the inquiry felt that a broad consensus around modifying SERPS, rather than abolition, 
had emerged (Nesbitt, 1995, p.86-87). In June 1985, despite Treasury and pension special interest 
opposition, a green paper was published that proposed the abolition of SERPS. Parliament debated 
the green paper, although the amount of time spent on the matter and degree of engagement with 
the substance of the policies proposed was relatively low (Schulze and Moran, 2006, p.72). In Cabinet 
and beyond Westminster, opposition to the abolition of SERPS was, however, substantial and virtually 
unanimous. Employers, the pension companies that would manage private replacement schemes and 
the Trades Union Congress all objected to the abolition of SERPS. Representatives of labour argued 
that SERPS offered valuable benefits to those with interrupted working lives and that personal 
pensions would be expensive to deliver and failed to pool risk. Employers shared the concerns about 
costs, and the pensions industry argued that abolition undermined pension policy continuity which 
was an important feature of retirement planning. The industry also argued that fragmentation would 
confuse pension savers, raise costs and could undermine existing occupational pensions. 
The Social Security Act (1986) 
In response to widespread opposition, the white paper Programme for Action (DHSS, 1985a), 
published in December 1985, and the subsequent Social Security Act (1986) dropped outright abolition 
and chose to reduce the generosity of SERPS while incentivising individual private pensions. The 
 
51 In his memoirs, Norman Fowler (Fowler, 1991, pp.203-211) makes clear that his twin aims were to reform 
private occupational pensions and abolish SERPS as part of a comprehensive review of pensions and social 
security spending, giving citizens “a pension of your own” that had the same appeal as “a house of your own” 
(Fowler, 1991, p.211). He notes SERPS was unfunded and would become increasingly expensive, that his father 
died before receiving his inflexible occupational pension leaving his mother without provision, and that in his 
career he experienced the ‘early leaver’ problem himself (Fowler, 1991, p.203). 
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original SERPS scheme was intended, in an era of high inflation, to ensure that all citizens had access 
to an inflation-proof earnings-related pension, either through a private occupational scheme or, 
where this was not available, via SERPS (Bozio et al., 2010, p.45). Pension rights accruing each year 
were based on earned income between a lower and upper earnings limit. Where earnings were below 
the lower limit no rights accrued and where earnings were above the upper limit accrued rights were 
capped. The best twenty years of real earnings were used to calculate the earnings-related pension 
payable on retirement. Where an individual reached twenty years of earnings, the pension payable 
from the state pension age was approximately 25% of the average real wage achieved in the best 
employment years (capped at the upper limit). This pension was indexed to inflation for life with a 
widows’ pension payable in full on the death of a spouse (Bozio et al., 2010). 
The 1986 reform reduced the generosity of public SERPS using modifications to the way in which 
earnings-related pensions were calculated. The post-reform SERPS pension was calculated using 
whole career average earnings with each year capped at the upper earnings limit. Unlike the original 
scheme, this now included years where little or no income had been earned. Over time the pension 
accrual rate was also reduced towards 20% of career average earnings with a widows’ pension payable 
at half of the original additional pension on the death of a spouse. Nobody retiring before April 1999 
was impacted by the changes and the reduction in the accrual rate was not applied to existing SERPS 
benefits accrued between 1978 and 1988. As predicted by retrenchment theory (Pierson, 1994, p.19), 
the changes were designed to ensure that the immediate impact of the reform was negligible, but the 
long-run impact was very significant. 
Table 3. The financial impact of SERPS modification in the UK 
 
N.B. This table does not include tax relief given on private pension contributions or National Insurance 
contributions foregone where individuals opted out of SERPS. The UK Government accounts treat 
these fiscal welfare costs as negative income (lower taxation / National Insurance receipts). 
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The deferred nature of the retrenchment in SERPS can be seen in Table 3 above. Budd and Campbell 
(1998, p.111) note that the impact of reforms enacted in 1986 and 1995 on public earnings-related 
pensions payable were relatively small up to 2011 but will be much more significant in the decades 
that follow with projected public spending in 2030/31 reduced by more than 70%. 
While Norman Fowler wanted to reduce the future cost of SERPS, he was also keen to embrace fiscal 
welfare measures that would incentivise private saving. In the face of an ageing population, his stated 
policy objective was not to reduce the overall level of saving for old age or future pensioner incomes, 
but to shift the focus of provision from the public sector to the private sector (Jacobs, 2008, p.209), so 
the reforms also used fiscal welfare to encourage the take-up of individual private pensions. The opt-
out provisions of SERPS were extended to include individual defined-contribution pensions and an 
additional five-year financial incentive to opt-out of the public earnings-related pension scheme was 
introduced. At a time of rising labour mobility, individual private pensions were also inherently 
appealing to an increasing proportion of the workforce. Unlike many existing occupational pension 
schemes, personal pensions were portable (being attached to the individual rather than the employer) 
and flexible (allowing the pension to be taken at any time between the age of 50 and 75) but benefits 
were not pooled, so they carried greater individual risk. 
While public pension benefit reductions were deferred long into the future, the reductions in 
generosity did demonstrate that there was a significant political risk to those who chose to rely on the 
state for their pension provision. This realisation and generous incentives that made personal pensions 
more attractive led many to move from public to private pension saving in the years after the reform. 
The new, financially incentivised, personal pensions were much more popular than policymakers 
anticipated. The Department of Social Security expected that 500,000 people would opt-out of SERPS 
in the period between 1988 and 1993, when the additional opt-out incentive finished, and that take 
up would eventually stabilise at below 2m people. Actual take up was 3.2m in the first year and 5.5m 
workers (a quarter of the employed workforce) by 1995 (Booth and Niemietz, 2014, p.142). While not 
as radical a change as originally envisaged by Norman Fowler, the Social Security Act (1986) was a 
major inflexion point in the development of the UK pension regime (Schulze and Moran, 2006, pp.67-
74). While earlier reforms had increased public provision, albeit slowly, the focus of the Act was to 
reduce the future cost of SERPS and to increase private pension coverage rates (Disney and 
Whitehouse, 1992, p.1). This approach was driven by the privatisation ideology of Conservative 
policymakers and was built using pre-existing institutions. Retaining a modified SERPS and embracing 
existing private pension institutions allowed the reform to be framed as a change of emphasis. The 
public were comfortable with the reforms as the banks and pension schemes that operated existing 
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private plans were long established and trusted. While the reform required an increase in the level of 
private pension saving, reversing into existing institutions reduced start-up and on-going 
administration costs. Lobbying by pension providers also successfully ensured that higher cost, lower 
margin savers would remain members of the existing public SERPS. 
Summary – the policy community preferred SERPS modification 
When the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme was first proposed in the mid-1970s, it offered 
policymakers a popular policy option that was cash generative and would help address persistent 
balance of payments problems by reducing domestic consumption. Unsurprisingly, pay-as-you-go 
public earnings-related pensions were introduced in 1978. SERPS was not, however, consistent with a 
Beveridgean approach to welfare and institutional, particularly Treasury, antipathy towards public 
hypothecation. Private earnings-related pensions were better aligned with institutional norms than 
existing policy, making successful path-departing reform more likely.  
The Social Security Act (1986) changed the trajectory of UK earnings-related pension provision. In the 
years that followed, millions of savers switched their mandatory saving from unfunded public pensions 
to funded schemes managed by established and widely trusted private pension firms. Existing public 
and private pension structures, institutions and accumulated rights mediated the nature and pace of 
change and offered ready-made institutional arrangements into which reforms could be directed. 
While the Conservative party enjoyed a large electoral majority, a coalition of business and pension 
interests blocked the outright abolition of SERPS. City institutions and existing pension funds were 
unwilling to take on large numbers of low-income, high administrative cost pension savers. Employers 
also lobbied for reform rather than abolition as this reduced the scale of the ‘double payment’ 
problem that they faced. Following the reform, the UK pension savings regime was a public / private 
hybrid built around mandatory pension deductions from earnings with a highly incentivised option for 
individuals to opt-out of SERPS and divert their savings into private schemes. While the UK welfare 
state had offered limited soft hypothecation of public welfare contributions, private hard 
hypothecation gave individuals stronger legal protections against future benefit retrenchment. 
Institutional momentum and policy consensus after the reform 
In Dismantling the welfare state, Pierson (1994, p.15) argued that UK public pensions experienced 
both actual and systemic retrenchment in the 1980s. With the de-linking of the basic pension from 
wages in 1980 and the partial privatisation of SERPS in 1986, this analysis looked valid at the time. In 
1997, the OECD predicted that UK public pension spending in 2040 would be just 5% of GDP (compared 
with a predicted OECD-wide average pension spend of 13.6% of GDP). The long-run impact of UK 
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pension policy has however been very different to these predictions. While relative pensioner incomes 
declined substantially in the 1980s, overall public and private pension expenditure has risen in 
subsequent decades. The link between the basic state pension and earnings was re-established, and 
while the gradual dismantling of the earnings-related element of the state pension culminated in the 
flat-rate single-tier state pension introduced in April 2016, hypothecated earnings-related pension 
saving is now delivered by private occupational schemes, personal pension funds and an auto-
enrolment savings regime. 
Berry and Stanley (2013, pp.5-8) argue that post-war UK pension policy has moved through three 
periods of broad political consensus with pension policy communities influential in guiding policy 
choices (See Table 4 below). Up until the 1970s, collective provision by the state and large employers 
delivered significantly better outcomes in retirement for some but coverage was incomplete, 
particularly for those without a long employment history. Mandatory saving via SERPS and after the 
1986 reform, personal pensions, were intended to address this failing. More recently, the policy 
consensus has moved towards a more generous universal, flat-rate pension for all, with employers 
required to offer automatic enrolment to all employees in private pension schemes. The use of nudge 
theory techniques to ‘encourage’ pension participation means that these occupational schemes are 
quasi-optional for employees, with less than 10% of those eligible for private auto-enrolment pensions 
in the UK choosing to opt-out (Espadinha, 2018). 
Table 4. The three eras of post-war pension policy consensus in the UK 
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Pension policy is an area of considerable interest to both the public and policymakers, and the forty-
year evolution from the introduction of public earnings-related pensions (1975) to a single-tier flat-
rate public pension (2014) has generated a great deal of debate and legislation. Major pension-related 
Acts of Parliament enacted between 1975 and 2014 are detailed in Table 5 below. Following the 1986 
reform, public earnings-related pension generosity and the link between contributions and benefits 
were gradually reduced (Hills, 2004, p.352), with SERPS and the contracting-out option for pension 
savers finally being abolished by the Pensions Act (2014). In the pages below, we explore the post-
reform rise of de-regulated personal pensions, policy responses to the growing levels of un-pooled 
individual risk that they generated and the continued inadequacy of non-mandatory retirement saving 
which led to a new pension consensus around a more generous single-tier basic pension and the 
introduction of auto-enrolment. 
Table 5. “The cement never sets on British pensions legislation” (Blake, 2003, p.vii) – Major pension 
reforms from 1975 to 2014 
 
Source: Schulze and Moran (2006, p.68) plus additional research. 
The rise of private pensions 
The 1986 reform was built on an established institutional framework of private pensions that had 
existed since the 1950s. From April 1988, previous restrictions on contracting out of SERPS into private 
personal pensions were lifted. Those who opted out of SERPS into a personal pension enjoyed the 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
109 
 
same tax relief and National Insurance rebate as existing occupational pension scheme members. 
Where they had not previously opted out, they also received an additional ‘rebate’ for five years. 
Employees now had the option of a tax-effective, hypothecated and funded private, personal pension. 
The reforms were intended to target the self-employed and workers in industries, such as hospitality, 
that traditionally had low levels of pension saving. The appeal of personal pensions was, however, 
much broader than these excluded groups and, by 1993, five million employees had taken out 
personal pensions in a “personal pensions stampede” (Disney and Whitehouse, 1992). Bonoli and 
Palier (1998, p.324) note that of these, around four million had chosen to opt out of SERPS. When 
combined with those who already opted-out of SERPS via an occupational pension scheme, more than 
two-thirds of the working age population (13.8m employees) were saving outside of SERPS by 1995. 
Seven years after the SERPS reform, the public scheme formed an increasingly marginal part of UK 
pension saving. 
The reduced generosity of the basic state pension and maturing of long-standing occupational 
pensions also drove a rise in the share of pensioner income coming from non-public sources. Between 
1979 and 1996/97, the average real income of a pensioner / pensioner couple increased by 58%. While 
average benefit income rose by 39%, income from occupational pensions (up 152%) and investments 
(up 124%) increased much more significantly. The share of the pensioner population receiving less 
than half of their retirement income from the state rose from 19% to 30%, and amongst the recently 
retired, where policy reforms had more impact, this figure rose to 41% (Department of Social Security, 
2000; Department for Work and Pensions, 2013). 
Increased regulation, funding shortfalls and S2P 
The rapid rise of private individual pensions in the late 1980s and early 1990s was followed by a period 
of consolidation. A significant proportion of those that switched to personal pensions would have 
accrued better pensions if they had not done so, and the problem of pension miss-selling became a 
focus for policymakers. Pension liberalisation also encouraged individuals and organisations to opt-
out of SERPS into defined contribution, rather than defined benefit, schemes. This allowed employers 
to begin transferring the risks associated with pension saving from businesses to employees and 
started the long decline in occupational pension scheme generosity (Bridgen and Meyer, 2009, p.603). 
Private pensions offered a new route to accumulate a pension, but high levels of saving inequality 
remained. Those on higher incomes, working in the public sector and existing workers in larger private 
businesses continued to enjoy access to generous occupational pension schemes. Unemployed 
people, the self-employed, those working for smaller companies and those with an interrupted work 
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history were less able to take advantage of private saving and were impacted most by reduced SERPS 
generosity. 
Following a succession of occupational pension scheme failures, including pension fraud at Mirror 
Group Newspapers, the Pensions Act (1995) introduced greater levels of regulation and a focus on 
scheme solvency. Increased regulation and declining rates of return on occupational scheme 
investments raised the cost of past defined benefit pension promises made and accelerated the move 
from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes. While the generosity of pension rights 
accruing, and the level of employer contributions fell during the 1990s, employees accumulated 
welfare property rights in company schemes were honoured (Bridgen and Meyer, 2009, p.599). The 
Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act (2000) replaced SERPS with the State Second Pension 
(S2P). SERPS benefits previously accrued were retained by scheme members, and future contributions 
were still earnings-related, but the new public pension scheme was more progressive, allowing those 
without income or on lower incomes to accrue more pension benefits. This further weakened the link 
between contributions made and accrued benefits. 
While the importance of public pensions continued to decline, from the mid-1990s onwards the non-
public pensioner income mix began to change.  Between 1996/97 and 2011/12, the real average 
income of a pensioner / pensioner couple increased by 46%. While state pension income rose by 29%, 
income from occupational pensions (up 60%) and personal pensions (up 467%) increased more 
significantly. The overall share of pension income contributed by occupational pensions increased 
more slowly than personal pensions as the generosity and availability of defined benefit occupational 
plans began to plateau (Department for Work and Pensions, 2013). The share of the pensioner 
population receiving less than half of their income in retirement from the state continued to rise (up 
from 30% to 41%). Amongst those that had recently retired, this increased to 53% (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2013). 
Auto-enrolment, S2P abolition and pension freedoms 
In 2002, the Labour government announced the creation of the Pensions Commission, a quango 
charged with reviewing the UK private savings regime. The commission produced three reports around 
which a broad political consensus emerged which has informed pension policymaking for more than 
a decade. While the original terms of reference, at the insistence of the Treasury, excluded the basic 
state pension, the commission extended their remit arguing that improving pensioner outcomes 
required a balanced, comprehensive approach that considered the interaction between public and 
private provision and enhanced all elements of the retirement savings mix. The commissioners 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
111 
 
proposed policy changes that would increase public spending and private pension saving. These 
included a more generous state pension with less means testing, a phased increase in the state 
pension age and, drawing on behavioural economics, the introduction of automatic pension 
enrolment with pension contributions by employer and employee with an option for individuals (but 
not employers) to opt-out of the scheme. 
The Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties broadly supported the proposals and promised to re-
link pensions to earnings at the 2005 general election, although the victorious Labour Party did not. 
The link was re-established in 2011 by the Coalition government. Auto-enrolment pensions were 
launched in 2012 for the largest employers with phased introduction for smaller firms between 2012 
and 2017. The State Second Pension (S2P) and associated national insurance contribution opt-outs 
were abolished in 2014 and new pensions ‘freedoms’ gave those with personal pensions a choice 
between pooling risk upon retirement by buying an annuity (which had previously been mandatory) 
and income drawdown. 
Pensions policy outcomes in 2020 and beyond 
Having followed “a long and circular road” (Crawford, Keynes and Tetlow, 2013, p.62) from the 
introduction to abolition of SERPS, the UK pension regime is now built on a universal flat-rate state 
pension that provides a “platform for private saving” (Berry and Stanley, 2013, p.19). Additional pillars 
of pension saving are offered by quasi-mandatory auto-enrolment occupational schemes and 
individual private pensions. While a past structure has started to reassert itself, the variety, scope and 
size of the UK pension sector is now larger, more sophisticated and more complicated. 
The last decade has seen a convergence in levels of European pension spending. Starting from a 
relatively low base, the UK has increased public and private expenditure in recent years, while much 
of Europe has seen little change or reduced the generosity of future pension benefits. The OECD 
recently noted that UK private pension benefits paid in 2011 amounted to 4.6% of GDP (OECD average 
1.6%) and the cost of fiscal welfare tax relief on pension contributions made was 1.5% of GDP (OECD 
average 0.4%). Overall UK public / private pension expenditure was 10.2% of GDP in 2011, this is above 
the OECD average (9.3%) and is predicted to remain so in the coming decades (OECD, 2015). Public 
pensions in the UK are also more sustainable (Schulze and Moran, 2006, p.49) and targeted than 
elsewhere in Europe. In 2011, the OECD reviewed public pension system progressivity, calculating 
national pension Gini coefficients and pension progressivity indexes for OECD member states. The 
index ranged from 100 (most progressive) to zero (neutral) and negative where public pensions were 
regressive. Anglophone countries tend to have more progressive, flat-rate public pension schemes 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
112 
 
and the UK basic pension (index score 82.8) is the most progressive in Europe with little link between 
employment earnings history and public pension benefits. The average index score is 37, Southern 
European public pensions are only marginally progressive, and public pensions in Sweden are 
regressive (OECD, 2011). In 2015, following the introduction of the triple-lock guarantee and the new 
Single-tier state pension, the OECD predicted that UK public pension spending in 2040 will amount to 
8.4% of GDP (See Table 6 below). This is significantly higher than the share predicted in 1997 (up 3.4%) 
and is closer to the now lower OECD predicted average of 11.6% (OECD, 2015). 
Table 6. OECD Projected future (2040) public pension expenditure – 1997 and 2015 
 
 
Sources: OECD (1997) quoted by Myles and Pierson (2001, p.309) and OECD (2015). 
N.B. While changes in predicted future GDP and demographic assumptions will impact projections for 
2040, the above comparison and falling spend variance suggests that European public pension 
generosity is converging and that public pension regimes in the UK and Ireland are becoming relatively 
more generous. 
At an individual level, the long-run outcome of UK pension policies has been higher relative incomes 
for pensioners. A recent report by the Resolution Foundation noted that; 
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“Pensioners have fared much better overall than working-age households … in recent years” (Corlett, 
2017, p.5). 
The report asserts that UK pensioners currently enjoy higher incomes, often from multiple sources, 
than working-age adults. Both mean and median income levels (after housing costs) are higher for 
pensioners, and poorer pensioners are considerably better off than poorer working-age adults 
(Corlett, 2017, p.26). This trend towards greater pensioner wealth has transformed the nature and 
age distribution of poverty over more than five decades. In 1961, older people made up more than 
30% of the poorest income decile. By 2015, fewer than 5% of the bottom decile were pensioners 
(Corlett, 2017, p.27). While average real incomes of those in work changed little between 2005 and 
2017 (ONS, 2017), real pensioner incomes rose by 31% between 2002 and 2015. Corlett (2017, p.5) 
asserts that half of this rise was driven by greater income from private pensions and other 
investments, with the other half (split roughly equally) coming from growing earnings from paid 
employment and more generous public pensions and other benefits. Income growth has been strong 
across all pensioner income groups (Corlett, 2017, p.43). Benefits, investments, occupational pensions 
and employment have all contributed to the increase in income, but the relative importance of the 
funding types varies by income group. For poorer pensioners increasing benefit levels have been the 
key factor in higher income, for middle-income and wealthy pensioners occupational pensions 
contribute the greater share of rising income. Corlett does, however, note that while UK pension policy 
and labour market reforms have significantly improved the wellbeing of each generation of older 
people, once retired, individual pensioner income tends to grow only modestly in real terms (Corlett, 
2017, p.34). There are also concerns that pensioner outcomes may not continue to improve in the 
future. While legal protections for accrued benefits have delayed pension retrenchment, defined 
benefit occupational schemes are becoming less generous and are often closed to new entrants. This 
suggests that the rise in relative pensioner incomes may slow or reverse in the coming decades. 
Summary - policymakers have institutionalised rising pensioner incomes 
Following pension changes introduced in the 1980s, many commentators argued that the reform of 
SERPS would cause damaging actual and systemic pension retrenchment. While relative pensioner 
incomes fell initially, the long-run impact of pension policies has been more positive, and pensioners 
now enjoy higher disposable incomes than the working-age population. While the basic state pension 
is underpinned by broad popular support and the triple-lock guarantee, private pension funds are also 
protected by legally enforceable property rights and contribution hypothecation. The recent history 
of UK and European public earnings-related pensions has seen public schemes, which often lack 
guaranteed future benefit levels, made less generous over time by policymakers. Pension privatisation 
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underpinned by mandatory saving and fiscal welfare has helped to protect UK savers from earnings-
related pension retrenchment. 
Post-reform pension policy has been relatively settled, with a political consensus around softening the 
link between contributions made and public pension benefits received and targeting public pension 
expenditure towards those on lower incomes, while earnings-related pensions are managed by the 
private sector. As a result, current and projected future UK public pension expenditure is relatively 
low (as a share of GDP) but more progressive than is the case in most developed countries, while 
private pension benefits paid and the cost of fiscal welfare on pension contributions made are well 
above the OECD average. Strong, state-guided and regulated private pension institutions have driven 
the positive post-reform momentum of UK pensioner income, collectively lobbying for rolling pension 
reforms that have increased the level of private saving allowing public provision to be increasingly 
targeted at those with lower incomes. 
Focused funding institutions can maintain welfare spending 
Reforms introduced by Conservative policymakers in the 1980s changed the institutional momentum 
of the UK earnings-related pension regime. In the years before the Social Security Act (1986), public 
pension provision had become an increasingly important part of the pensions mix. The Act 
transformed the direction of travel for pension funding and addressed perceived failings with existing 
occupational and public pensions. SERPS had been in operation for eight years when the reforms were 
introduced and had yet to mature. While public SERPS was implemented successfully and 
demonstrated that mandatory earnings-related pension saving was popular, accrued benefits were 
relatively small and the programme was not embedded in the core welfare state. This made transition 
from an unfunded pay-as-you-go public scheme to private funded provision (an unplanned pension 
policy ‘double movement’ that bridged the gap between the golden and post-golden age of welfare) 
more likely, allowing the relevant Conservative policymakers to harness the power of popular 
capitalism by re-engineering pre-existing private pension arrangements to maximise personal pension 
take-up. 
The pension regime changes introduced had significant parallels with social care reforms that were 
also enacted by the Thatcher administration52. Both programmes support the living and care needs of 
older people and were gradually outsourced by Conservative policymakers in the mid-1980s, for 
ideological and functional reasons, using financial incentives to encourage a switch to predominantly 
 
52 English social care reforms introduced by Conservative policymakers are analysed in chapter five. 
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market provision. Both also saw a significant increase in short run public expenditure, as the reforms 
were introduced and embedded, followed by a long period of Conservative / New Labour consensus 
on the direction of policy. While social care provision generosity and the level of investment in the 
care home estate improved significantly after the reform, long run funding outcomes have 
deteriorated and are consistent with actual and systemic retrenchment. Pension policy changes had 
the opposite profile. Short-run outcomes were negative as breaking the link between wage growth 
and the basic pension at a time of rising real incomes drove up pensioner poverty. Most commentators 
predicted that there would also be long-run pension retrenchment, but actual outcomes have seen 
relative pensioner incomes rise significantly and (after housing costs) they are now higher than for 
those in work. Levels of income inequality are also lower amongst pensioners than for the working 
age population. 
Social care for older people and earnings-related pensions are both positioned outside the core 
welfare state but have experienced very different long-run programme outcomes. Public social care 
is commissioned and paid for by marginal local councils that have few protections against financial 
austerity. The funding for earnings-related pensions comes from state-guided and regulated, quasi-
mandatory saving by employees and employers supported by fiscal and regulatory welfare. Pension 
funds are self-funded by individual pension contributions and accrued benefits are backed by assets 
and legally enforceable, making it extremely hard for governments or employers to reduce accrued 
earnings-related pension benefits. This analysis of the development of UK pension policy has 
highlighted two institutional approaches that can maintain and grow the overall level of welfare 
programme spending. The funding of the most salient, core welfare state programmes is underpinned 
by high levels of social solidarity and policy taker support. Where a policy area has lower public 
salience or provision is more fragmented, protection can also come from a robust, well-resourced 
funding institution. Both of these funding poles underpin rising pensioner incomes across the UK. 
Neither apply to the funding of English social care. 
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4. Comparison of two sustainable funding reform cases 
Chapter four has analysed the introduction and post-reform development of German long-term care 
insurance in the mid-1990s, and UK earnings-related pension reform in the late 1980s. In both cases, 
policymakers engineered new devolved welfare funding institutions by repurposing pre-existing, 
widely trusted funding organisations that were available when policymakers were looking for an 
alternative approach. The institutions that policymakers created have delivered sustainable, long-run 
funding outcomes. In the final analytical section of the chapter, we focus on the policymaker reform 
decision, employing Mill's method of agreement to highlight common explanatory variables53 
consistent with funding reform in the two comparator cases. Potential variables are grouped into four 
types (global, national, institutional and political calculus variables at the time of funding reform) and 
are discussed in turn below. The welfare reform cases are quite different, so despite only two cases 
being compared, many national environment variables and most of the institutional variables 
considered can be discounted as being required to achieve successful welfare funding reform. The 
common reform case variables isolated below are focused on global environment factors (such as 
population ageing and globalisation), situational political calculus variables that informed the reform 
decision itself (a problem that relevant policymakers perceive needs to be resolved, policy consensus 
amongst the relevant policymakers and political opportunity) and two institutional variables (a 
relatively underdeveloped existing funding approach and an already available alternative funding 
approach / institutional recombination that is more consistent with the belief systems of the relevant 
policymakers and popular with citizens). Chapter six takes the set of explanatory variables consistent 
with sustainable welfare funding reform generated here and uses Mill's method of difference and 
process tracing to isolate explanatory variables that are common to the successful reform cases but 
not present in the historically non-reforming English social care case. 
 
  
 
53 The methodology employed here is detailed and discussed in chapter two. Set A = German social care variables 
in the mid-1990s and Set B = UK earnings-related pension variables in the late-1980s. 
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Global explanatory variables 
We start by comparing various global explanatory trend variables that may have made German and 
UK policymakers more likely to consider and implement sustainable funding reforms to welfare 
programmes that cater for older people. These are grouped into four trend types (social, economic, 
technological and demographic). The comparison in Table 7 below suggests that the global trend 
variables explored and analysed in the thesis (these include increasing family fragmentation, rising 
female labour market participation and the Baumol cost effect) are common to both the sustainable 
funding reform cases, although there are some differences (income inequality is somewhat greater in 
the UK and population ageing is more pronounced in Germany). 
Table 7. Sustainable funding reform – global explanatory variables 
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National explanatory variables 
When we turn to national explanatory variables, we get a very different outcome. The two cases of 
sustainable, de-centred welfare funding reform analysed in the chapter were achieved in 
heterogeneous political and welfare state regimes. Constitutional structure, political system type 
(Lijphart, 1984), welfare state type (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and the ‘preferred’ national welfare 
funding approach all differ (see Table 8 below). The one area of national similarity, if not agreement, 
is a post golden age of welfare ideational environment and policymakers employing strategies 
consistent with globalisation and ordo-liberalism / neoliberalism (Majone, 1997, p.140). This suggests 
that the explanation for successful welfare funding reform is not to be found within these national 
explanatory variables. It is possible for policymakers to enact sustainable welfare funding reform in 
both the German consensual conservative / corporatist and UK majoritarian liberal (with legacy social 
democratic features) political and welfare state environments. 
Table 8. Sustainable funding reform – national explanatory variables 
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Institutional explanatory variables 
Similarly, when we compare pre-reform institutional funding and provision approaches, the two 
reform cases have very different characteristics. Before funding reforms were introduced, the existing 
funding institution, risk approach, benefit-type, programme structure and level of programme 
salience were all very different. Table 9 below suggests that we can discount many of the existing 
programme features listed below as being prerequisites for sustainable funding reform.  
Two areas of institutional similarity highlighted by the analysis undertaken in this chapter are a 
relatively immature pre-reform funding approach, and the existence of an alternative pre-existing, de-
centred funding institution more consistent with the policy preferences of relevant policymakers than 
the status quo. These alternative funding options were pre-existing public and private health 
insurance schemes in Germany, and long-established private pension companies in the UK. Before the 
reforms, German social care provision and funding were relatively underdeveloped (Pavolini and 
Ranci, 2008, p.247). A predominantly public long-term care insurance scheme was preferred by 
policymakers as the approach was popular, rapidly deployable, would pool social care costs and 
complemented existing means tested Länder funding. In the UK, public SERPS increased the level of 
(mandatory) pension saving but was still a relatively immature welfare programme in the 1980s, so 
the double payments required when moving from pay-as-you-go to funded pensions were relatively 
small and switching to private earnings-related pensions was popular and consistent with the 
privatisation ideology of Conservative policymakers and Beveridgean ideas that underpin the UK 
welfare state. 
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Table 9. Sustainable funding reform – institutional explanatory variables 
 
Political calculus variables 
Finally, we turn to the situational political calculus variables around the funding reform decision. The 
multiple streams framework (Kingdon, 1984) suggests there are three relatively independent streams 
that must converge before policy reform can happen (an agreed problem, agreed policy solution and 
the political focus and requisite political majority required to enact and perpetuate change). When 
they converge a policy window opens, and change can result. When we apply multiple streams analysis 
(see Table 10 below), we find that the problem stream is consistent in both of our sustainable funding 
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reform cases. In Germany in the mid-1990s and the UK in the late 1980s, the relevant policymakers 
perceived that there was a funding problem that needed to be addressed54. 
Following an extended, robust debate in both cases, a sufficiently broad consensus emerged about 
the most appropriate policy approach amongst the relevant policymakers and the wider policy 
community. Agreement was driven by two policy entrepreneurs (Norbert Blüm in Germany and 
Norman Fowler in the UK) and guided by pre-existing funding institutions that were popular with 
citizens and more consistent with the belief systems of relevant policymakers than the existing 
approach. In both cases, the political stream was also consistent with reform. A broad cross-party 
consensus eventually emerged in ‘consensual’ Germany and the Conservative Party had a large 
parliamentary majority in the ‘majoritarian’ UK (Lijphart, 1984). 
Table 10. Sustainable funding reform – political calculus explanatory variables 
 
 
54 In Germany the perceived problems facing policymakers included the possibility of catastrophic individual care 
costs, an over reliance on means-tested social assistance rather than (preferred) pooled social insurance and 
growing budgetary pressures on regional government. In the UK, perceived problems included a belief that 
unfunded public earnings-related pensions were both inappropriate and unsustainable, and that existing private 
occupational pension schemes were not well matched to the needs of a changing labour market. 
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5. Achieving and perpetuating sustainable de-centred welfare funding 
The two cases of sustainable, de-centred welfare funding reform analysed in this chapter 
demonstrate that when the relevant policymakers agree that a serious funding problem exists, 
and a preferred and implementable solution presents itself, reform was possible in the 
‘majoritarian’ UK and ‘consensual’ Germany55. They also show that policymakers can introduce 
reforms that significantly increase current and future welfare programme spending during times 
of financial restraint. A significant funding increase formed part of the reform package in both 
countries, helping to ensure that the new approach, which was better aligned with the policy 
objectives of the relevant policymakers than the existing institutional settlement, was successfully 
introduced. 
 
In both cases, the existing funding approach was not deeply embedded in the welfare state and 
new funding institutions were constructed by reworking existing, widely trusted organisational 
structures that were in place and operating successfully. Having a pre-existing institutional 
structure into which reform efforts could be directed helped policymakers (and citizens) to 
engage with funding reform and allowed a large enough policy consensus to develop amongst the 
relevant policymakers56. Both reforms introduced an additional state-guided, hybrid public and 
private funding pillar that complemented basic taxation funded public provision. The two 
institutional structures have diverged towards long-standing national institutional norms over 
time, although both remain successful. While mandatory German long-term care insurance has 
retained the public-private funding mix, the scheme has started to move away from the original 
defined contribution approach and the contribution rate has started to increase. Mandatory 
earnings-related pensions in the UK have gradually evolved into a private quasi-mandatory auto-
enrolment regime that allows citizens to opt-out of saving (although few do). Unfunded, public 
earnings-related pensions were abolished in 2014. 
 
 
55 The profile of the ‘relevant policymakers’ required to deliver reform was however quite different. A cross party 
policymaker consensus delivered reform in ‘consensual’ Germany, while the Conservative Party relied on a large 
parliamentary majority in the ‘majoritarian’ UK. 
56 The introduction of public SERPS in 1978 (which mandated earnings-related pension saving and established a 
‘market’ that could then be privatised) and the gradual privatisation of SERPS from 1986 suggests a similar policy 
‘double movement’ might offer a path to sustainable social care funding in England. The implications of a two-
stage implementation approach are discussed in chapter six. 
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An analysis of post-reform institutional development also demonstrates the protective, 
simplifying and beneficiary empowering benefits that can accrue to a welfare programme that is 
supported by a focal, devolved funding institution. In both cases, ring-fenced funding has 
protected against benefit retrenchment, and where benefits are paid directly to care recipients, 
this can help citizens to negotiate mature welfare states that can be increasingly complicated. 
Once a welfare funding institution exists, it also gives policymakers and those operating in the 
associated policy networks a focus for lobbying, provision improvements and an obvious non-
taxation, state-guided, devolved mechanism to increase the level of funding over time. Where 
welfare funding is linked to need (defined benefit funding rather than defined contribution) a 
hypothecated funding institution can deliver path-dependent upward funding momentum. 
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Chapter 5. De-centred welfare without sustainable funding 
The first two analytical chapters of the thesis argue that core taxation funded welfare states have 
become the relatively stable collections of mature, little punctuated, welfare institutions that 
historical institutionalism anticipates, tend to focus on existing policy takers and struggle to meet new 
welfare needs. To address emergent welfare gaps, policymakers have increasingly turned to devolved 
bespoke solutions to deliver and fund the welfare provision required. In this chapter, we chronicle the 
institutional development of English social care. Social care for older people is a fragmented, marginal 
welfare programme where demand for significant levels of formal, non-family care emerged relatively 
recently. This need has not been adequately addressed by the core welfare state and policymakers 
have not seriously engaged with funding reform. While the marketisation of care provision in the 
1980s mobilised private capital and transformed care delivery, alternative sources of de-centred 
financing were not introduced or encouraged, and social care lacks the sustainable funding approach 
that policymakers enacted to support German social care and UK earnings-related pensions. When 
post-2008 financial austerity measures were employed by the Coalition government, English publicly 
commissioned social care remained reliant on funding from general and local government taxation 
and spending was reduced. In the pages that follow, we analyse how decades of policymaker non-
engagement57, ‘accidental’ reforms, a lack of strategic thinking, an absence of obvious alternative 
funding approaches and asymmetric local government austerity have left English social care 
fragmented and without a reliable institutional mechanism to sustainably fund care, making 
policymaker action on funding reform both urgent and problematic. 
1. Life outside the core welfare state 
Social care for older people is a marginal58, locally managed, non-universal area of the English welfare 
state with a relatively narrow clientele and few sustainable mechanisms to increase funding over time. 
Policymaker attention tends to be relatively low, although this has increased during the current 
funding crisis, and the social care landscape that has evolved is highly fragmented. Despite a passing 
 
57 An MP with an active interest in social care argues central government already underwrites much of the 
national pension and health care risk and does not want to assume additional social care risk as well. The 
Treasury is also against requiring employers to contribute to a new social care funding levy. When the MP 
discussed this with the former Chancellor (George Osborne), Osborne argued that the rising employer cost of 
auto-enrolment pensions and the new apprenticeship levy were already a problem (Interviewee 031, 2018). 
58 The care of older people has long been a secondary objective of the UK / English welfare state (Beveridge, 
1942, p.92; Means et al., 2002, pp.163-165; Gorsky, 2012, p.441) with under investment, low wage levels and 
staff recruitment problems persisting in the care sector for decades (Townsend, 1964, p.38; Colombo et al., 
p.159). 
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dalliance with national supplementary benefit funding for residential care in the 1980s, the local 
government care funding approach today is little different to the one that existed forty years ago. 
Formal care provision is however very different, managed by a diverse network of public and private 
institutions and having seen a great deal of change. In the 1980s, the Conservative government 
enacted reforms that outsourced most care provision. The marginal nature of the sector allowed 
policymakers to aggressively encourage radical, market-based change to the ways in which care was 
delivered. While social care was transformed and modernised in the 1980s (Gingrich, 2011, p.179), 
other than a brief period of generously funded private provision that followed, spending has often 
struggled to keep pace with demand. While the introduction of markets and private sector capital 
transformed the care home estate, the outsourced institutional structure of formal care reduced the 
already modest protections that the sector had against retrenchment in times of fiscal consolidation 
(Pierson, 1994, p.15). While the reforms unlocked significant levels of investment, the changes did not 
address the need to secure sustainable long-term public or private funding sources for social care. 
When the, now privately managed, care industry faced a funding shortfall in the late 1990s, provision 
contracted rapidly. In response, the Blair administration increased short-run local government funding 
and reduced the regulatory burden (Netten et al., 2005, p.334) but failed to put in place a secure 
system of public funding or to incentivise private insurance or saving for care. This stabilised the 
situation, but the opportunity to create a sustainable long-run funding framework was again not 
taken. Following the financial crisis of 2008 and the on-going fiscal contraction that followed it, care 
spending was reduced and formal, taxation funded, public care provision was intensified (Burchardt 
et al., 2015, pp.52-53). 
 
Numerous commissions have proposed care funding reform, but the funding basis for formal social 
care remains individual, non-pooled self-insurance with means-tested public support only available 
when the care recipient approaches insolvency. Much of the care gap caused by the reduction in 
formal, publicly funded provision over the past decade has been filled by increasing levels of informal 
family care, mirroring a trend across much of Europe (Pavolini and Ranci, 2008, p.247). While this re-
familialisation of care has been accompanied by more public support for family care in Germany, 
where such funding is increasingly seen as a right of social citizenship, relatively few informal carers 
in England enjoy funding (Beesley, 2006, p.26). This failure to pool support costs, either publicly or 
privately, increases the individual risk of very significant care expenditure being incurred by English 
citizens in old age (Barr, 2011, p.15). 
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Chapter structure 
Three phases of public social care history are analysed in the pages that follow: residual, stigmatised 
workhouse provision for the poorest in society, the brief flowering of private formal residential care 
in the 1980s and more recently an era of cost containment, care intensification and the re-
familialisation of lower intensity care. Firstly, we consider the historical development of formal social 
care for older people in England, analysing the rise of publicly delivered and funded formal care and 
the shadow cast by the deliberately bleak Victorian workhouse. Secondly, we explore the rapid 
changes in the public / private formal care mix that were initiated in the 1980s by the Conservative 
government. In ten years, the provision of residential care was transformed from mostly public to 
mostly private, average care home size was reduced and the last of the old workhouses were closed. 
While formal care provision changed significantly, the funding structure of state-commissioned care 
remained general taxation, and as uncapped care costs rose rapidly, access to care was restricted. 
Policy stabilised in the early 1990s, with a focus on cost containment and more targeted, higher 
intensity provision in the formal care sector. Finally, having explored policymaker disengagement and 
the rejection of universal social care funding by both Labour and Conservative governments, we 
complete the chapter by mapping a 2020 public social care regime in England that is broad in scope, 
incoherent, difficult to navigate and less well funded than it was a decade before. 
2. The Cinderella service 
English public social care for older people is today built around managed welfare markets and the 
separation of institutional responsibilities. The commissioning and funding of formal care are 
managed by local government, the standard of care provided is regulated by the Care Quality 
Commission and provision is mostly delivered by private operators. Three distinct functional activities 
have been isolated, and the management of social care contracts is now a core activity of local 
government. While provision has been transformed and quasi-markets are utilised widely, the 
general-taxation based funding regime has changed little in decades. Social care is still funded first by 
individual and family self-insurance with little government supported fiscal or regulatory welfare that 
might encourage private insurance risk pooling, although private, tax subsidised pensions do help to 
meet care costs. Means-tested public funding is only available when the recipient of care approaches 
insolvency. 
 
Before the Thatcher administration, provision was very different with formal social care largely 
delivered publicly by local councils. Other than a period of reorganisation and investment that 
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followed the Seebohm Report (1968)59 and was curtailed by the 1973 oil crisis, there had been 
insufficient capital investment for decades (Means and Smith, 1998, p.166; Means et al., 2002, p.69), 
there were few incentives to innovate and there was minimal, self-regulation of care standards. 
Oesterle and Rothgang (2010, p.379) argue that the need to care for older people was largely seen as 
a family risk rather than a social risk across the OECD until relatively recently and that this led to care 
sector marginalisation, policymaker disengagement and underfunding. When Townsend (1964, p.58) 
surveyed English public residential care provision in the 1960s, he found that it was, in many places, 
still reminiscent of the workhouse. He saw no future for residential care and argued for comprehensive 
de-institutionalisation. In the pages that follow we explore the historical origins of marginalised 
English social care provision and analyse decades of institutional de-layering of a ‘bad’ institution. 
The long shadow of the workhouse 
The residential care services that are available to older people today have evolved from the 
stigmatised, residual institutional care provision that was made available to paupers of all ages under 
the Poor Laws. Townsend (1964, pp.3-11) traced the development of formal care for older people 
from the workhouse to the institutions that he surveyed in the early 1960s. He describes a 
marginalised area of English welfare provision that lacked coherent sector-based strategies and had 
long been impacted by policy choices made for other more politically salient welfare areas. 
 
The onset of the industrial revolution and the social fragmentation it engendered led to growing 
demand for, and a rising cost of, public poor relief (Powell and Hewitt, 2002, p.24). To address these 
funding problems, Parliament set up a commission to review the Poor Laws. The commission primarily 
focussed on working-age adults and proposed a move away from means-tested ‘outdoor relief’ (Blaug, 
1964, p.229) towards ‘indoor relief’ and the strict discipline of the public assistance institution 
(workhouse). It was anticipated that this move from cash benefits to stigmatised, institutionalised 
provision for the few would reduce the cost of relief. With a focus on those who were able to work, 
the sick and the old were something of an afterthought. Paupers of all ages were housed in mixed 
institutions and the system was made deliberately unappealing to disincentivise those who might opt 
 
59 The Seebohm Report (1968) proposed integrated local government social services departments that combined 
the management of residential and home care for older people with children’s services and parts of existing 
welfare, education, health and housing departments. Most of the measures proposed by Seebohm were enacted 
by the Social Security Act (1970) (Means and Smith, 1998, p.277) but the primary focus of policymakers was not 
social care. With a change of government in 1970, an oil crisis in 1973 and a major local government 
reorganization from 1974, local government care provision remained a marginal area for central government 
policymakers and the reforms did not institutionalise sustainable upward momentum in the level of publicly 
delivered social care for older people. 
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to move into the workhouse voluntarily. While plans were made for separate provision for older 
people, little progress was achieved and at the time of The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws (1909) 
less than 2% of the 140,000 older people in Poor Law institutions were separated. Most were housed 
in large mixed institutions that were described by the commission as human warehouses. The mixed 
nature of institutional care was, however, addressed by a variety of policy initiatives between the 
wars. In the 1920s, the Local Government Act (1929) officially abolished the workhouse and the 
management of care institutions passed to local councils. Many were re-categorised as specialist 
hospitals, children’s homes and maternity homes. This separated the young and the sick to parallel 
institutions and changed the population composition of the former workhouses that catered for older 
people. The nature of care became more targeted as other programmes escaped. 
 
Townsend noted that while a lack of investment, overcrowding and insufficient medical staff were 
endemic across all welfare institutions, the quality of institutions caring for older people was amongst 
the worst. Gorsky (2012, p.442) argues that the failure to engage with the issue was driven by the low 
priority accorded to the care of older, non-productive people by capitalist societies. This view is also 
present in the ideas outlined and codified by the Beveridge Report (1942, p.92), long embedded in the 
fabric of the English welfare state. Beveridge asserted the primacy of those who were of working age 
or who could work in future, arguing that; 
 
“It is dangerous to be in any way lavish to old age, until adequate provision has been assured for all 
other vital needs, such as the prevention of disease and the adequate nutrition of the young”. 
 
In 1944, The Nuffield Foundation surveyed housing conditions and institutional care for older people 
(Seebohm-Rowntree, 1947). The committee argued that specialist housing and smaller, modern care 
homes for older people should be built and that domiciliary care should be improved. While local 
councils had built very few smaller care homes at that time, there were a significant number in the 
voluntary sector, often offering specialist care for disabilities or religions. In 1947, Aneurin Bevan, 
Minister of Health (1945-1951), argued strongly in support of smaller residential homes where older 
people could live comfortably with dignity as guests rather than inmates. Following the National 
Assistance Act (1948) the reality was somewhat different to the policy aspiration (Townsend, 1964, 
p.20). Of the four hundred public assistance institutions that existed when the National Health Service 
was created, a quarter became centrally funded hospitals and a similar proportion residential care 
homes controlled by local councils. The remaining institutions combined both functions. In 1949, 
40,000 residents were housed in former workhouses. By 1960, the figure was still 35,000. Despite the 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
130 
 
plans made in 1948, a lack of public funding, a focus on alternative expenditure priorities and a rising 
population of older people prevented the replacement of existing provision. While local councils drew 
up development plans, these were limited by central government restrictions on capital expenditure 
(Means and Smith, 1998, p.166). The new smaller homes that opened in the 1950s and 1960s could 
meet rising demand but were insufficient to allow the closure of existing capacity. Townsend (1964, 
p.6) argues that the Poor Law was abolished to great acclaim, but no policy was introduced to replace 
it. Residential care remained a marginal, residual area. Wages were low, homes had staff recruitment 
and retention problems and less than two per cent of the retired population lived in a care home. 
Around two-thirds of the beds available were publicly managed, with half of these in large former 
workhouses that catered for the most disadvantaged and the remainder in smaller, modern local 
authority homes. The voluntary sector was considered an area of excellence and provision was 
growing rapidly while private for-profit operators were the least significant providers of care. 
 
Institutional care was widely criticised by Townsend and others in the 1960s and 1970s in the “anti-
institutional … literature of dysfunction” (Johnson, Rolph and Smith, 2010, p.10). This powerful 
critique of policy outcomes reinforced public perceptions of residential care as a ‘bad’ institution of 
last resort. The professional view that older people should be liberated from residential care was not, 
however, without its critics and institutional abolition was not achieved. Replacing care homes would 
have required significant levels of public expenditure, specialist house building and higher quality 
domiciliary care. Where new, smaller homes were built they were popular and residential care bed 
numbers continued to rise from the 1950s until the late 1990s. 
Institutional de-layering 
The programmes that make up the English welfare state have organisational cultures that are an 
accumulation of past political decisions and ideational choices made (John, 1998, p.32) and as 
importantly in the social care context, funding and other policy choices not made or obfuscated. To 
understand how social care has evolved requires an appreciation of this developmental process. A 
criticism often levelled at historical institutionalism is that it emphasises continuity and can struggle 
to explain change. While many core welfare state programmes are secure, reinforced by path 
dependency and the support of existing policy takers, English social care provision has seen significant 
recent change that we can analyse. Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests policymakers exhibit 
bounded rationality, focusing on a few key policy areas. Institutions are on a stable developmental 
path until a crisis or opportunity brings an issue to the attention of policymakers and, where 
practicable, they can change the direction of travel. In this vein, Gingrich (2011, p.185) argues that the 
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growing population of older people from the 1970s onwards caused policymakers to focus on social 
care after decades of marginalisation. Arguments for long periods of path dependent, institutional 
stability emphasise positive feedback processes that lock-in policymakers and takers (Pierson, 2004, 
p.20-22). Where institutions are strong and widely perceived to be ‘good’, we might expect long 
periods of stability with occasional short exogenously generated critical junctures where policy 
entrepreneurs can implement change. A second historical change explanation approach focuses on 
institutional evolution through endogenous processes. Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p.1) suggest that 
the impact of continual minor changes that are internally driven is also significant. For them, 
institutional settlements are not universally accepted (Thelen, 2004, p.32) and institutional 
entrepreneurs can effect change within institutions. Lewis and Glennerster (1996, p.3) argue that 
bureaucrats and organisations representing care recipients initiated a transformation in this way when 
local funding choices made by individual officers developed into the national care reforms of the early 
1980s60. Pierson (2004, p.155) argues that the political and financial costs of replacing or converting 
an existing institution will have a significant impact on institutional stability, and how change is 
implemented if policymakers decide that it is required (see Figure 8 below). Where both costs are 
high, new institutional features are likely to be layered on top of existing ones61. Where internal 
conversion costs are low and external replacement costs are high existing institutions are likely to 
adjust to changing circumstances by changing internally, an outcome consistent with the institutional 
evolution process outlined by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). Where conversion costs are high and 
replacement costs are low the institution is more likely to be replaced. 
 
  
 
60 In the previous chapter, the two cases of sustainable welfare funding reform analysed exhibit both 
exogenously driven reform and, once a focal de-centred funding institution had been created, endogenously 
driven change. 
61 Institutional layering was the reform approach adopted by policymakers in both of the sustainable welfare 
funding reform cases explored in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 8. Conversion costs, replacement costs and institutional change 
 
 
Source: Pierson (2004, p.156) 
 
The transition of the English public social care sector from provision to commissioning is explored in 
depth later in the chapter. High internal conversion costs (closing existing obsolete care homes and 
building and opening new public ones is very expensive) and low public replacement costs (the private 
sector built new care homes without using public funds) made institutional replacement (the bottom 
left quadrant above) the most likely outcome. This did, indeed, happen in the 1980s when there was 
a desire to enhance the level and quality of provision. While institutional provision was 
comprehensively transformed, existing funding mechanisms remained in place. The separation of 
provision and funding allowed the public institution to be replaced by private provision while retaining 
the exterior public funding ‘wrapper’ and minimising any negative impacts of change on citizens and 
service users. Despite outward stability, the introduction of internal quasi-markets changed how 
services were managed and delivered. 
 
This analysis by Pierson (2004, pp.153-157) helps us understand how change is likely to be structured 
when it arrives, but not when it is likely to happen. The multiple streams framework suggests that 
when the problem, policy and political ‘streams’ converge policy entrepreneurs are more likely to 
successfully enact change. In the 1980s, the problem and political streams were consistent with 
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reformed care provision and the previously blocked policy stream was unblocked by ideas, values and 
beliefs (Steinmo, 2008, p.130). The Conservatives came to power in 1979 with a desire to privatise 
where possible and to introduce market mechanisms into government and the welfare state. The 
political and institutional dynamics of social care allowed the outsourcing of care provision with little 
political cost, and the ideology of privatisation offered a new policy route to institutional replacement 
(that was not previously available to policymakers) at minimal, public financial cost, so provision was 
outsourced. In Pierson’s analysis, there is also an implicit assumption that institutions are ‘good’, and 
that greater provision would be welcomed by policy takers. What is less clearly explored is how 
institutions evolve over time if they are a ‘bad’ institution and policy takers would prefer less provision. 
Here we define a ‘bad’ institution as one that delivers a service that is deemed necessary by 
policymakers and society but is designed to stigmatise service users and disincentivise use. The 
Victorian workhouse, from which English residential care provision developed, represented the 
“ultimate sanction” (Means et al., 2002, p.166), and was an institution of this type. In the decades 
before the arrival of Thatcherism and the outsourcing options that privatisation gave policymakers to 
mobilise private capital within the welfare state, the institutional replacement cost (public de-
institutionalisation of care recipients with more sheltered housing and homecare provision) and 
conversion cost (building more modern care homes) of outdated public residential care institutions 
were both prohibitively high. Inverting the arguments made by Pierson we might, therefore, expect 
policymakers to favour long-run institutional de-layering in the years before 1979. As predicted, 
despite promised abolition, the post-war development of the workhouse is a story of institutional de-
layering over time as all bar older people escaped the public workhouse. 
Marginal, bad and underfunded 
When Townsend (1964) investigated residential care provision in the early 1960s, he found a sector 
that was marginalised and underfunded. Wages were low, homes had problems recruiting staff and 
care home facilities were often of poor quality. Costa-Font and Courbage (2011, p.5) assert that the 
underfunding of care for older people remains an issue today and that the continued marginalisation 
of English social care is far from unique. European welfare states have very different approaches to 
the funding and provision of social care, but they tend to give greater priority to core welfare 
programmes. English mixed-care institutions experienced long-run institutional de-layering. Care 
provision for children and working-age adults along with public hospitals all escaped the workhouse 
in the first half of the twentieth century. Before the rise of Thatcherism, publicly commissioned private 
social care provision was not a policy option that was considered and there was little policymaker 
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appetite to use general taxation to fund the replacement of workhouse-based social care for older 
people, so the transition to more modern provision was slow. 
3. Reform, drift and care intensification 
In Dismantling the Welfare State, Pierson (1994, p.2) argues that, despite the expectations of many 
commentators in the 1980s, there was only modest welfare state retrenchment by the Thatcher 
administration. His analysis did, however, assert that while popular universal programmes would not 
change radically in the ways in which they presented to policy takers, more marginal programmes 
could experience significant levels of immediate programmatic retrenchment. He also suggested that 
systemic retrenchment policies that reinvented institutional forms might weaken pro-welfare interest 
groups and other protections against retrenchment. While such measures might be costly to 
introduce, Pierson suggested they might make future public spending cuts more likely. 
 
The 1980s saw increasing levels of public care funding and a major change in the provision of social 
care in England. The role of local authorities was transformed from the comprehensive provision of 
care to a commissioning and procurement role62 (Fowler, 1984; Ridley, 1988, pp.16-17; Means et al., 
2002, p.135). This new model of public sector enabled private provision delivered significant levels of 
capital investment. The public sector had failed to close the old workhouses; the transition to the 
market achieved this within a decade. Gingrich (2011, p.179) argues that, unlike core welfare 
programmes like pensions and healthcare, there had been no golden age of publicly provided social 
care. The demand for significant levels of formal, non-family care for older people emerged relatively 
recently in a neoliberal environment where welfare pluralism was the dominant ideational approach 
(Bode, 2008, p.2). 
The disengaged, accidental rise of residential care 
In the late 1970s, individual social security offices began making emergency supplementary benefit 
payments where local councils were unable to fund private care residents (Lewis and Glennerster, 
1996, p.3). Conservative policymakers, looking to reject the long-standing institutional settlement and 
to promote a mixed economy of social care (Wistow et al., 1992, p.25), allowed these taxation-funded 
payments to be made available nationwide to all who passed an income and asset-based means test 
(Brooks, Regan and Robinson, 2002, p.51) with the number of funded care beds limited only by the 
 
62 In a speech to the Social Services Annual Conference, Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Services (1981-1987) argued that enabling not providing should be central to the role of local council social 
services departments (Fowler, 1984). 
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number of residents that met the financial criteria. Payments covered board, lodging and personal 
expense costs, were only payable to those living in private residential care homes and were not 
available for domiciliary services. Unsurprisingly, there was a rapid expansion in private sector 
residential care provision and a corresponding smaller decline in public provision. Gash and Roos 
(2012, p.20) argue that far from being a planned policy, a lack of local council funding in the early 
1980s led various voluntary sector homes to arrange local agreements to meet unpaid resident fees. 
This policy ‘accident’ at a critical juncture was escalated by disengaged policymakers63 into a 
nationwide policy that transformed the nature of social care provision over the course of a decade. 
Gingrich (2011, p.175) describes the care market that emerged with a strong bias towards private 
residential provision and minimal quality regulation as a producer-driven pork barrel market. This 
insulated care home residents from excessive costs and allowed private providers to achieve stable, 
guaranteed income from public finance; care home operators enjoyed significant market power as the 
state had underwritten care financing. She argues that this laissez-faire approach was motivated by a 
desire to see private providers innovate and invest in care provision. Midwinter, in a report that 
explores the changing role of English residential care (Lievesley et al., 2011, p.11) suggests that for a 
brief point in the early 1980s; 
 
“residential care could be a social lifestyle option rather than a clinical necessity”. 
 
An alternative explanation for the drive to significantly increase the level of private residential care 
provision focuses on the interface between social care and health care (Means et al., 2002, p.79). The 
twenty years to 2010 saw a significant reduction in the number of more expensive and non-means 
tested National Health Service ‘back ward’ geriatric beds (bed numbers fell by 60% between 1987 and 
2010). While this declining trend has been repeated across all non-acute hospital areas, occupancy 
rates for geriatric beds are significantly higher than for other bed types, suggesting they are in the 
highest demand (Lievesley et al., 2011, p.15). The rise in the number of residential and nursing care 
beds (up from less than 300,000 in 1970 to significantly more than 500,000 in 1996, although lower 
today) and the rise of private provision within residential care (up from 10% of total provision in 1970 
to more than 60% in 2005) meant that most free at the point of use core welfare state National Health 
Service geriatric hospital beds and existing means-tested publicly delivered residential care home 
 
63 Norman Fowler was responsible for health and social care throughout the period of social care reform and the 
rise of residential care provision. In his memoirs (Fowler, 1991, pp.183-224) he discusses NHS reforms and 
changes made to SERPS (analysed in the previous chapter) at length but makes no mention of social care. 
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places for older people were replaced by means-tested private social care provision between 1980 
and 2010. 
Funding insecurity and institutional drift 
While the National Health Service savings generated by fewer geriatric beds were significant, the 
unrestricted cost of general taxation funded private provision started to grow. Gingrich (2011, p.181) 
notes that social security care fee payments rose from £6m in the late 1970s to £2.4bn in 1991. Council 
funded residential care spending for older people was flat during the 1980s, rising from £914m in 1981 
to £957m in 1990 (both figures in 1991 prices) (Knapp and Wistow, 1996, p.358). Centrally funded, 
supplementary benefit financing for residential care went from virtually nil to more than two thirds of 
residential care funding in less than a decade. Local government ‘home help’ spending also rose from 
£405m to £604m over the same period (Knapp and Wistow, 1996, p.358) but remained a secondary 
element in the formal social care mix. The Firth Committee (1987) and the Audit Commission (1986) 
argued that the unplanned funding arrangements that had emerged were inefficient and “perverse” 
(Audit Commission, 1986, p. 28) as they incentivised more expensive private residential care provision 
over cheaper domiciliary care. The Committee also noted that the system caused some to be placed 
in residential care when they would rather have remained at home. Conservative policymakers did 
not want to give greater funding responsibility to local government (Ridley, 1988, p.6), but Griffiths 
(1988) and others (Audit Commission, 1986), eventually convinced them that something had to be 
done64. Griffiths noted a lack of policymaker leadership and strategic direction, arguing that (Griffiths, 
1988, p.iv); 
 
“community care is a poor relation, everybody’s distant relative but nobody’s baby”. 
 
He recommended that responsibility for all social care spending (both domiciliary and residential) 
should revert to local government. Councils would then be able to commission the appropriate care 
package from a range of providers, with less of a structural (central government) bias towards more 
expensive residential care. Griffiths also argued a Minister for Community Care should be appointed 
and that central government grant funding for social care should be ring fenced. The Conservative 
 
64 A social care consultant argues “there was huge resistance to … Griffiths from central government. Local 
government embraced it, central government … took forever and … Thatcher said it was the least-worst 
alternative. That was the Conservative view of local government. … All the alternatives for social care funding 
were considered. When none … would work they decided they would have to go with local government” 
(Interviewee 023, 2018). 
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government remained unhappy about giving councils a greater funding role65 (Means et al., 2002, p. 
4), but as the cost of taxation-funded private residential care became increasingly unsustainable 
(Lewis and Glennister, 1996, p.6) and, mirroring the situation today, policymakers lacked realistic 
alternatives that could be deployed, they eventually decided to reform care funding much as Griffiths 
proposed. The National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) transferred funding and case 
management from centrally funded supplementary benefit back to local councils. This switch moved 
away from open-ended per capita funding for all older people that met the financial criteria (a defined 
benefit approach) to local council block grants (defined contribution) with incentives to encourage 
competition by outsourcing provision (Means et al., 2002, p.130) and to drive down the cost of 
provision. The twin goals were to restore budgetary control and to integrate residential and 
domiciliary care budgets, allowing those that wished to remain at home to do so. While the Social 
Services Select Committee and many commentators (Gingrich, 2011, p.187) agreed with Griffiths that 
care funding should be hypothecated, the government only agreed to do this for a transition period, 
preferring to blur accountability and remain less engaged by not dictating care spending priorities to 
local government. Despite this, care professionals broadly welcomed the proposals and local councils 
were keen to take on additional responsibilities. Care recipients and providers were less enthusiastic 
about the reforms, so existing claimants were exempted from the changes and providers were 
compensated. Gingrich (2011, p.17) terms this new market structure a private power market. She 
argues that residential care home providers still dominated the market but now sought to extract 
income from welfare consumers (Baldock, 2003, p.69) rather than rent seeking from public funds as 
had previously been the case. This was done by charging additional fees on top of public funding to 
residents and, with information asymmetries on service levels and a lack of regulation, by reducing 
quality. Gingrich argues that an outsourced social care market structure of this type is likely to emerge 
where fiscal constraints limit the scope of public funding. 
Constrained residential care funding66 
Between 1980 and the early 1990s, the relatively generous pork barrel market structure allowed most 
residential care provision to be outsourced from state to private providers, with many small private 
 
65 Lewis and Glennerster (1996, p.6) argue that Margaret Thatcher was against curtailing social security 
payments for residential care as this would have closed many small private homes that she wanted to support. 
Having considered all the alternatives, Conservative policymakers resolved that the only feasible institutional 
approach to managing and funding de-centred community care was through local council social services 
departments. This was anathema to the Prime Minister so reforms were delayed and care funding costs spiraled. 
66 A care provider manager (Interviewee 020, 2017) argues that the current social care funding crisis is 
significantly worse than the situation in the late 1990s. While providers struggled with increasing regulation and 
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operators controlling one or two care homes. Once the transition to mostly private provision had been 
secured, a move from direct central government care funding to non-hypothecated block grants paid 
to local government changed the policy direction. The funding reforms incentivised councils to tighten 
the eligibility criteria for residential care beds, and the approval criteria shifted from a purely financial 
means-test to one that included a needs assessment. The Audit Commission suggested that these 
assessments could be used to ration care with the criteria adopted by councils varied locally to match 
demand and funding in council areas. This regime of tighter eligibility criteria, caps on fee rates paid 
and increasing regulation by the newly introduced National Care Standards Commission drove 
industry consolidation as many smaller private and voluntary operators exited the sector. Exogenous 
factors also impacted care providers, with the introduction of the national minimum wage and 
European working time directive which both increased care home costs. Between 1995 and 2005, 
continued reductions in local authority provision and the closure of smaller private homes saw a fall 
in the number of available beds from 570,000 (Lievesley et al., 2011, p.4) to 470,000. After decades of 
growth, the rate of home closures reached 5% of homes closing each year. While noting staffing issues, 
Netten et al. (2005, p.331) argue compellingly that the primary cause of closures and market exit was 
financial. Rising staff costs, static income per resident and growing care intensity as councils tightened 
eligibility criteria for home entry all added to the burdens. Those closing homes stated that the major 
factor causing closures was the failure of local authorities to adequately fund the provision of care. 
Councils had significant market power and used it to reduce supplier margins. Care home closures 
started to become a significant political issue. The response of the Labour government to public 
concern about the number of homes that were closing and the pressure that the reduction in capacity 
was putting on hospitals was to allow the level of funding to rise and to reduce the level of regulatory 
pressure that homes were experiencing. Policymakers increased local government commissioned 
social care spending significantly from 2000 onwards, and expenditure reached £19.2bn67 in 2010 
(NHS Digital, 2018, T4). Care bed numbers started to stabilise, but the market structure had changed 
with larger, more professional care home operators now in place. While noting that this short-run 
funding policy change had successfully stabilised the number of beds, Netten et al. argue that; 
 
“central government funding is not ring-fenced and there are many other calls on local authority 
resources” (Netten et al., 2005, p.335). 
 
 
care costs in the past, he suggests there are now more serious labour market supply problems (particularly for 
nursing staff) and regulation is becoming much more onerous. 
67 The NHS Digital expenditure figures quoted are indexed to September 2018 prices. 
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They expressed concerns about a lack of strategic planning, the lack of risk sharing (with most risk 
being taken by the private care provider organisations), uncertain medium-term funding and future 
levels of quality regulation. This left them unconvinced that the funding mechanisms in place would 
deliver suitable levels of long-run investment in the sector. 
Intensification and austerity 
In the absence of the ring-fenced funding recommended by Netten et al., the recent history of English 
public social care has seen cost containment, increasing levels of care rationing, policy drift and since 
2010, a focus on financial austerity. Following the 2008 financial crisis, austerity policies reduced local 
government care expenditure to £17.9bn in 2018 (NHS Digital, 2018, T4) (7% below the level of 
spending in 2010) at a time of growing demand pressures. While care marketisation initially increased 
investment, greater institutional complexity and the separation of commissioning and provision 
compounded sector marginality and, as predicted by Pierson (1994, p.16), the politically obscured, de-
centralised institutional arrangements gave reduced protection against cost-cutting in times of 
austerity. Without the sustainable, upwardly path dependent funding mechanisms enjoyed by the two 
comparator welfare programmes, per capita care funding fell significantly, accelerating the existing 
trend towards increasing care intensity with more care beds being allocated to those with dementia 
and other chronic conditions. As the intensification of residential care provision increased, there was 
also an acceleration in the relative decline of domiciliary and preventative care. While the number of 
publicly funded service users in residential care beds fell by 17% between 2006 and 2014, domiciliary 
care provision fell by 34% (see Figure 9 below) while the number of people aged over 65 increased by 
10% in the same period. 
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Figure 9. English service users receiving social care commissioned by local authorities (2006 to 
2014) 
 
 
Source: Burchardt et al. (2015, pp.30-31) citing NASCIS RAP proforma P2f. 
Burchardt et al. (2015, p.52) do, however, note that public expenditure on formal social care for older 
people has failed to keep pace with growing need since the mid-2000s, and while years of austerity 
have caused a significant reduction in the level of per capita public social care funding, care 
intensification pre-dates austerity. Across Europe, ageing societies have generated increasing demand 
and a growing belief that social care should be treated as a social risk rather than being a family risk. 
Following the financial crisis and widespread financial austerity, policy has, however, increasingly 
turned to the family to deliver and, in some countries, fund non-intensive social care while formal 
provision has seen care intensification. Oesterle and Rothgang (2010, p.382) argue that there is no 
optimal level of formal residential and domiciliary care and that developed societies have arrived at 
very different care model equilibria based on cultural norms and past institutional development68. 
 
68 Anttonen and Sipilä (1996, p.96) developed a typography for European social care regimes in the early 1990s. 
They note two distinct care models (a Scandinavian universal, publicly funded and delivered care model and a 
southern European informal family care model in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy) and two less distinct models; 
a central European subsidiarity model (Germany and Netherlands) where responsibility lies with the family, 
formal provision is delivered by not-for-profits and care is funded by the state and, a neoliberal, British means-
tested safety-net model with a reliance on family funding and care. Timonen (2005, p.32) proposes a similar 
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They illustrate this point using OECD care home bed statistics. In 2006, bed density rates ranged from 
less than 20 beds per 1,000 people aged 65+ in Italy, to more than 80 beds in Sweden and between 
40 and 60 beds across much of Europe, USA and Australia. When Pavolini and Ranci (2008, p.257) 
analysed social care policy reforms enacted in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
the UK, they noted two broad trends: the introduction of policies that fund, support and incentivise 
less intensive family care to complement existing in-kind formal provision, and the introduction of 
social care markets that draw on private capital and utilise competitive processes to encourage 
efficiency, service innovation and offer greater choice. They argue that the mix of these reforms 
chosen by policymakers is mediated by existing national welfare institutions and traditions. Reviewing 
the structure of care in the mid-1990s they placed the UK in the middle of a European social care 
continuum69 that ranged from Sweden, with an in-kind service-led approach to Italy with a strong 
tradition of family care. Pavoloni and Ranci then explored how social care has developed since the 
mid-1990s, arguing that other than Italy, where there has been little change, the broad trend is 
towards programme convergence. Existing social care models were not fit for purpose; universal 
healthcare provision targeted acute care rather than long-run dependency, funding was insufficient 
and family support under pressure with the dependency ratio and female labour market participation 
rates both increasing. In 1996, Sweden and the UK had the highest levels of domiciliary care of the 
countries reviewed. Policy reforms in the decade to 2005 saw both countries reduce the number of 
older people receiving homecare. The average number of hours of care received per recipient did 
however increase leaving overall expenditure in the UK broadly unchanged as provision became more 
intensive and targeted (Laing Buisson, 2016). 
  
 
typography. Under the statist (social democrat) approach the state funds and provides formal care, the family / 
individual (liberal) approach sees family or the care recipient responsible for funding care with means-tested 
public provision when funds are exhausted, and in the state pays and others provide (conservative) approach 
formal care is funded publicly but provision is shared by family, the voluntary sector and the for-profit private 
sector. 
69 Pavolini and Ranci (2008, p.247) categorised countries based on the percentage of those aged over 65 
receiving formal social care. In the mid-1990s, Sweden (21%) was high, the UK (14%) medium and Italy (3%) had 
low levels of formal provision. 
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Figure 10. English adult social care expenditure and informal adult care output value (2008 to 
2014) 
 
 
Sources: Burchardt et al. (2015, p.18) citing NASCIS PSS-EX1 and ONS (2016a). 
 
More recently, policymakers in England have allowed the expenditure neutral intensification of care 
to morph into significant declines in domiciliary care coverage and expenditure (see Figure 9 above). 
Absolute funding reductions, increasing demand and care intensification have shifted the care mix 
towards two institutions that have long had primacy in the provision of English social care for older 
people: family and the residential care home. The growing importance of family care can be seen in 
Figure 10 above which compares total council spending on adult social care services with the ONS 
estimate of the volume and value of informal adult social care given between 2008 and 2014. While 
council spending rose modestly, plateaued and then fell, informal care (by value) rose by 18% in the 
period. The ONS valuation of informal adult care in 2014 was 260% higher than public council spending 
on formal adult care (ONS, 2016a). Burchardt et al. (2015, p.27) also report that between 2009 and 
2013 there was a 17% increase in the number of self-funding care home residents with self-funding 
payments up from £4.8bn to £6bn in the period (Laing, 2017, p.14).  
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From systemic to actual retrenchment 
Across Europe, welfare states remain focused on existing policy takers and core programmes tend to 
be resistant to change. Social care for older people is, however, a residual, marginal welfare area in 
many countries and has been more open to innovation in programme delivery and funding. This 
potential for adaptability driven by policy entrepreneurs and policymakers with innovative ideas and 
beliefs can be seen in the transformation of English residential care provision in the 1980s. The 
outsourcing of formal social care delivered layered provision in a partnership between public agencies, 
private companies, not-for-profit organisations and families. Reforming social care provision in 
England was, however, expensive and the transition period saw a significant increase in care spending 
(Gingrich, 2011, p.181). While the Conservative administration enacted significant changes in how 
formal social care was delivered, there was little policymaker focus on engineering sustainable public 
funding, encouraging risk pooling or increasing the variety of funding sources and central government 
opted to disengage from funding decisions. This policy approach, along with public unwillingness to 
engage with the need to individually fund social care, left most citizens making little or no personal 
provision for potential social care costs, increasing the cost pressures on publicly funded care. 
 
In the past twenty years, English policymakers have sought to manage increasing demand for social 
care while controlling expenditure by ‘encouraging’ local government to toughen eligibility criteria 
(reducing the share of the population receiving public social care), focusing additional resources (using 
the National Health Service funding channel) on the boundary between health and social care (Means 
et al., 2002, p.73) and reducing the per-recipient net public cost of provision by facilitating private co-
payments. The intensification and rationing of formal care (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.34) has reinforced 
the position of public and private residential care and the family as the two dominant institutional 
traditions in social care. Domiciliary care and funding to support family care have been reduced in 
scope and there has been a significant growth in the level of unmet need (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.44). 
While this approach can limit short-term increases in care spending, demographic, social and 
economic trends (Pickard et al., 2007, p.363; Baumol, 2012, p.4) all suggest that there is a need to 
better support existing informal provision and to enhance the funding of formal, non-family social care 
(Colombo et al., 2011, p.13). 
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4. Policymaker rejection of centralised funding 
 
In the 1997 election, the Labour Party manifesto (Labour, 1997) promised to introduce a ‘fair’ system 
to fund long-term care for older people and to improve the regulation of residential and domiciliary 
care. Having been elected with a large parliamentary majority, Tony Blair (1997) told the Labour Party 
conference; 
“I don’t want (our children) brought up in a country where the only way pensioners can get long-term 
care is by selling their home.”70 
A Royal Commission was established in December 1997 tasked with proposing a new funding 
approach, and the Sutherland report was published in March 1999. While acknowledging that there 
was “no obvious answer” (Brindle, 2009) to the social care funding problem, the report argued self-
insurance was an inappropriate way to fund social care for older people and proposed that care risks 
should be pooled with free, universal nursing and personal care for all funded by general taxation and 
a more generous means-test for ‘hotel’ care costs (Jarrett, 2017, p.4). 
Self-insurance, housing and family 
Despite policy aspirations to the contrary, home ownership as personal social care self-insurance 
remains the primary funding source for private formal care in England. Using housing wealth as a 
savings vehicle is problematic as houses are an imperfect, illiquid instrument to pay for care (Laferrère, 
2011, p.73) and the approach requires house prices to rise significantly over the course of a lifetime 
to generate the capital required to fund care in old age. In the absence of a robust public social care 
funding solution and an economic environment where house prices have historically risen, this funding 
approach emerged in an unplanned way. English private care insurance lacks meaningful public 
support, policymakers have not offered fiscal incentives or used regulatory welfare, and the market 
has failed to develop. Colombo et al. (2011, p.258) argue that without compulsion or public subsidy, 
private social care insurance will remain, at best, a niche product. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981, p.372) 
suggest that informal care by the family is preferred and crowds out formal care funded by private 
insurance, while Oesterle and Rothgang (2010, p.378) argue the reverse, that the continuing 
importance of family provision within the social care sector is driven by the relatively low priority given 
to caring for older people across the OECD. Willetts (2010, p.8) notes that family and the welfare state 
 
70 In July 2019 Boris Johnson, in his first speech as Prime Minister, mirrored Tony Blair’s language when he 
asserted “my job is to protect you or your parents or grandparents from the fear of having to sell your home to 
pay for the costs of care” (Campbell, 2019). 
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are the main institutions that manage and co-ordinate welfare funding and provision. In many areas 
the welfare state has become the primary welfare institution, but social care for older people is one 
of the few welfare realms where the family retains primacy with most social care still provided by 
family and friends (Colombo et al. 2011, p.43; Oesterle and Rothgang, 2010, p.384). 
The case for risk pooling 
Barr (2011, p.3) argues that the English self-insurance model is inefficient, and that there are strong 
theoretical reasons to fund social care using collective insurance. Where individuals are risk averse, 
he demonstrates that the widespread adoption of long-term care insurance would deliver significant 
social welfare gains as pooling the financial risks of old age removes uncertainty while leaving the 
average expected value of the cost of care unchanged. When Barr (2011, pp.4-15) compares private 
and public social care insurance, he notes that private actuarial insurance is based on an ability to 
quantify and manage risk. He argues long-term care insurance is characterised by uncertainty about 
the likely cost and duration of care required by older people. As these factors are very hard to quantify, 
pure market solutions are likely to be prohibitively expensive (Colombo et al., 2011, p.251).  This 
suggests that public risk pooling is the most efficient and equitable approach to funding the care needs 
of older people. Barr’s preferred funding approach is public care spending financed by ring-fenced 
social insurance (2011, p.12), but he argues that, despite the actuarial problems, policymakers can 
construct a hypothecated private insurance market that is preferable to the current English taxation 
funded approach which lacks funding sustainability mechanisms in times of austerity. The state can 
use a fiscal and regulatory welfare approach to design, promote and regulate private social care 
insurance products that enhance societal welfare at little or no public cost and achieve a similar 
funding outcome to a public social insurance scheme. The Dilnot Commission (2011) drew on this 
analysis and recommended a ceiling on individual lifetime residential care spending for all citizens. 
The policy was included in the 2015 Conservative Party manifesto (Conservative, 2015, p.65) with a 
limit on lifetime care fees payable. If implemented, the cap would have made a basic level of long-
term residential care a universal benefit. 
Continuing funding policy disengagement 
In July 2000, the Labour Government accepted the case for universal general taxation funded nursing 
care but rejected the proposal for free personal care that was also made by Sutherland (1999), arguing 
this would be expensive (impacting resources already committed to the National Health Service), may 
not improve services (a point made in a note of dissent to the report) and would not help poor 
pensioners as they already had access to means-tested funding (Jarrett, 2017, p.5). Over the following 
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two decades, commission after commission has deliberated on the direction of English social care 
policy (Comas-Herrera et al., 2011, p.151); these include Wanless (2006), the National Care Service 
(2010) and Dilnot (2011). The focus of recommendations made has included appropriate levels of 
provision, continuity of service, and a desire to make social care provision more equitable. Dilnot 
(2011) proposed layered public and private funding with co-payments for hotel costs and recipient 
top up fees as required. A care fee cap was designed to encourage the creation of private care 
insurance products that could fund, the now quantifiable, capped non-public care fees. Fiscal welfare, 
regulatory welfare and behavioural economics could then be used to ‘guide’ citizens towards taking 
up such products. The Care Act (2014) introduced a lifetime cap on care fees of £72,000 with a policy 
start date of April 2016. The introduction of the Dilnot care cap was later deferred until 2020 at the 
request of local councils (who were charged with delivering the reform) and the monies saved 
allocated to support existing provision. It was dropped altogether in 2018. 
Conservative and Labour policymakers have actively engaged with social care funding three times over 
the past thirty years. In each case they have rejected centralised care funding and opted to return 
(1990) / leave (2000 and 2018) the financing of publicly commissioned care spending to local 
government. When Conservative policymakers were considering care funding approaches in the late 
1980s, they decided, despite an unwillingness to pass greater responsibilities to councils, that there 
was no serious alternative. In the two more recent points of potential path deviation, policymakers 
have considered a universal entitlement to funded personal care (2000) and long-term residential care 
(2018) in England (that would still be managed by local government) but rejected the approach on the 
grounds of cost. Continuing social care funding policy disengagement has been the preferred 
policymaker approach. 
5. English social care in 2020 
Having analysed the historical and recent development of English social care and discussed past 
policymaker rejections of commission proposed, publicly funded universal personal care for all, the 
chapter concludes by considering the nature of the social care institutions that have evolved in 2020. 
The English public social care regime is broad in scope but unhelpfully complicated to navigate for 
those needing care, significantly less well funded than it was before the financial crisis of 2008, 
commissioned by marginalised local government, dysfunctionally funded by cross-subsidisation from 
private care recipients and by redirecting funds supposedly destined for other non-statutory areas of 
local government, and often delivered by thousands of private care providers who are paid below the 
‘fair’ cost of care. Despite past policy reforms that attempted to offer individual care budgets, better 
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integrate social care with the National Health Service and cap the lifetime cost of care, there has been 
little lasting success in any of these areas. English social care is a significant yet marginal, de-centred 
welfare programme that lacks a sustainable source of funding. A decade of continued disengagement 
combined with financial austerity have made provision even less coherent and harder for 
policymakers to steer. Central government has long struggled with the wicked institutional problems 
that beset social care and remains unclear about how to address these and reform public care funding. 
Few policy levers for policymakers 
The social care funding regime has evolved piecemeal over decades and there is no national care 
budget (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.16). Publicly commissioned social care (2017 – £16.8bn) is funded by 
local council taxation and business rates, a non-hypothecated revenue support grant (funded by 
general taxation, paid from central to local government and managed by the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government) and payments made by care recipients. This core funding is 
augmented by targeted additional funding from the Department of Health via National Health Service 
budgets (the Better Care Fund) and an additional hypothecated adult social care support grant from 
central government. The Department of Work and Pensions also pay attendance allowance (2017 – 
£4.7bn), disability living allowance (2016/17 – £3.6bn) and carers allowance (£2.3bn) to carers and 
those needing care (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.16). 
With a lack of central oversight and strategic direction, a regular complaint made by those who need 
support from the English care system is that provision and funding are complicated to understand and 
hard for those needing care and their families to navigate. A social care consultant argues that few 
people, including policymakers, really understand the system or why it has developed over time in the 
ways that it has. They suggest that supposed solutions introduced by policymakers often do not take 
account of these complexities and interrelationships, and that reforms tend to be underfunded 
(Interviewee 023, 2018). While the outsourcing of public care provision has contributed to growing 
complexity and incoherence (Innes, 2017, p. S35), the passage of time in a mature welfare state is also 
a contributory factor. The political cost of cancelling existing benefits can be high, so new policy 
initiatives are often layered on top of earlier ones without fully replacing them. As an example, 
Slasberg and Beresford (2018) argue that care personalisation and the introduction of personal care 
budgets was a major policy focus in the recent past but has now been marginalised, but not abolished. 
While the Care Act (2014) put personal budgets on a statutory footing, they suggest that austerity has 
rendered them “undeliverable” (Slasberg and Beresford, 2018). 
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English social care is provided by (in order of magnitude) the family, private sector and the state, and 
the care mix has multiple dimensions: health or social care, formal or informal care, residential or 
domiciliary care, public or private care and support in-cash or in-kind. Informal care is delivered to 
older people by millions of friends and family members, the market for social care provision in England 
is mature, complex and diverse with more than 20,000 provider organisations (Gash and Roos, 2012, 
p.21) active in the sector and care policy and commissioning is distributed between 125 single-tier, 
‘unitary’ local councils and 27 county councils (Sandford, 2018, p.4). Following decades of deliberate 
central government policymaker non-engagement, a former Department of Health Civil Servant 
(Interviewee 026, 2018) argues that the department is remote from local authority delivered social 
care, there are few policy levers available to central government policymakers and the divide between 
local government and the department is almost as great as the public sector / private sector split. As 
a result, central government employs a regulatory approach when attempting to guide council activity, 
using legislation and statutory instruments to influence devolved organisations as there are no real 
financial incentives available. Local government social care commissioning and (usually) private 
provision are therefore governed by primary legislation, regulations, codes of best practice and 
guidance drafted / issued by the Department of Health and Social Care. This view is supported by a 
local government social care manager who agreed that “the Department of Health [and Social Care] 
is fairly remote from council social care activity … local actors in the National Health Service and local 
council drive local policy choices” (Interviewee 027, 2018). 
Systemic care funding problems 
The impact of post-2010 austerity on government spending has been asymmetric. Expenditure 
programmes within the legacy core welfare state that enjoy broad popular support and a high public 
profile (such as the National Health Service) and those with protected, defined benefit status (such as 
the state pension) have seen public spending rise despite austerity. Local government funding does 
not enjoy these institutional and social solidarity protections and offers central government 
policymakers an opportunity to share responsibility for reductions in public expenditure. This 
opportunity was taken in the early years of austerity. Initially, falling funding delivered organisational 
change within council social care commissioning budgets and improved efficiency (Interviewee 027, 
2018). Austerity was not however deployed strategically by policymakers to enhance operational 
performance; it was a blunt instrument used to reduce government spending. The National Audit 
Office reports real terms local government funding from central government fell by 49.1% and 
spending on council services fell by 32.6% between 2011 and 2018, with the difference between the 
two reductions being made up by higher local taxation, more user charges and drawing down of 
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reserves (National Audit Office, 2018, p.4). Within falling budgets, local government policymakers 
prioritised social care spending (which fell by 3% in the same period), but on-going expenditure cuts 
have degraded the quality and quantity of social care capacity as care providers have responded to 
care payments that have fallen below the ‘fair’ cost of care by reducing investment in human and 
physical capital71 and in some circumstances, exiting contracts and moving away from providing 
publicly commissioned care. Social care spending cuts have been focused on the areas of highest 
deprivation (in areas where deprivation is lowest, spending has risen) and spending has tended to 
switch away from prevention towards crisis management (Tinson et al., 2018, p.6). A Competition and 
Markets Authority report (2017, p.6) argues that the current publicly commissioned care provision 
model is unsustainable.  
Austerity has highlighted structural problems with the local government funding channel. Many care 
providers now routinely charge private care recipients higher user charges, cross-subsidising their 
publicly funded clients (Jarrett, 2018a, p.7). On-going funding cuts have similarly forced councils to 
finance social care using funds allocated by central government for use in other areas. This budgetary 
approach is dysfunctional and is undermining the unitary / non-unitary structure of English local 
government. A greater proportion of unitary council spending is discretionary, which allows more 
discretionary funding to be used to cross-subsidise statutory areas than in non-unitary councils. 
Austerity has had an asymmetric impact on otherwise similar local government areas because of this 
funding anomaly. Between 2011 and 2013 there was a “bonfire of ringfenced funding” which gave 
councils greater scope to reallocate funding towards statutory (legally required by central 
government) areas of activity. Finance managers working in local government are understandably 
keen to minimise funding ring-fencing to maximise their operational flexibility (Interviewee 030, 
2018). 
While an on-going tightening of care eligibility criteria (care intensification) and a freeze on rises in 
care fees paid to provider organisations were deployed as an initial response to austerity, further use 
of these options is becoming increasingly unrealistic. In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of local council 
social care moved from direct public provision towards public commissioning. A decade of austerity 
has now started to shift the focus towards the facilitation of community assets72. A local government 
 
71 The ONS (2019) reports that English residential and nursing care output fell in every year from 2005 to 2018, 
productivity in care homes fell by 1.8% in 2018 and overall publicly funded social care productivity was lower in 
2018 than in 1997. 
72 In his Big Society Speech, David Cameron (2010) argued that community empowerment could redistribute 
power from “elites in Whitehall to the man and woman on the street” and that the state should “push power 
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social care manager argues that the funding squeeze has gone much too far, but it has encouraged 
better targeting of resources, more innovative approaches to the delivery of care (the council has 
helped create local volunteer care agencies) and greater use of technology. Much of this is out of 
necessity (Interviewee 027, 2018). The move from council provision to the paid commissioning of 
private care fragmented control in the 1980s, substituting VCSE (Voluntary, Community and Social 
Enterprise) groups with their own distinct agendas for private-for-profit homecare providers makes it 
even harder to direct provision locally (Interviewee 027, 2018) and to regulate and monitor quality 
from Whitehall. 
The on-going public austerity agenda has driven some major care operators to start moving their focus 
away from publicly funded residential care, towards privately funded care and other private care 
approaches (Interviewee 020, 2017). These include retirement villages offering a spectrum of care 
provision in one location, from sheltered housing through to a nursing home. All are, however, entirely 
private. Large legacy operations providing publicly commissioned care will remain, but investment 
there is not a priority. Recent moves in the publicly commissioned care market have also seen a 
gradual drift away from nationwide care businesses towards more focused regional operators that 
enjoy strong local connections with specific commissioning councils (Interviewee 020, 2017). Publicly 
commissioned care is losing access to significant areas of best practice and the drift towards regional 
operators will increase care fragmentation still further. 
National Health Service incompatibility 
Publicly commissioned private social care provision and care benefit funding are not just fragmented 
and lacking coherence, they are also poorly integrated with the National Health Service. Shortly after 
the 1997 general election Frank Dobson, Secretary of State for Health (1997 – 1999), stated that he 
wanted to bring down the “Berlin Wall” (Dobson, 1997) that existed between health and social care. 
Little progress has been made. Orren and Skowronek (2004, p.322) argue that points of contact and 
interaction between inconsistent institutional and ideational orders operating in a common space are 
likely to lead to conflict. They suggest that institutional orders can emerge and congeal in very 
different periods of historical development, may be configured differently and be based on an 
incompatible ethos to other parallel institutions. 
  
 
away from central government to local government and … drive it down …to communities, neighbourhoods and 
individuals”. 
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Table 11. English social care policy regimes 
 
The health and social care policy regimes that operate in the English social care sphere emerged and 
matured in very different eras. As a result, the funding approach, methods of provision and the 
ideational basis of the institutions themselves differ significantly. Some of these differences are 
documented in Table 11 above. A National Health Service Trust director argues that there are ‘political’ 
and cultural issues (Interviewee 022, 2018) that reduce the scope for the National Health Service to 
make use of existing private-for-profit social care provision to reduce pressure on hospital beds. These 
cultural impediments to more integrated health and social care provision are reinforced by budgetary 
factors. The structure of existing budgets limits the scope for National Health Service institutions to 
outsource provision. High fixed (mostly staff) costs and low variable costs mean that National Health 
Service Trusts aim to maximise bed occupancy levels to hold down the per capita cost of healthcare. 
There are also significant incentives within the National Health Service for Trusts to develop their own 
care provision using available capital budgets. Building in-house facilities rather than paying for 
predominantly private social care beds (which are readily available) also reduces on-going operational 
expenditure, which is funded by a separate revenue budget (Interviewee 022, 2018). 
These blocks on the National Health Service and private-for-profit organisations working together 
were also noted by a senior manager working for a large care provider. He suggested that Better Care 
Fund monies do not get through to private care homes and presumed that they end up being spent 
within local government and by the National Health Service (Interviewee 020, 2017). National Health 
Service Trusts are, however, more willing to work collaboratively with charities, not-for-profits and 
other public-sector organisations, utilising a “raft of charity services offering support, day centres or 
helplines” (Interviewee 022, 2018). In the council area represented by an interviewed councillor 
(Interviewee 024, 2018) the adult social care team (offering short-term residential, domiciliary and 
respite care) works closely with the National Health Service and is funded by the Better Care Fund to 
help reduce hospital admissions and support those leaving hospital. This is one of the few areas where 
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council care provision is in-house and delivered by public sector staff. Similarly, discussions with a 
council social care commissioning manager (Interviewee 027, 2018) suggested that the council care 
commissioning function works reasonably well with the local National Health Service organisations 
although there are budget disputes in grey areas of funding ambiguity. 
Wicked institutional problems 
English social care policymakers are beset with wicked problems. Worsening demography, rising per 
capita care costs, families becoming less able to provide care and a mature welfare state that has 
become less relevant over time, all suggest that significantly higher (and rising) levels of spending will 
be needed in the coming decades just to continue delivering existing levels of care eligibility (Grant 
Thornton, 2018, p.8). Central government has historically left the strategic and operational 
management of social care to local government, while announcing often underfunded regulatory 
welfare policy initiatives (Interviewee 023, 2018) such as the Care Act (2014) which established a 
standardised national threshold for care eligibility where councils had previously assessed need 
independently. This hands-off policymaking approach combined with increasing levels of centrally 
mandated regulation has resulted in an increasingly fragmented, confused funding and policy 
environment with an assortment of under delivered initiatives that persist but are often not 
adequately funded. Devolved social care proved useful when policymakers wanted to share the blame 
for financial austerity, but the growing impact of spending cuts and a lack of policy levers or a clear 
funding channel for central government when policymakers choose to engage and want to steer, 
underpin growing calls for a new, centrally controlled more sustainable funding approach that would 
give the centre greater influence over funding policy choices and could be designed to deliver more 
appropriate levels of care funding73. 
6. Disengagement and institutional drift 
When Townsend (1964) surveyed public residential care provision he found a marginal, fragmented 
and underfunded welfare programme. The residual nature and low salience of English social care 
persisted and facilitated radical Conservative reforms in the 1980s when private providers were 
encouraged to embrace a boom in publicly commissioned private residential care that delivered 
significant capital investment and transformed the national care home estate. The reforms did not 
however address the need to secure and structure sustainable sources of public or private social care 
 
73 The introduction of German long-term care insurance in the mid-1990s gave central government policymakers 
a de-centred institutional mechanism that allowed them to directly control provision and funding policy, 
delivering both of these objectives. 
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funding. They also undermined the modest institutional protections that had previously existed 
against reductions in provision, and increased the scope for later retrenchment (Pierson, 1994, p.146). 
The historical development of English social care has been as much about choices avoided as about 
reforms introduced. The evolution of care funding has seen central government policymaker 
disengagement, policy ‘accidents’ (supplementary benefit emerging as a funding approach for 
residential care until the cost became unsustainable), the emergence of unplanned funding 
approaches (housing wealth becoming a self-insurance savings vehicle), the use of underfunded arms-
length regulatory welfare to drive policy outcomes and targeted funding fixes to address specific 
policymaker concerns rather than reforming the funding system as a whole (the Better Care Fund). 
 
Despite radical provision reforms and more publicly funded domiciliary care in the 2000s, the historical 
contours of English social care remain strong. Post-2010 austerity has accelerated a reversion to 
informal care by the family and formal residential care. While social care suffers from systemic 
underfunding, older people do have means tested access to a broad care sector and there are deeply 
embedded, devolved public and private care institutions that commission and deliver social care. 
English social care is at a different developmental stage to the two reformed welfare programmes 
analysed in the previous chapter, UK earnings-related pensions were reformed after just eight years 
of operation and German non-family social care was underdeveloped before the introduction of long-
term care insurance in the 1990s. English social care in 2020 is a relatively well developed, devolved 
welfare institution that policymakers struggle to control or reform, while lacking salience or a 
sustainable funding institution the sector has a large and vocal institutional community that dominates 
the policy stream and advocates greater care funding. Austerity was a significant institutional shock 
to a social care system that enjoyed real-terms funding growth of 5% per annum between 2000 and 
2010 and had anticipated that funding would continue to rise as the number of older people needing 
care increased. Widespread calls74 for a system of sustainable care funding reflect an institutional 
desire to return to the predictable funding increases seen in the recent past. 
 
Decades of policymaker disengagement and the outsourcing of social care in the 1980s allowed a 
complicated, devolved welfare institution to develop. This has veto points across many institutions, is 
poorly integrated with the National Health Service and is financed via local government that has 
 
74 An analysis of 178 written policy community submissions to a House of Commons inquiry into the funding of 
adult social care (House of Commons, 2018) by care providers, staff organisations, individuals, councils, interest 
groups, professional and public bodies, demonstrates a widespread desire for a sustainable, predictable, 
understandable, long-term funding solution for social care that links future provision with future demand. 
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become an increasingly porous funding mechanism, reducing the scope for central government to 
target funds at social care and forcing policymakers to turn to council funding workarounds like the 
National Health Service Better Care Fund. With general taxation funding via local government likely to 
‘leak’ into other areas, policymakers have also been drawn towards the introduction of a new 
devolved, non-taxation, sustainable funding pillar for social care, but such solutions tend to be built 
by re-purposing an existing approach and, as Conservative policymakers discovered in the late 1980s, 
an obvious alternative funding mechanism does not exist. When they try, policymakers struggle to 
steer social care policy and the National Health Service finds it difficult to engage with non-public 
welfare institutions. Numerous commissions have proposed changes to English social care policy over 
the past twenty years, but the basis of formal social care funding in England remains individual, non-
pooled self-insurance with public funding only available when the care recipient nears insolvency. This 
approach does not maximise social welfare and has been liable to systemic retrenchment. While 
funding in core areas of the welfare state is secured through social solidarity, public expectation of 
programme receipts and the power of existing policy takers, these protections do not extend to social 
care. Persistent care underfunding is a personal and institutional crisis but has failed to become a 
wider crisis in the public imagination. Eight years of austerity has, however, put the need for social 
care funding reform firmly on to the policy agenda. 
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Chapter 6. Funding policy paralysis 
Previous chapters have argued that the mature, general taxation funded welfare state is relatively 
inflexible and that English policymakers have increasingly looked to devolved, non-taxation welfare 
solutions to meet new welfare needs as they emerge. Change was facilitated in two comparator 
reform cases by the availability of ready-made, popular, preferred funding institutions better aligned 
with the policy objectives of the relevant policymakers than the status quo when they sought an 
alternative funding approach. Growing demand for formal social care in England has not been 
adequately addressed by the core welfare state and alternative sources of public or private funding 
have not been introduced or encouraged by policymakers. Past reforms outsourced, expanded and 
fragmented care provision but failed to deliver a sustainable funding approach and there are low 
expectations that radical funding reform will be proposed in a long promised green paper. The analysis 
undertaken here and in previous chapters suggests that any reforms that are introduced are likely to 
be built by reconfiguring existing institutional and market arrangements. Despite widespread 
policymaker disquiet about the funding channel damage wrought by austerity, there is no obvious 
alternative sustainable funding approach in the policy garbage can, so local government remains the 
only realistic way to manage and fund publicly commissioned social care. Unlike healthcare and the 
basic state pension, central government policymakers have chosen not to underwrite the cost of social 
care by introducing a universal entitlement to care in old age. In the absence of a private insurance 
solution, a patchwork of centrally funded benefits and local government managed and systemically 
underfunded care provision with targeted fixes such as the National Health Service Better Care Fund 
seem set to continue. 
1. The elusive green paper 
 
On 23 June 2016 the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to leave the European Union. Since that 
date, Brexit has been the primary focus of government and parliament while other policy issues have 
been marginalised (Mudge, 2019; Interviewee 029, 2018; Kerslake, 2018). This lack of policymaker 
engagement is not however a new situation for English social care. While a current justification for 
policymaker inaction might be Brexit, the social care funding crisis has been building for a decade, and 
policymakers have long been undecided about how to address persistent demands for greater care 
funding. There is widespread agreement amongst those engaged with the debate that social care 
needs a more sustainable funding solution (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.5) that can deliver rising public 
funding over time without the need for policymaker intervention, but there is little consensus on how 
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this can best be achieved. This desire for change is however, tempered by a belief that unilateral care 
funding reform has the potential to be politically damaging, and the lack of an obvious alternative 
approach has meant that successive governments have preferred to increase local government care 
spending rather than embrace radical sustainable change (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.78). 
A decade of austerity 
Historically, when policymakers have sought to address social care funding problems they have turned 
to local government. In the past forty years, English social care has moved through two policymaker 
driven funding cycles. The first upswing began in the 1980s to support a Conservative ideologically 
driven switch from predominantly public to mostly private provision. Supplementary benefit funded 
residential care spending was allowed to rise for a decade to incentivise market entry by private care 
providers. Policymakers then consolidated all care funding with local government in the early 1990s, 
stabilising spending growth once the reforms had been secured. The second public funding upswing 
came in the late 1990s, after the Blair administration had introduced the national minimum wage and 
increased the level of care regulation. The profitability of smaller private social care providers was 
badly affected and the number of residential and nursing home beds available fell from 563,100 in 
1996 to 463,400 in 2004 (Laing, 2017). In response to growing public concern, central government 
applied more short-term funding through local government, encouraged greater homecare provision 
and slowed the increase in the regulatory burden. Between 2000 and 2010, local government 
commissioned social care spending increased by 54%, from £11.8bn to £18bn (Simpson, 2017, p.4). 
Today the funding problems faced by social care are more intractable. Following the financial crisis of 
2008, austerity policies have significantly reduced public social care spending (Simpson, 2017, p.4) 
while social, economic and demographic pressures have increased care costs and the level of need. In 
many cases, austerity has driven the per capita payments made by councils to care providers below 
the ‘fair’ cost of delivering care (United Kingdom Homecare Association, 2018), so any funding 
increases will take time to have an obvious impact as greater spending will initially lead to higher and 
more sustainable per capita payments to existing providers for existing care recipients. This post-
austerity spending dynamic has compromised the ability of local government to improve care quality 
and provision levels in the short to medium term. Austerity has also highlighted wicked institutional 
problems with the structure of English local government, leaving parts of the country with unitary 
local authorities better able to cross-subsidise social care provision from other non-statutory budgets 
than areas which have two tier local government. Despite the institutional and structural problems 
associated with the local government funding channel and extensive debate about alternative funding 
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approaches, decades of policymaker disengagement have left many commentators unconvinced that 
care funding reforms that increase central government involvement are likely. Public policy on care 
funding remains devolved and the centre has long failed to engage, preferring to use legislation and 
regulatory welfare to influence the direction of local provision. In the past decade, the Coalition and 
Conservative governments have introduced the Better Care Fund that targets additional National 
Health Service funding at the interface between health and social care, a social care precept that 
allows local government to modestly raise council tax bills and a modest adult social care support 
grant funded by central government. These measures have been welcomed by councils, but they do 
not undo years of austerity and much of the additional spending is short term and does not constitute 
a sustainable commitment to higher future spending or greater central government engagement with 
social care. 
Institutional demands for rising spending 
Wittenberg et al. (2002, pp.226-248) note that social care can be funded by private self-insurance 
(personal pensions, savings and housing equity), private insurance, public social insurance and general 
taxation. English care insurance institutions are not well developed, the country lacks a functioning 
private social care insurance market and, unlike Germany, has no tradition of public social insurance. 
In the absence of public or private risk pooling, private care is mostly funded by self-insurance and 
public social care is systemically underfunded from general taxation. For many the cost of social care 
in old age is low, but a significant number of older people suffer catastrophic care costs75. While 
English social care funding institutions are underdeveloped, the outsourced model of social care 
provision is now deeply embedded. The level of individual per capita care spending by English councils 
on care may be below the levels seen in the highest spending countries76, but with 150 local councils 
commissioning care and 20,000 provider organisations delivering care, England has a complex, well-
developed, devolved care infrastructure. Demand for greater current and future spending on publicly 
commissioned social care in England is significant and growing. Persistent public underfunding of 
these existing social care provider institutions has undermined the viability of the sector and reduced 
investment in human and physical capital. A sustainable long-term funding solution that delivers 
consistently rising funding to meet rising need and ensures ‘fair’ funding payments for care delivered 
would deliver better outcomes and is clearly preferred by those operating within the social care sector. 
 
75 In 2011, Dilnot (2011, p.13) estimated that half of those aged 65 can expect lifetime care costs of less than 
£20,000 but ten percent can expect costs of more than £100,000. The Dilnot Commission argued that pooling 
risk by capping lifetime care costs would reduce the likelihood of catastrophic care costs in old age. 
76 In 2014 the UK spent 1.2% of GDP on public social care, the Netherlands spent 4.3% of GDP, Sweden spent 
3.2% of GDP and the OECD30 average spend was 1.4% of GDP (OECD, 2018). 
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The reality of recent English social care funding has been very different. Public social care funding fell 
by 9% between 2010 and 2015 while care need, and the per capita cost of care increased. In this 
environment, local councils struggle to pay a ‘fair’ price for care provided, care providers have started 
to cancel some of the more marginal existing care agreements and the wage levels paid to make care 
contracts economic are often too low to attract sufficient staff (United Kingdom Homecare 
Association, 2018). A growing gap between previously met need and current levels of provision has 
opened, the quality of care provided to those still eligible for care has often declined (visits are often 
shorter and agency staff more common) and reducing funding while regulators demand service-level 
continuity puts downward pressure on social care wages and upward pressure on work intensity. 
While the impact of austerity on public social care provision has been damaging, the social care 
funding debate is marginal for many, and the care funding crisis remains predominantly institutional 
and personal. A comparison with the funding dynamics of the reform cases analysed in chapter four 
suggests that the institutional crisis in English social care is not driven by the absolute level of care 
spending, but by the rate of change in funding falling below historically expected norms77 while 
policymakers continue to increase regulatory demands. German long-term care insurance is seen by 
many commentators (Frisina-Doetter and Rothgang, 2015, p.17) as an example of care funding good 
practice, but overall care spending in Germany at 1.1% of GDP in 2014 (OECD, 2018) was lower than 
the equivalent figure for the UK of 1.2% of GDP (OECD, 2018). The trend in German social care 
spending has however been rising while it has fallen in England. This contrast in programme 
perceptions (‘good practice’ in Germany and ‘funding crisis’ in England) at similar spending levels was 
an area of significant interest when discussed with policymakers drafting a report on English social 
care funding (Glendinning and Wills, 2018b). 
The stalled funding debate 
In the spring of 2017, in response to growing concern about the state of publicly funded social care, 
the Conservative government announced that a green paper on care and support for older people 
 
77 Four Seasons (the UK’s second largest care home provider in 2017) was purchased by a private equity group 
in 2012 using a significant amount of debt to fund the acquisition which was “in our sweet spot: asset backed, 
in an essential industry and in need of fundamental change” (Hands, 2014). Rising care costs and public spending 
cuts since 2012 have however left the business unable to meet rent and interest payments that were financially 
engineered into a business model that presumed increasing public care demand and fees (Pratley, 2017). Four 
Seasons went into administration in April 2019. Social care business failure and high levels of borrowing are not 
confined to Four Seasons. Southern Cross (the largest care home operator at the time) collapsed in 2011 and 
the UK’s four largest private care home operators (HC-One, Four Seasons, Barchester Healthcare and Care UK) 
have combined debts of £2.2bn which equates to £40,000 per care bed (Plimmer, 2019). 
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would be published before the summer. Following a snap general election in June, the government 
promised that the green paper would be published before the end of the year (Jarrett, 2018b, p.5). By 
November, the publication date had been delayed to the parliamentary recess in July 2018 (Green, 
2017) and the government also announced that the introduction of the Dilnot lifetime social care 
spending cap, which had previously been deferred from 2016 to 2020, would be dropped altogether. 
In March 2018, Jeremy Hunt, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (2012 - 2018), outlined the 
principles that he said would underpin the green paper, arguing that a sustainable funding model was 
required and that care risks should be pooled. Responsibility for the green paper was transferred from 
the Cabinet Office to the rebranded Department of Health and Social Care, in June 2018 and it was 
announced that publication would be delayed until the Autumn. In September 2018, Caroline 
Dinenage, Minister of State for Care at the Department of Health and Social Care, stated that the green 
paper would be delayed again (Quigley, 2018). Having missed another green paper publication 
deadline in April 2019 (Brady, 2019), Dinenage sought to dampen funding policy reform expectations 
asserting that the green paper would not solve all of the challenges faced by adult social care (Haynes, 
2019). Having become Prime Minister in July 2019, Boris Johnson stated that the government would 
fix the social care crisis and that he had a clear plan (Campbell, 2019). The green paper was 
subsequently delayed again. 
During the extended gestation period of the green paper there was initially a robust technocratic 
debate and a variety of evidence based funding policy proposals were produced. The Health and Local 
Government Select Committees jointly organised a ‘Citizens Assembly’ of representative citizens 
(Involve, 2018, p.7) that explored care funding options, received more than 180 written submissions 
from interested parties78, considered oral evidence at length and published a report into the funding 
of adult social care in June 2018 (House of Commons, 2018). The Local Government Association also 
published their own policy consultation green paper in July 2018 (Local Government Association, 
2018) and the King’s Fund published two policy papers in February and May 2018 (Wenzel et al., 2018; 
Bottery, et al., 2018). While 2018 saw a flurry of social care funding papers and proposals, the 
continued lack of policymaker action has stalled the funding reform debate. In 2019, the Centre for 
Policy Studies (Green, 2019, p.17) and Institute for Public Policy Research (Quilter-Pinner and Hochlaf, 
2019, p.7) both argue, as recommended by the Sutherland Report (1999) and long the case in 
Scotland, that personal care should be free to all at the point of need. Green goes further and argues 
that basic accommodation costs should also be publicly funded for all (Green, 2019, p.19). While both 
 
78 Written submissions to the inquiry from the social care policy community have been reviewed, aggregated (by 
institution type) and analysed. 
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reports discuss how this change might be funded (higher taxation or national insurance) neither 
proposes a policy route that would institutionalise sustainable future funding, choosing to focus on 
increased benefit generosity. More than two years after the green paper was promised, the future 
direction of English social care funding policy remains unclear. Independent commissions and 
committees of the House of Lords and Commons have explored care funding approaches in 
anticipation of the green paper, but concrete funding reform proposals have not emerged. When the 
Citizens’ Assembly on Social Care (Involve, 2018, p.5) asked 47 representative citizens, a majority 
supported universal social care for all funded by a compulsory social insurance scheme and general 
taxation, but the level of engagement and understanding displayed by members of the assembly 
before it was convened was relatively low (Involve, 2018, p.9) and social care remains a relatively 
marginal concern for many. The social care funding crisis is a personal crisis for those who suffer 
catastrophic non-pooled care costs, and an institutional funding crisis for the organisations 
commissioning and providing care at below the ‘fair’ cost of care (Laing, 2008, p.5), but despite 
warnings that publicly funded social care is “on the verge of collapse” (Butler, 2018), the underfunding 
of English social care institutions has failed to become a wider national crisis in the public imagination 
(Just, 2019, p.4)79. This has caused exasperation amongst some care organisations and commentators 
with calls for the government to educate and inform the public about how bad the situation has 
become and the need for reform (Wenzel, 2018, p.78; Fabian Society, 2018; County Councils Network, 
2018; Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, 2018). 
  
 
79 Between 2012 and 2017, Just Group research found that around two thirds of those aged over 45 were 
interested (if not engaged) in the social care funding debate. In 2018 this dropped to 55% and the number who 
were not interested doubled (to 17%). The fall in interest was repeated across all age groups. The report suggests 
that persistent policymaker inaction may be driving public disengagement (Just, 2019, p.4). 
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Chapter structure 
The final analytical chapter of the thesis chronicles social care funding policy inaction, arguing that the 
lack of an existing more appropriate alternative funding solution (as perceived by the relevant 
policymakers) has undermined attempts to achieve a sufficiently broad policymaker consensus on 
reform and the publication of a social care green paper has been repeatedly delayed. Having discussed 
the funding policy debate in advance of the promised green paper, in the next section we compare 
the set of variables consistent with sustainable funding reform generated in chapter four with their 
equivalents for English social care in 2019. Process tracing and Mill's method of difference are 
employed to isolate explanatory variables common to the two successful reform cases but not present 
in the non-reforming English social care case. The analysis of the drivers of social care funding policy 
inaction that conclude the chapter draw on this comparison and on primary research undertaken, 
focusing on the political and institutional obstacles to social care funding reform. This research 
material includes interviews with those operating in and around social care, event observation with 
appropriate engagement and document analysis. 
2. Comparison with two successful funding reform cases 
Having explored the historical development of English social care, UK earnings-related pensions and 
German long-term care insurance in the two previous chapters, we now employ Mill's method of 
difference to isolate explanatory environmental, institutional and political variables common to the 
two successful funding reform cases but not present in the persistently non-reforming English social 
care case. In chapter four we developed nineteen potential explanatory variables80 that are employed 
below to interpret this lack of social care funding reform by English policymakers, and to consider any 
environmental or institutional changes that might make reform more likely. The variables are grouped 
into four types (global, national, institutional and political calculus) and are discussed in turn. UK 
earnings-related pensions and German long-term care insurance are successful, but very different, 
welfare reform cases where policymakers delivered change in heterogeneous political and welfare 
state regimes. The national and most of the institutional variables considered were therefore 
discounted as being necessary for successful welfare funding reform in chapter four. This leaves us 
with global, political calculus and two institutional variables as potential drivers of successful public 
welfare funding reform. 
 
80 The nineteen potential explanatory variables are listed in the appendix. 
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Global explanatory variables 
Case comparison suggests that the global environmental variables included within the sustainable 
funding reform set (these are variables like population ageing, automation and greater female labour 
market participation) are reasonably consistent in all three of the comparator cases considered. As 
the variables are common to all three cases, we can discount these broad trend variables as a driver 
of public funding inertia within English social care and reform in the other two cases. This analysis is 
documented below in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Three case comparison – global explanatory variables 
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National explanatory variables 
The two cases of successful public welfare funding reform considered occurred in countries with very 
different constitutional structures, political systems, welfare state types and institutional approaches. 
While there have been significant constitutional changes in the UK over the past thirty years, these 
national explanatory variables are broadly shared by UK earnings-related pensions in the late 1980s 
and English social care in 2019. As noted in chapter four, this analysis confirms that the drivers of 
welfare funding reform and non-reform in the three cases analysed are unlikely to be found within 
these national explanatory variables. The three cases show that sustainable public funding reform is 
possible in both the English / UK and German welfare states. The analysis undertaken is documented 
below in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Three case comparison – national explanatory variables 
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Institutional explanatory variables 
The two cases where sustainable funding was introduced by policymakers also had very different pre-
reform institutional characteristics. Prior to the reform, the comparators funding and risk approach, 
benefit-type, programme structure and level of programme salience were all very different. This 
suggests that five of the seven existing programme features detailed in Table 14 below were not 
required drivers of funding reform in the comparator cases. Two institutional variables do however 
agree in the two pre-reform comparator cases and are not present in the English social care case in 
2019. Existing provision in the comparators was relatively underdeveloped and both had an already 
available and trusted alternative funding institution, consistent with the belief systems of the relevant 
policymakers and popular with citizens, in place before reform was contemplated. 
In both cases, the sustainable funding reforms introduced were plucked from the policy garbage can 
and structured in ways that allowed policymakers to remain relatively disengaged. While English social 
care does not currently enjoy, and has not historically had, an obvious pre-existing alternative 
sustainable funding approach of this type, there are policy options that policymakers could re-purpose 
and enact to demonstrate that they are engaged with social care and doing ‘something’. Older people 
in Scotland have enjoyed free personal care since 2002 and the legislation for a cap on catastrophic 
care costs has been passed but not implemented (both of these policies would increase current care 
benefit generosity, but not ensure sustainable future funding), and private auto-enrolment has 
emerged as a successful, popular way to fund pension saving. Auto-enrolment pensions also enjoy 
broad cross-party support (Thurley, 2018, p.3), having been enacted by a Labour Government and 
implemented by the Coalition Government. 
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Table 14. Three case comparison – institutional explanatory variables 
 
 
Political calculus variables 
Finally, we turn to the situational political calculus variables that inform the funding reform / non-
reform decision itself. The variables employed are suggested by the three ‘relatively independent’ 
streams of the multiple streams framework (Kingdon, 1984). Kingdon argues that when the relevant 
policymakers have an agreed problem, agreed solution and there is the requisite political focus / 
consensus, the streams converge, a policy window opens, and policy entrepreneurs can enact change. 
Applying Kingdon’s approach, we find that an agreed problem is common to all three cases. Prior to 
reform in the comparators and in English social care today, there was / is a perceived funding problem 
amongst relevant policymakers in each case. A lack of an issue that policymakers perceive to be a 
problem is not an explanation for English social care policy inertia (NHS Confederation, 2019, p.9). The 
cases also have Norbert Blüm, Norman Fowler and Damian Green (Green, 2017 and 2019) acting as 
policy entrepreneurs. This suggests that the reason for a current lack of social care funding policy 
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reform lies within the policy and political streams. In Table 15 below we see that the policy stream 
and political stream were consistent with reform in 1990s German social care and 1980s UK earnings-
related pensions and are consistent with non-reform in English social care today. While there have 
long been policy stream impediments to social care funding reform, austerity and electoral 
considerations have altered the nature of these constraints in the past decade. Historically, both 
Conservative (1983 and 1987 elections) and Labour (1997, 2001 and 2005 elections) administrations 
enjoyed large parliamentary majorities which would have allowed reforms to be enacted, but neither 
government seriously considered sustainable social care funding reform (Interviewee 029, 2018). In 
2019, a reasonably broad consensus across all political parties had emerged around the need for more 
sustainable funding to replace / support the existing system, but there was significant partisan 
disagreement about what policy approaches might be appropriate and how these might be achieved. 
The political stream in 2019 was no more consistent with delivering reform than was the case in either 
the 1980s or the 2000s. Unlike the (non-reforming) past, enacting and implementing sustainable 
public social care funding reform today is likely to require a relatively broad cross-party policymaker 
consensus. This looks unlikely81. 
Table 15. Three case comparison – political calculus explanatory variables 
 
 
81 A new Conservative administration was elected in December 2019 with a working parliamentary majority. 
While this has eased some of the political stream issues, past political damage caused by unilateral policymaker 
action (discussed later in the chapter) and a lack of policymaker focus remain significant problems. 
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Political, policy and institutional impediments to reform 
Analysis of the three welfare programmes considered, using process tracing and case comparison, 
suggests that there are two connected variables that underpin the current lack of sustainable funding 
policy reform in English social care. These are the inability of cross-party policymakers to agree (and 
continue to agree for a sufficient period to allow any change to become embedded) that the current 
social care funding problems can best be addressed by specific institutional reforms, and the absence 
of an existing more appropriate funding solution (as perceived by the relevant policymakers) that can 
be deployed at relatively low political cost (both of the comparator cases suggest that a high political 
cost is more of an obstacle to reform than high financial cost). In the two successful reform cases, 
layered funding that allowed existing structures to be retained was possible and popular and the 
existing funding approach was not deeply embedded which made reform more likely. 
Having isolated these explanatory variables, the remaining analytical sections of the chapter focus on 
each in turn, analysing the politics of sustainable funding reform and the blocked policy paths that 
English policymakers face. 
3. The politics of funding non-reform 
 
The technocratic case for social care funding reform would appear to be a strong one. While English 
social care has become a relatively mature welfare programme, existing care providers are 
systemically underfunded by the state, the care regime lacks direction and coherence, and there is a 
widening gap between social care need and the level of publicly funded provision. There is widespread 
agreement amongst policymakers across all political parties that the current system is not fit for 
purpose82 and that a more sustainable, long term funding approach is needed. 
Despite a majority of MPs believing that English social care is in crisis and that ‘something’ needs to 
be done about public social care funding (NHS Confederation, 2019, p.9), there is a lack of agreement 
about what this might be, little appetite for cross party dialogue or compromise (Beckett, 2018) and 
few signs that significant reforms are likely to be introduced (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.5). Policymaker 
inaction on sustainable care funding is not, however, a new phenomenon. In the past twenty years 
twelve green and white papers and other public consultations have addressed social care policy 
(Wenzel et al., 2018, p.5), but English policymakers have consistently failed to move towards universal, 
 
82 A COMRES poll of 101 MPs commissioned by Independent Age found that 89% of MPs “don’t think the current 
social care system is suitable for the UK’s ageing population” (Independent Age, 2017). 
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central government guaranteed and funded social care or to invest sufficient political capital in 
delivering a devolved sustainable funding approach. In the pages that follow we consider the 
implications of public disinterest in social care outcomes, discuss local government and care institution 
marginality and analyse the adverse political dynamics that stand in the way of securing sustainable 
social care funding reform.  
A vocal (but marginal) policy community 
The policy community that has developed around social care commissioning and provision, and those 
within the care sector who advocate sustained levels of higher funding and more investment are led 
by influential technocratic institutions83. While National Health Service organisations and the Local 
Government Association have the ear of policymakers, older care recipients are often politically 
disengaged, much of the care workforce is paid the minimum wage with many agency workers and 
recent migrants, and the outsourced social care market structure gives significant market power to 
the state. Social care is also funded and managed by local government which is a secondary area of 
the UK state. The unitary structure of the English political system and Treasury limits on council 
spending have combined to reduce the influence and financial power of local government. While 
social care in England is a devolved council responsibility, tax raising powers are controlled by central 
government and pooled funding from the centre has been reduced significantly in recent years (down 
by 49.1% between 2011 and 2018 (National Audit Office, 2018, p.4)). These political and institutional 
structures are very different to those seen in the German long-term care insurance reform case 
analysed in chapter four. The German bicameral parliamentary system gives the Länder veto powers 
in the German upper house (Bundesrat) on all proposed legislation that has a local impact, which in 
practice extends to most legislation. English local authorities have no equivalent to the political power 
conferred by this veto mechanism. Retrenchment theory (Pierson, 1994, p.2) suggests that reductions 
in welfare state expenditure driven by the central government austerity agenda are likely to be 
focused on marginal, lower salience areas of public spending where accountability and blame can be 
shared. As predicted by Pierson, local government has been a major focus of the post-2010 drive for 
financial austerity. John McDonnell, Labour Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, argues that central 
government unwillingness to publicly fund social care on a sustainable basis is a deliberate policy and 
 
83 Health for Care, a coalition of fifteen national health organisations, has called for “a sustainable social care 
system in England backed by a long-term financial settlement” (NHS Confederation, 2019, p.3). In March 2019, 
a joint letter on adult social care issued by the Local Government Association (2019) argued local government 
funded “social care is at breaking point” and needs urgent investment. 
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that local government has been used as “a human shield for austerity”, forcing councils to absorb and 
share the blame for on-going funding cuts (Stewart, 2018). 
Mostly private social care provider institutions and lobbying organisations also lack influence with 
central government policymakers. An MP with an active interest in social care funding, but no working 
background in social care, argues that the care sector is under represented within parliament. While 
there are many former National Health Service doctors and nurses who are now MPs, there are few 
who have worked in and understand the institutional dynamics of social care (Interviewee 031, 2018) 
84. This paucity of parliamentary understanding of the complex historical issues impacting the social 
care sector undermines the effectiveness of policymaking (Interviewee 023, 2018), inhibits 
policymaker engagement and makes a strategic, longer term approach to funding policy reform less 
likely85. Social care also lacks a single central government department with overall responsibility for 
care spending and there is no focal institution that could become a focus for central accountability 
and lobbying for greater care funding. This fragmentation, the devolved nature of the commissioning 
and policymaking function across local councils and relatively low market concentration86 all dilute the 
influence of thousands of independent organisations and companies operating within the care sector. 
Partisan politics and a fog of incomprehension 
Unlike the two comparator cases analysed in chapter four, there is little agreement amongst the 
relevant English policymakers about the scope and focus of sustainable funding reform (NHS 
Confederation, 2019, p.16). While a residual, third way desire to work on a cross-party basis remains 
amongst some MPs (House of Commons, 2018, p.53), for many it does not (Beckett, 2018) and an 
increasingly partisan political environment has impeded funding reform attempts (Hill, 2019). In the 
past decade, both of the major political parties have successfully weaponised unilateral funding 
reform proposals to cause their opponents political damage. When the Labour Party proposed a new 
10% estate levy on death to fund their National Care Service proposals in 2010, this was characterised 
as a death tax by the Conservative Party and was dropped as a proposal during the general election 
campaign (Watt, 2010). Similarly, when the Conservative Party attempted to address the problem of 
 
84 In his memoirs, Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services (1981 to 1987) writes at length about 
NHS reform and the pension funding reforms analysed in chapter four. The pension reforms drew on his personal 
and family experience with the existing pension system (Fowler, 1991, p.203). He makes no mention of his social 
care reforms. 
85 A social care consultant argues social care is “an incredibly complex system … politicians … with [little] 
understanding pull the wrong levers … because there is a failure to understand how it all works … there are no 
clear solutions and no quick fixes” (Interviewee 023, 2018). 
86 The twenty-five largest residential care homes businesses manage 31% of all care beds. The remainder of the 
market is dominated by providers operating three care homes or less (Jarrett, 2018a, p.2). 
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catastrophic care costs in the 2017 election campaign, this was characterised as a dementia tax by the 
Labour Party and also proved to be deeply unpopular with the electorate. A social care consultant 
argues there is a “fog of incomprehension” (Interviewee 029, 2018) that protects policymakers within 
the social care policy arena. Most citizens are not particularly engaged with social care, many feel they 
have “paid their stamps, so their care is paid for” (Interviewee 031, 2018), assume the National Health 
Service provides, and do not realise that they may have to use their house and children’s inheritance 
to pay for social care in old age. This lack of engagement and understanding, and the hope that family 
will take on a caring role, have also contributed to the failure of the English private social care 
insurance market (House of Lords, 2013, p.36). Polling evidence in 2017 confirmed that most citizens 
(63%) assumed that social care was provided by the National Health Service and 47% believed that it 
was free at the point of use (IPSOS MORI, 2017). When policymakers make the funding reality clear 
by announcing policy initiatives that seek to improve the current situation the political messenger 
tends to get blamed (Interviewee 029, 2018). 
This wicked policymaking dynamic reinforces a longstanding unwillingness amongst central 
government policymakers to engage with social care policy and is deeply problematic for the prospect 
of public social care funding reform. The ways in which English social care provision is funded require 
policymaker attention and reform is overdue, but Lent (2017) similarly argues that a "veil of ignorance" 
protects policymakers from public concern about care institution underfunding. When policymakers 
lift the veil by suggesting a new funding approach, this causes concern to previously unaware citizens 
(Bottery et al., 2018, p.30), and the party proposing change is punished politically. Lent suggests this 
marginality with high reform salience could make social care funding an untouchable “third rail in 
politics, killing anyone who touches it” (Lent, 2017). His analysis suggests that a reasonably broad 
political consensus will be required to achieve public funding reform (Interviewee 031, 2018) following 
the significant political damage that has been suffered when policymakers have acted unilaterally. 
More recent polling evidence does suggest that the extended social care debate has increased public 
awareness of the lack of public social care funding (Just, 2019, p.14) with far fewer citizens now 
believing that social care in England is free at the point of use. The research however also notes that 
public interest in social care reform is starting to wane and that many citizens have still not engaged 
with how the funding system operates. When asked, a significant minority (42%) believed that the 
Dilnot funding cap (which was dropped by the Conservative government in 2017) had been 
implemented. 
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A government focused elsewhere 
Historical process tracing and interviews with social care commentators suggest that the political 
environment was more consistent with radical public funding reform in the 1980s and late 1990s than 
was the case in 2019. While previous Conservative and Labour governments with large parliamentary 
majorities were better placed to enact significant changes, neither government did so, and social care 
funding concerns were addressed by greater short-term expenditure rather than sustainable funding 
reform by both administrations. Previous periods of underfunding were not as deeply entrenched 
(Interviewee 020, 2017) as the current systemic funding crisis wrought by years of local government 
austerity, and serious consideration of reforms designed to deliver sustainable long run funding was 
not a policymaker focus (Interviewee 029, 2018). A continuation of the existing general and local 
government taxation funding model was presumed by policymakers in both political parties. 
Following the 2017 general election, a minority Conservative government with 317 seats out of a total 
of 650 was elected, ruling with the support of the Democratic Unionist Party with 8 seats87. Without a 
parliamentary majority, the Conservative government was unable to unilaterally enact funding 
reforms and, having seen the political damage suffered by parties that have unilaterally proposed 
‘death’ or ‘dementia’ taxes to fund social care in the recent past, was wary of doing so (Interviewee 
031, 2018). With active and persistent policymaker engagement and a reasonably broad political 
consensus (which both look increasingly unlikely) required to deliver and embed reform, the likelihood 
of a new sustainable funding mechanism being introduced is low. In the past, the marginality of social 
care has often meant that “within cabinet there would usually be more pressing issues that needed 
to be raised than social care … [so] social care would not tend to be considered” (Interviewee 026, 
2018). For the past three years this dynamic has increased significantly as Brexit has taken up an 
increasing amount of “political headspace” (Interviewee 029, 2018), with Bob Kerslake, former Head 
of the Civil Service, arguing that negotiating an exit from the European Union takes up most “thinking 
time at the top of government” (Kerslake, 2018), while important policy issues, such as social care 
reform, are marginalised. Mudge (2019), in a discussion with Emily Andrews of the Institute for 
Government, similarly argues that Brexit has gridlocked domestic politics leaving public services 
neglected and no room for a national conversation on how social care should be funded. 
 
87 Following the removal of Theresa May and installation of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister in July 2019, 21 
Conservative MPs rebelled over Brexit policy and lost the Conservative party whip. This, along with other 
defections, reduced the number of Conservative MPs to 288. The decline was reversed in the December 2019 
general election after which the Conservative Party had 365 MPs (a parliamentary majority of 80). 
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Policymakers disagree and are wary of unilateral reform 
A majority of policymakers across all political parties agree that local government commissioned 
public social care is failing and needs reform, but partisan policymakers are wary of compromise and 
without an obvious alternative funding approach (like the one that allowed a cross-party reform 
consensus to coalesce around German long-term care insurance), fundamentally disagree about how 
sustainable care funding can best be achieved. The Conservative government, with a minority of MPs 
in parliament until the December 2019 general election, failed to build a large enough consensus 
around any funding reform approach and two failed and deeply unpopular policy proposals in the 
recent past have demonstrated that unilateral social care funding reform can cause significant political 
damage to any party that proposes change. Social care recipients and the (mostly private) 
organisations that provide care are politically marginal, local government is a non-core area of the 
welfare state that has been useful when Conservative / Liberal Democrat policymakers want to share 
the blame for public austerity and few members of parliament have worked in or engaged with the 
care sector. The political stream does not augur well for radical public social care funding reform. 
4. What’s in the policy garbage can? 
The political obstacles to the introduction of a sustainable social care funding approach documented 
above are reinforced by significant impediments to reform within the policy stream. English social care 
is a marginal welfare programme that has suffered a decade of systemic underfunding, leaving many 
engaged commentators and policymakers convinced that public social care needs significantly more 
funding today and mechanisms to ensure rising funding in the future. After more than a century of 
central government disengagement and the outsourcing of local government provision in the 1980s, 
English social care networks are highly devolved, complex and mature with most care policymaking, 
provision and regulation managed at the local level. Central government attempts to use legislation, 
regulation and funding to guide care outcomes have had limited success (Interviewee 026, 2018) and 
policy reform in such a heterogeneous policy area is highly complicated. After numerous commissions, 
reports and debates, English policymakers have spent almost three years intermittently consulting on 
a variety of funding approaches. The reform options considered draw upon sustainable social care 
funding institutions that have been introduced in other countries, existing English welfare funding 
approaches such as the general taxation funded, free at the point of use National Health Service and 
devolved, non-taxation funding approaches that also draw on pre-existing arrangements. 
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In the final analytical section of the chapter, we explore the collection of sustainable and non-
sustainable funding institutions and approaches that policymakers have found in the policy garbage 
can when they have looked. While there is a broad consensus that a problem exists, achieving funding 
reform will require policymakers to agree on a solution that they are willing to deliver politically and 
is functionally implementable. All of the alternatives being considered, including the existing local 
government funding approach, have political and functional defects, and there is little sign of cross-
party agreement on the most appropriate way to progress88. 
Damaged local government funding 
All of the funding reforms that are being considered by policymakers have significant drawbacks and 
all bar hypothecated social insurance fail to address the need for more sustainable future funding. 
Despite being compromised by years of austerity, the paucity of alternatives makes a continuation of 
the existing local government funding approach a strong candidate for the most likely future funding 
approach. Local government care funding is widely perceived to be failing by policymakers and, when 
prompted, the public. Austerity has caused significant damage to the council funding channel and 
policymakers are actively looking for an alternative solution. When faced with care funding problems 
in the past, policymakers have however consistently chosen to retain or increase the finance and 
commissioning role of local government. The Labour government did so in the 2000s, and Margaret 
Thatcher also conceded in the late 1980s (Lewis and Glennerster, 1996, p.6), despite serious 
reservations about an increased role for councils, that they were the least-worst way to manage and 
fund public social care in England. Central government policymakers have also consistently preferred 
not to underwrite the full cost of social care from general taxation (Interviewee 031, 2018). 
A relatively modest increase in care funding using the existing institutional channels would allow the 
centre to remain disengaged and is easy to implement, but the fragmentation and incoherence of 
social care provision and funding, lack of long run funding sustainability and absence of a focal funding 
institution would all remain. This approach gives few protections against future retrenchment and 
recent austerity has also damaged the ability of local government to respond quickly if and when care 
funding is increased. Flat social care spending in the face of increased demand and costs has impacted 
care quality, put downward pressure on the wages of care staff, reduced the current capacity of local 
 
88 A COMRES poll of MPs commissioned by the NHS Confederation in June 2019 found that a majority across all 
parties agreed that there is a social care funding crisis. There was, however, a significant cross-party difference 
of opinion on the most appropriate policy response. While 40% of Labour MPs advocated free, universal, general 
taxation funded social care, only 4% of Conservative MPs agreed. Conservatives MPs were much more receptive 
to auto-enrolment care insurance (30% in favour) than Labour MPs (8% in favour) (Dickson, 2019). 
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government and private providers and limited the scope for higher levels of provision in the future. 
Years of suppressed local government expenditure intended for other council areas that has been 
used to cross-subsidise social care spending89 will also absorb a significant part of any additional 
funding as it is applied. As a result, increased funding for social care using the existing local 
government channel will take longer to deliver results than was the case in the past. In a reversal of 
the blame sharing benefits of focusing the costs of austerity on councils (Pierson, 1994, p.17), when 
care outcomes eventually start to improve, credit for addressing the problem will be shared by central 
and local government. If general taxation must rise to fund higher social care spending, policymakers 
are likely to want positive outcomes and to be credited with those improving outcomes. Passing 
general taxation funding to local government will take time to deliver results and risks credit 
obfuscation. This suggests that some kind of central government initiative that is widely credited by 
the public as addressing care underfunding may be more likely to be considered today than in the 
past. 
Flawed alternative funding approaches 
Having considered problems associated with increased spending using the existing care funding 
channel, we turn to a discussion of four alternative social care funding approaches that were evaluated 
by the King’s Fund (Wenzel et al., 2018 and Bottery et al., 2018). These are the Conservative 2017 
manifesto proposals (a ‘cap and floor’ approach intended to protect citizens from catastrophic care 
costs), the integration of health and social care, Sutherland’s (1999) free personal social care and a 
hypothecated social care tax. The King’s Fund argue that all of the options are also problematic. 
The ‘cap and floor’ care funding approach proposed by the Conservative Party at the 2017 general 
election was widely characterised as a dementia tax (Asthana and Elgot, 2017). The Conservatives 
proposed raising the ‘floor’ on the means-tested asset threshold below which care costs would be 
publicly funded. While there was no initial mention of a limit to lifetime self-funded care costs (the 
Dilnot care cap that had been dropped by the government in November 2017) this was later added. 
This approach would make the current confusing care funding system even more complicated (Wenzel 
et al., 2018, p.49), is almost as expensive as the much simpler to understand and more popular free 
 
89 In 2010, social care spending made up 34% of council spending. By 2018 the figure had risen to 41% of council 
spending (Green, 2019, p.10). This excludes ring-fenced education spending which is directly funded by central 
government. 
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universal social care approach90 (Bottery et al., 2018, p.3), does not address the need for sustainable 
future funding and was deeply unpopular with the electorate. 
The integration of health and social care is a policy aspiration (Quilter-Pinner and Hochlaf, 2019, p.16) 
that has been a work-in-progress for decades. Integration with the National Health Service is not a 
funding solution but would be easy to explain, popular with the public and, if merged, social care 
would enjoy the potential funding benefit of being part of the significantly better funded National 
Health Service. In June 2018, the government promised the National Health Service a funding 
settlement that would increase real public spending on health by 3.4% per annum (£20.5bn) over the 
following five years (Department of Health and Social Care, 2018). The National Health Service is, 
however, focused on acute care and those working in social care are wary of the medicalisation of 
care provision. There is a real fear that social care would be marginalised if local government and 
National Health Service budgets and management functions were merged (Interviewee 027, 2018). 
Health and social care have been separated since the 1940s. When discussing social care funding, two 
commentators (Interviewee 023, 2018; Interviewee 029, 2018) focused on this long-standing 
institutional divergence that separates health (which is free at the point of use) and social care (which 
is mostly means tested). A manager working for a large care provider (Interviewee 020, 2017) also 
argues that Better Care Fund monies don't filter through to private providers and merging social care 
with the National Health Service might involve public care provision losing access to private sector 
care competencies91. Residual care funding and the separation of social and health care are deeply 
ingrained in England. Integration would require a very significant level of institutional change. 
Similarly, free at the point of use personal care is a change in the generosity of public care benefits 
rather than a sustainable funding solution that will deliver rising funding in the future. If the policy 
also involved the creation of a national focal care institution and greater on-going central government 
engagement and accountability (Involve, 2018, p.11) this could improve long-term funding outcomes. 
Making health and social care both free at the point of use might also help the National Health Service 
and social care work more closely together (Quilter-Pinner and Hochlaf, 2019, p.16) and is much easier 
 
90 Bottery et al. (2018, p.3) model the projected cost in 2021 of various future care funding models. Assuming a 
cap on lifetime social care costs of £75,000 and an asset ‘floor’ of £100,000 the additional cost of the ‘cap and 
floor’ model is £4bn. They note that the cost is contingent on the level at which the cap and floor are set. The 
additional cost of free personal care for all would be £6bn per annum. 
91 A social care consultant suggests the NHS is not good at working with smaller private providers or the third 
sector, arguing “it’s about scope and scale … while [social care has] big providers, there are still an awful lot of 
small and medium sized providers who are providing specialist care because they have developed the expertise 
over time. That sort of scale of provider is unheard of in the NHS … if you merged NHS and social care budgets 
[they] would be squeezed out completely” (Interviewee 023, 2018). 
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to implement than full integration. The concept of a ‘National Care Service’ is also well understood 
and likely to be well received by the public (Involve, 2018, p.11) and amongst Labour MPs (Dickson, 
2019). The King’s Fund (Wenzel et al., 2018 and Bottery et al., 2018, p.42) also argue that this approach 
is only a little more expensive than the much more complicated cap and floor approach. While the 
2017 Labour Party Manifesto (Labour Party, 2017, p.71) proposed the introduction of a National Care 
Service, promising to significantly increase funding, adopt the Unison Ethical Care Charter (Unison, 
2017) nationwide and ensure that all carers are paid the higher living wage rather than the minimum 
wage, it did not advocate free at the point of use personal care for all. The manifesto echoed the 
Conservative proposal to raise the asset threshold floor on personal contributions to care costs and 
suggested the party would consider a wealth tax, employer care contribution or a care levy and seek 
to build a funding consensus as “providing dignity and care in old age should transcend party politics 
and campaign slogans” (Labour Party, 2017, p.72). Neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party 
advocated free personal social care at the 2017 general election, although this position is evolving 
(Butler, 2019)92. Problems with this proposal are that it would not institutionalise funding 
sustainability nor be targeted at those in greatest financial need, benefiting older people at all income 
levels who would not have qualified for means tested care. The policy approach would also not see 
social care become part of the better funded National Health Service. 
The final funding reform approach being considered by policymakers is ring-fenced taxation (House of 
Commons, 2018, p.20). While the Citizens’ Assembly (Involve, 2018, p.16) suggested that the public 
would welcome greater linkage between taxes paid and benefits received, there are major 
institutional problems with employing public social insurance to fund care. A significant block on this 
sustainable funding approach is a deep reluctance within the English public sector to hypothecate 
funding and a long-standing tradition of pooled taxation (Hills, 2004, p. 352). There are very few 
examples of successful ring-fenced taxation in England / the UK (the SERPS comparator case in chapter 
four documents the dismantling and eventual abolition of hypothecated public earnings-related 
pensions). All UK central government revenues bar National Insurance are pooled in the Consolidated 
Fund (2017 receipts – £556bn) which was founded in 1787 as “one fund into which shall flow every 
stream of public revenue and from which shall come the supply for every service” (HM Treasury, 
2017). Revenues raised via general taxation plus deficit funding from the National Loans Fund are then 
 
92 In September 2019, John McDonnell, Shadow Chancellor, announced that, if elected, the Labour Party would 
inject an additional £8bn into local government over the next few years to fund free universal personal care for 
all older people, increase care wages, enhance human capital and (over time) bring social care provision back 
into public ownership. Labour would also introduce an individual lifetime cap on residential care ‘hotel costs’ 
payable and would fund all of these benefit enhancements via general taxation (Butler, 2019). 
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used to pay for all central government funded welfare spending other than contributory benefits. 
National insurance contributions received are nominally paid into a separate National Insurance Fund 
(2017 receipts £98bn / payments - £100bn of which the state pension accounts for £92bn). While the 
accounting for contributory and non-contributory welfare benefits is distinct, in practice the Treasury 
consolidates all funds received into the Whole of Government Accounts and does not practice funding 
hypothecation. Local government also has tax raising powers (2016 receipts - £59bn), but these are 
subject to central government control and local government welfare spending is jointly funded by the 
Consolidated Fund and local government taxation. Introducing a ring fenced funding solution for social 
care in isolation that did not include free at the point of use care could also “exacerbate the lack of 
alignment between … health and social care” (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.71) making integration, a key 
policymaker objective, more difficult. Critics have also argued that strict funding hypothecation would 
mean funding would rise and fall with economic activity and may not necessarily be aligned with 
increasing demand (Wenzel et al., 2018, p.69). 
A blocked policy stream and policymaker procrastination 
There are three broad sustainable public funding approaches that English policymakers might adopt. 
These are (in order of generosity) a defined benefit promise to raise spending for every care recipient 
every year93, a defined contribution promise to increase real spending over time (or to link overall 
spending to GDP)94 and the introduction of ring-fenced public social care insurance95. None of these 
are likely to be adopted for English social care. The first two guarantees exist elsewhere within the UK 
public sector but have not been seriously considered in the social care debate, and the third is 
problematic for those advocating greater integration of social care with the National Health Service 
and unlikely to be welcomed by the Treasury. 
Despite widespread policymaker agreement that greater funding sustainability is needed, a funding 
policy garbage can without appealing options, little cross-party goodwill, few signs of an emerging 
 
93 The UK state pension triple lock guarantee is a defined benefit promise. Simon Stevens, Chief Executive of NHS 
England, has argued that the triple lock should be extended to guarantee income, housing and care for older 
people. Lord Willetts, Chair of the Resolution Foundation, similarly suggested that the automatic uprating of 
pensions should be extended to include a commitment to fund in full the rising costs of social care (House of 
Lords, 2017, p.58). 
94 UK government commitments to keep defence spending above the NATO 2% of GDP guideline and overseas 
development aid above the UN 0.7% target are defined contribution promises that ensure rising programme 
funding when the economy is growing but do not link spending to need. Linking funding to GDP in this way has 
been suggested for social care in isolation (Later Life Ambitions, 2018) and for combined public health and social 
care spending (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 2018). 
95 Mandatory social long-term care insurance operates in Germany and is analysed in chapter four. 
Hypothecated taxation has not been widely adopted in the UK. 
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policy consensus, a government that is focused elsewhere and a keen awareness amongst 
policymakers of the political damage caused by unilateral social care funding proposals in the recent 
past all suggest that publicly funded social care is unlikely to be radically reformed. Bottery et al. (2018, 
p.41) agree, arguing that policymakers have made little progress in the past two decades, still face the 
problems that divided and undermined the work of the Sutherland Commission (1999) and have yet 
to agree on the issues that they want to address. Reintroducing the Dilnot cap on personal care 
spending would allow policymakers to address catastrophic care costs, Sutherland’s free universal 
personal care would deliver greater equity, reduce system complexity and help with National Health 
Service integration, and more funding via local government will eventually improve care availability 
and access. There is little political consensus on which of these problems is the priority. 
5. More generous care benefits without sustainable funding 
 
When English social care policymakers look in the policy garbage can, history has not left them an 
obvious, low political cost, alternative approach that can deliver sustainable, upwardly path 
dependent social care funding. The extended social care crisis and protracted policy debates do 
however suggest that policymakers will eventually choose to do ‘something’ beyond simply injecting 
greater funding into the existing system. Central government and the Department of Health and Social 
Care are remote from care policy decisions made by local councils, and there are good operational 
reasons for this devolved approach. While central government has largely left care management to 
local government, a regulatory approach has long been used to guide the direction of provision96. This 
devolved policy approach allowed policymakers to share the blame for austerity after 2010, but the 
growing impact of spending cuts and a lack of social care policy levers that central government can 
pull when needed underpin calls for a new approach that would give policymakers more control over 
funding policy and could be designed to better fund existing and future care institutions. Sutherland 
(1999) and Dilnot (2011) both offer policy reform based on off-the-shelf solutions that would allow 
policymakers to engage with the problems of social care funding without having to invest significant 
political capital. The Dilnot care cap has already been enacted (and then reversed) by policymakers 
and Sutherland’s free personal care has been operating in Scotland since 2002. While both of these 
policy changes require a significant step change in public spending, this obstacle did not block funding 
reform in the two comparator cases (or English social care provision reform in the 1980s). A more 
 
96 Local government is regulated to ensure that the policy priorities of incumbent administrations are delivered; 
care outsourcing and marketisation in the 1980s, cost containment in the 1990s, personalisation, homecare and 
gradual care intensification in the 2000s, and austerity and ‘Big Society’ community empowerment after 2010. 
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serious issue with adopting either / both policies is that neither delivers a sustainable funding regime. 
Both propose an increase in the generosity of care benefits funded by the existing inadequate funding 
approach, far from addressing systemic local government underfunding, they could exacerbate the 
problem. 
Widespread calls for sustainable funding reform from the social care policy community and continued 
government inaction initially drove various interested organisations to propose new funding policy 
solutions but continued green paper delays, despite the efforts of Damian Green (Green, 2019) and 
other policy entrepreneurs, have stalled the institutional reform debate. While many commentators 
argue radical reform is needed, there are significant political and functional problems with all of the 
funding alternatives being considered (including the status quo). The marginality of English social care 
and Thatcherite ideational unblocking of the policy stream allowed Conservative policymakers, with a 
large parliamentary majority, to marketise commissioning and outsource care provision in the 1980s 
at little political cost, but they did not enact sustainable funding. This failure to institutionalise 
upwardly path dependent funding to address rising need left care institutions vulnerable when 
policymakers reduced public spending after 2010. In the decade before financial austerity, publicly 
commissioned social care spending increased by more than half (Simpson, 2017, p.4), a period 
congruent with the organisational goals of social care institutions and a funding environment to which 
those operating in the sector would prefer to return. The social care crisis is driven by public spending 
falling below the norms anticipated by public and private care institutions while demographic and 
socio-economic factors have increased demand. Local government has a statutory requirement to 
increase care provision, but local taxation is capped by central government and central funding grants 
to local government have been reduced significantly. Static (or worse) public funding, rising care costs 
and demographic change have put downward pressure on per capita care spending, damaging the 
quality of care provision and increasing unmet need. This approach is unsustainable, but in the 
absence of broad public engagement, the social care funding crisis remains a personal crisis for those 
within the care system, a source of conflict between central and local government and an institutional 
crisis for those delivering care. 
Without systemic reform, the future financing environment for English social care does not look 
promising. Years of austerity have damaged the ability of local government to improve care provision 
and highlighted major structural problems with how local government is financed. While there is a 
widely perceived need and policymaker desire to improve care funding, radical public funding reform 
is vanishingly rare, and the current English political environment is no more consistent with reform 
than it was in the recent non-reforming past. This leaves many commentators pessimistic about 
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sustainable public funding reform. Despite this pessimism, there could be scope to rework existing 
institutions to engineer a new alternative funding approach. The successful reform cases analysed in 
chapter four, and past English social care provision reforms, demonstrate that change is possible in 
marginal policy areas when there is a perceived problem and an alternative approach exists that is 
better aligned with the policy objectives of the relevant policymakers than the current approach. With 
mandatory insurance and public hypothecation politically problematic, non-mandatory but 
‘encouraged’ private reform options may be more likely. State-guided, private hypothecation has 
delivered a successful auto-enrolment pension regime in the UK and auto-enrolment care insurance 
might eventually deliver similar outcomes while allowing policymakers to frame the programmes as 
voluntary97. Auto-enrolled pensions enjoy broad cross-party policymaker support (Harrop and Hall, 
2017, p.3), so it may be possible to build a reasonably broad consensus around such a scheme 
(although a consensus may not coalesce until the scheme has been introduced and successfully 
embedded in the fabric of the welfare state). Before the most recent delay in publication, Brady (2019) 
reported that the green paper was likely to propose a more generous means test for publicly funded 
care, would revisit the lifetime cap on social care payments and consult on policy options that included 
“an insurance contribution model, a care ISA [private savings account] and tax-free withdrawals from 
pension pots” (Brady, 2019) to fund care. While major public players in the social care policy 
community are likely to block long-run hypothecated public social insurance, private, auto-enrolment 
insurance could complement means-tested public care funding, combining some of the risk pooling 
benefits of mandatory German long-term care insurance with the legal guarantees that protect private 
funded pensions in the UK. While auto-enrolment pensions will reduce means tested benefits payable 
by the state to future pensioners, they are not widely seen as a disguised tax. If an auto-enrolment 
social care insurance scheme were similarly perceived, this approach might also allow policymakers 
to engineer a new voluntary, ‘encouraged’ welfare funding institution at minimal public cost that 
avoided the political damage associated with the ‘dementia’ and ‘death’ taxes98.  
 
97 While UK auto-enrolment pensions are non-mandatory, in the seven years since they were introduced the 
share of the employed workforce with a private pension (93%) has almost doubled. In September 2018, Matt 
Hancock, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, noted that auto-enrolment pensions have been a great 
success and argued that introducing private auto-enrolment care insurance could significantly increase the level 
of saving for social care (Espadinha, 2018). 
98 The comparative analysis undertaken in chapter four suggests that a reform implementation approach 
mimicking the unplanned evolution of SERPS (1978 to 2014) might also help policymakers negotiate two 
significant blocks in the sustainable care funding policy stream (a failed private social care insurance market and 
a UK institutional unwillingness to introduce and persist with public hypothecation). Temporary ring-fenced 
public care insurance could be introduced relatively quickly, followed by a move to hybrid public / private 
insurance once the market had been proven and on to private, auto-enrolment insurance in the longer term. 
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Chapter 7. Why does English social care face a persistent funding crisis? 
Policymakers in England are faced with very significant demographic and socio-economic issues when 
they are formulating policies to support the welfare needs of older people. The population is ageing, 
many families are becoming less able to provide informal care and the cost of health and social care 
tends to rise more quickly than general prices. In some policy areas, welfare programmes for those 
who have retired have become increasingly generous while in others the welfare state has responded 
to rising need by restricting benefit eligibility and attempting to contain costs. While average incomes 
for those in work have changed little in the past decade, real pensioner incomes have risen 
significantly99. In contrast to rising pensions, public funding for residential and home care fell in the 
years that followed the Great Recession and 460,000 fewer older people received publicly funded 
social care in 2018 than in 2009 (Burchardt et al., 2015, p.28; NHS Digital, 2018, p.8). 
To analyse the drivers of these very different programme outcomes in a single welfare state, this thesis 
has explored how existing institutions channel the politics of organisational change, charted the 
historical development of English social care provision and the wider welfare state, compared 
programme outcomes and institutional structures in three welfare programmes that cater for older 
people, drawn upon data sets, document analysis and interviews, and applied ideational and 
conceptual approaches that include a maturing welfare state, institutional and policy drift, 
retrenchment theory, the multiple streams framework and the garbage can model. 
In the decade before the financial crisis of 2008, the three welfare institutions compared in the thesis 
all enjoyed rising programme spending. In the subsequent decade, UK pensioners and German long-
term care insurance recipients continued to see rising funding and improving programme outcomes, 
while English public social care spending fell. Policymakers had institutionalised sustainable, ring-
fenced funding to support provision in the two better performing welfare programmes but had not 
done so for English social care. The outcome divergence seen is underpinned by these very different 
institutional funding arrangements. When taxation is pooled, funding tight and policymakers aim to 
minimise the political damage they suffer from spending restraint, marginal lower salience welfare 
programmes that lack sustainable funding mechanisms are more likely to suffer systemic 
 
99 The thesis argues that rising pensioner incomes at a time of stagnant real wages and growing income inequality 
are underpinned by a robust, upwardly path-dependent, multi-pillar pension funding regime. While the current 
funding approach has delivered improving pensioner incomes for decades, continuing pensioner income growth 
may not be financially sustainable in the longer term if policymakers fail to engineer a return to rising real wages 
for those in work. 
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underfunding. Having argued that the funding sustainability mechanisms present in the two 
comparator cases are a key element of welfare programme success, the introductory chapter asked; 
If a robust funding approach has delivered sustainably funded benefits to UK pensioners and German 
social care recipients in a climate of on-going financial austerity, and there is widespread agreement 
that the current social care funding approach is inappropriate and inequitable, why have policymakers 
consistently failed to introduce a sustainable funding approach for English social care? 
To answer this question, the thesis began by demonstrating that English social care is a residually 
funded welfare programme that is of marginal interest to many citizens100 and makes up a relatively 
small part of UK government spending101. Policymakers could (and may well) choose to apply 
significantly more resources to social care using the existing local government funding approach in the 
next few years102 and this will, after a period of austerity reversal, resolve the current underfunding of 
existing care institutions103. The ingrained marginality of English social care will however remain, and 
once policymaker engagement with the need for rising care funding and investment begins to wane, 
a significant, mature and growing welfare institution will again be left without the sustainable, 
upwardly path dependent funding mechanisms of the legacy positive welfare state core or more 
recently introduced devolved, non-taxation funding institutions104. 
 
This is the systemic funding problem that mediates calls for reform. While there is broad cross-party 
policymaker agreement that England needs more care funding today and a sustainable care funding 
 
100 A social care consultant suggested that a “fog of incomprehension” (Interviewee 029, 2018) protects social 
care policymakers who fail to address persistent care underfunding and an MP argued that most citizens are not 
particularly engaged with social care (Interviewee 031, 2018). 
101 In 2018 total public spending in the UK was £810bn (ONS, 2019b). English local government social care 
spending in 2018 was £17.9bn (NHS Digital, 2018, T4), which is 2.2% of UK public spending in the year. In 2019, 
the Local Government Association (Local Government Association, 2019) stated that preserving existing 
(inadequate) levels of local government commissioned social care provision in England would require spending 
to rise by an extra £3.6bn per annum by 2025 (0.4% of public spending in 2018). 
102 The Blair administration increased local government commissioned social care spending by 54%, from 
£11.8bn to £18bn (Simpson, 2017, p.4) between 2000 and 2010. 
103 The thesis has argued that the English social care funding crisis is institutional and personal, with the 
institutional funding crisis driven by the rate of (upward) change in funding levels falling below historically 
expected norms. German social care policy is well regarded by many commentators, but publicly funded care 
spending levels there are similar to England. German social care expenditure has however risen in the past 
decade from a lower base while it has fallen in England. 
104 Devolved regulatory welfare funding solutions introduced by policymakers in the UK include the national 
minimum wage, pension auto-enrolment and the student loan scheme. These sustainable, programme-specific 
funding approaches are all built around employment, guided by the state, not directly funded by pooled general 
taxation and, to varying degrees, engineered using fiscal welfare, regulatory welfare and the ideas of behavioural 
economics. They tend to be mandatory for employers but are ‘optional’ for citizens. 
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approach for the future, history has not left an obvious route to a sustainable social care funding 
solution in the policy garbage can. The lack of a clear alternative approach has left semi-engaged 
policymakers undecided about the most appropriate policy response and care funding stuck in the 
residual, Poor Law, local welfare state paradigm without automatic mechanisms to grow funding. Half-
hearted attempts to promote and engineer private social care insurance have also failed, leaving 
citizens unable to protect themselves against the risk of catastrophic care costs in old age. With the 
state reluctant to row, and no obvious funding institutions that policymakers might repurpose and 
steer, a significant market failure remains unaddressed. In the two comparator cases, when 
policymakers perceived there was a funding problem and broadly agreed what should be done (based 
on an established, rapidly deployable institutional solution which minimised the political cost of 
reform), it was possible to enact sustainable welfare funding reform. Having re-engineered pre-
existing institutions, policymakers then used legislation and regulatory bureaucrats to steer the 
reimagined welfare funding institutions they had created. Where alternative funding arrangements 
are weaker or do not exist, introducing a new sustainable funding institution is more complicated and 
likely to incur a higher political cost. This dynamic inhibits policymaker action in English social care. 
While policymakers might express a desire for funding policy change, moving social care towards the 
more generously funded welfare state core has proved to be technically and politically unworkable 
and, lacking a pre-existing reform template, less than fully engaged policymakers have failed to 
engineer a bespoke, sustainable funding solution105. 
 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the research findings developed and evidence presented in 
the analytical chapters that underpin this analysis, considers the analytical benefits of combining 
historical institutionalism with the multiple streams framework and suggests that engineering a care 
funding ‘double movement’ that mimics the evolution of SERPS pensions might offer English 
policymakers an implementation path to a more sustainable care funding approach. 
 
105 Most English policymakers believe the current local government managed and funded social care regime is 
not fit for purpose and needs reform (Independent Age, 2017). Having stumbled into using means-tested 
supplementary benefit payments to fund residential care for older people in the 1980s, the Thatcher 
administration also sought a new funding approach in the late 1980s that did not rely on local government to 
fund and manage social care. Eventually, despite a clear preference to not increase the scope of local 
government at the time (Ridley, 1988, p.6), Conservative policymakers concluded there was no serious 
alternative (Means et al., 2002, p. 4) and the management and funding of all publicly commissioned residential 
care reverted to local government. 
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1. Research findings 
Chapter three charted the historical development of the UK welfare state, arguing that successful 
welfare institutions are supported by sustainable funding mechanisms. Two very different welfare 
state eras and institutional inertia have created two sustainable welfare funding poles: a legacy 
general taxation funded welfare state core and devolved non-taxation funding mechanisms which 
have become the preferred reform approach for today’s policymakers. Neither of these poles 
sustainably supports English social care. The UK’s mature general taxation funded welfare state has 
enjoyed a rising share of national income for decades, is an aggregation of often quite different 
institutions that have evolved over time and is not particularly responsive to emergent welfare need. 
Historically, the developing welfare state drove centralisation and standardisation, as the 
management of provision passed from parish to council to central government. While this process 
improved coverage rates and programme quality, rising taxation was required and some marginal 
welfare areas, including social care, were left behind. Golden age policymakers made generous 
welfare state promises and these have broadly been kept. Despite attempted retrenchment, the 
visible, popular, taxation funded welfare state core remains resilient, but past choices limit current 
policy options, and policy drift and the strength of welfare state insiders reduce institutional flexibility. 
Once institutions are created and embedded in the fabric of the welfare state, they are hard to reform. 
An environment of welfare state maturity, managerial policymakers, financial constraints and popular 
support for existing provision limits the scope for welfare state outsider programmes to achieve 
increased levels of taxation funded public welfare provision. To fill gaps in coverage, policymakers 
have increasingly turned to regulation, fiscal welfare, and behavioural economics to steer the choices 
made by citizens and companies. When combined with existing, slow changing insider programmes, 
we have an increasingly heterogeneous welfare state made up of programmes with very different 
objectives, founding missions and funding approaches. While English social care never really escaped 
the marginal, local council funded Poor Law tradition, the state pension and National Health Service 
reside in the more generously funded legacy positive welfare state core and the minimum wage, 
student loans and auto-enrolment pensions have all been created in the post golden age era of 
regulatory welfare. The legacy core public welfare state and more recent devolved regulatory welfare 
programmes are underpinned by very different, but sustainable, funding mechanisms and have fared 
relatively well in the past decade. 
Social care has not and is managed and funded by local government which lacks institutional funding 
supports and has been badly impacted by austerity. With a move towards the core welfare state 
politically and technically problematic, a broad coalition of commentators and policymakers have 
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argued for a step change in spending today and a more sustainable funding approach for the future. 
While policymakers have started to increase English social care spending, funding reforms have not 
been forthcoming. Sustainable funding reform has however been possible in similarly marginal 
welfare programmes that cater for older people, so chapter four analysed two post golden age cases 
where new welfare funding approaches were introduced. The chapter argued that reforms in the two 
comparators were based on pre-existing alternative institutions and were made more likely because 
the existing funding institution was relatively underdeveloped. In both cases these popular, preferred 
funding institutions were readily available, and this guided the politics of organisational change when 
policymakers sought a more sustainable funding approach. The cases demonstrate that when 
policymakers agree there is a problem and a preferred and implementable solution presents itself, 
reform was possible in majoritarian and consensual political systems. Having a pre-existing 
institutional structure into which reform efforts could be directed helped policymakers and citizens to 
understand and engage with funding reform and allowed a large enough policy consensus to develop 
amongst the relevant policymakers. Both reforms institutionalised an upwardly path dependent, 
state-guided, hybrid public and private funding pillar that complemented existing general taxation 
funded public provision. An analysis of post-reform institutional development also demonstrated the 
protective, simplifying and beneficiary empowering benefits that can accrue to a welfare programme 
that is supported by a robust programme specific funding institution. Ring-fenced funding can protect 
welfare programmes against benefit retrenchment and gives policy entrepreneurs, policymakers and 
the wider policy community a focus for lobbying, provision improvements and a clear state-guided, 
non-taxation mechanism to increase funding over time106. 
Having analysed two cases where policymakers successfully introduced sustainable welfare funding, 
the final two analytical chapters asked why policymakers have failed to move social care towards the 
better funded welfare state core or to enact a more robust bespoke funding approach.  Chapter five 
noted that English social care has historically been a relatively marginal, fragmented welfare 
programme. The residual nature and low salience of social care facilitated radical provision reforms in 
the 1980s when private providers were encouraged to deliver publicly commissioned care, but 
policymakers failed to address the need for sustainable funding or to protect against future 
retrenchment. The recent development of English social care has seen continued central government 
 
106 The Netherlands introduced mandatory, defined benefit, universal public social care insurance in 1968. As 
care need grew and policymakers broadened eligibility over time, upwardly path dependent programme funding 
increased automatically. Starting from a relatively low base in 1968, public social care spending had risen to 4.3% 
of GDP by 2014 (OECD, 2018) leaving many policymakers concerned about social care ‘overfunding’. In 2014, UK 
care expenditure was 1.2% of GDP (OECD, 2018). 
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disengagement, emergent policies and the use of regulatory welfare and targeted fixes to achieve 
specific policymaker outcomes rather than adopting a long term, strategic approach. The devolved 
nature of social care has allowed central government policymakers to remain disengaged from an area 
of rising welfare need and to share the blame for recent cuts in provision. Austerity has reduced care 
spending while demand has increased, accelerating care intensification and a reversion to informal 
care by the family and formal residential care. While social care suffers from systemic underfunding, 
decades of policymaker disengagement and care outsourcing have created a complex of well-
developed de-centred institutions that commission and deliver social care. This fragmented network 
distributes veto points across multiple institutions, is poorly integrated with the National Health 
Service and is financed by local government that is an increasingly porous funding mechanism. With 
the council funding channel damaged by austerity, policymakers have been drawn towards the need 
for an alternative, more sustainable funding solution, but no obvious mechanism exists. Numerous 
commissions have proposed policy change, but English social care is still funded by individual self-
insurance with public funding only available when the care recipient approaches insolvency. 
In 2020, English social care is a relatively well developed, devolved welfare institution that central 
government struggles to steer. While lacking a sustainable funding approach the sector does have a 
large and vocal institutional community that advocates greater care funding after a decade of austerity 
that has been a significant shock to care institutions that enjoyed strong public funding growth in the 
preceding decade. Chapter six noted that social care faces an individual and institutional funding crisis, 
but policymakers are still not particularly engaged and remain unwilling to invest significant amounts 
of political capital in policy reform, so they look for pre-existing, popular solutions to the funding 
problem. The growing impacts of spending restraint and a lack of central government policy levers 
underpin calls for a more sustainable and steerable funding approach that would give policymakers 
greater influence over funding policy direction and programme outcomes. Unfortunately, when 
policymakers have looked in the policy garbage can, they find that history has not left them an obvious 
solution that they can use to engineer a sustainable care funding solution. While austerity has 
damaged the ability of local government to improve care provision and there is a widely perceived 
need and policymaker desire to improve care outcomes, radical reforms look unlikely. There is 
however scope for policymakers to do ‘something’ about social care. Public hypothecation and 
mandatory taxation-based funding reform are problematic, but Sutherland (1999) and Dilnot (2011) 
do offer a path to more generous care benefits, albeit financed by the existing systemically inadequate 
public funding approach. If a green paper is eventually published it may also propose other policy 
options plucked from the policy garbage can: a promise to consult on care insurance, care savings 
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accounts and the use of pensions to fund care. While not delivering sustainable care funding for all 
citizens, these approaches would allow policymakers to demonstrate government activity, are 
deliverable and would give the better off a way to protect against the risks of catastrophic care costs 
in old age. 
2. Path dependency and path deviation 
In the two cases of sustainable funding reform analysed, when a “critical moment for path deviation” 
(Spohr, 2016, p.269) opened, history had put an alternative funding institution, better aligned with 
regulatory state policymaker preferences than the status quo, in the policy garbage can. When 
policymakers concluded that a problem existed, they chose to embrace the more attractive alternative 
funding approach. Having a clear alternative policy solution already in place allowed the politics of 
reform to follow the existing institutional form. England lacks a compelling alternative social care 
funding approach, strong UK governments with large majorities have failed to enact radical funding 
reform in previous critical junctures and most commentators argue that the chances of sustainable 
funding reforms being introduced today, despite widespread policymaker agreement that there is a 
problem, are low. 
The garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972) and multiple streams framework (Kingdon, 
1984) both treat the problem, policy and politics streams as relatively independent variables, but in 
the two successful reform cases analysed we see policymakers choosing between existing historically 
determined structures, policies and institutions with existing alternative solutions guiding the politics. 
Mucciaroni (1992, p.467) argues that the garbage can model and three streams approach give undue 
weight to the situational aspects of policymaking and need to be combined with a consideration of 
the critical antecedents (Slater and Simmons, 2010, p.911) of change and the impact of institutional 
factors that mediate the problems and solutions that are considered by policymakers (Mucciaroni, 
1992, p.482). This approach blends historical institutionalism, which emphasises the deterministic, 
path dependent qualities of institutions (Spohr, 2016, p.258) giving less attention to policy 
entrepreneurs and the mechanisms of change (Lynch and Rhodes, 2016, p.424), with complementary 
approaches that can better predict policymaker action / inaction. For Pierson (2004, p.155) the 
financial and political costs of replacing an institution also mediate institutional stability and how 
change is implemented when policymakers decide it is needed. Where both are high, he predicts that 
existing institutions will persist with reforms operating in parallel. This is how change unfolded in both 
of the funding reform cases considered. Pre-existing institutional structures channelled how 
policymakers engaged with reform and allowed a large enough policy consensus to develop giving 
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policymakers space to rework existing, trusted organisations to institutionalise a new parallel funding 
pillar without having to incur the political and financial costs of removing the existing funding 
approach. 
Spohr (2016, p.258) drew on Mucciaroni’s critique, developing a “framework for the explanation of 
path dependency and deviation” that combines historical institutional insights with Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework, and used it to analyse labour market reforms in Germany and Sweden. He 
concludes that path deviating reform was contingent on four factors: a new policy approach must 
emerge in the policy stream, the grip of any focused, technocratic policy community that dominates 
the policy stream needs to weaken107, a window of opportunity (a “critical moment for path 
deviation”) has to open and policy entrepreneurs need to “strategically exploit the ambivalence of 
institutions, values and problems” (Spohr, 2016, p.269) to shape the path of reforms. 
This thesis has employed a similar framework to analyse two cases of successful funding reform and 
a case of persistent social care non-reform. The research undertaken confirms that combining 
historical institutionalism and the multiple streams framework delivers valuable insights into the 
forces that drive path continuity and deviation. The thesis also demonstrates that despite a clear 
reform opportunity in the problem stream (the political stream also became more consistent with 
reform after the December 2019 general election) and the best efforts of Dominic Green and other 
policy entrepreneurs, achieving path departing funding reform requires a ‘new’, plausible and 
implementable alternative policy approach within the policy stream / garbage can that is acceptable 
to the (still dominant) social care policy community. Without this policy entrepreneurs are less likely 
to be able to deliver path deviating change. 
3. Punctuating the inadequate care funding equilibrium 
Writing in the 1990s, Pierson (1994, p.2) argued that welfare state retrenchment had been more 
modest than was expected by many commentators in the 1980s. While asserting that popular 
universal programmes had not changed radically in the ways in which they presented to policy takers, 
he suggested that marginal programmes were more likely to experience immediate retrenchment and 
that systemic retrenchment policies that reinvented institutional forms could also weaken protections 
 
107 Kingdon (1984, p.118) notes that the structure of policy communities can range from focused, integrated 
policy communities to fragmented issue networks. Spohr (2016, p.259) argues that “the structure of policy 
communities may … provide an explanation for path dependency and deviation” with integrated policy 
communities tending to prefer path dependent evolutionary change. This suggests path departure is less likely 
in welfare areas like social care where a focused, technocratic policy community dominates the policy stream 
and policymakers are less than fully engaged. 
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against future retrenchment (Pierson, 1994, p.146). Pierson’s analysis began a robust debate, with 
some arguing that public welfare spending may have risen, but not fast enough to meet increasing 
need (Levy, 2010). A further critique suggests that while overall retrenchment may have been modest, 
a policy environment that combines growing welfare demand with constrained spending has created 
winners (large, popular, universal core welfare state programmes like pensions and healthcare) and 
losers (smaller, niche programmes without a broad policy taker base that lack popular support such 
as English social care). While core welfare programmes might persist, emerging non-core welfare 
needs would not be met as neoliberal policymakers blocked the extension of the core welfare state 
into new areas leaving more marginal welfare programmes systemically underfunded. Pierson (2011, 
p.22) later returned to his analysis of retrenchment to consider the implications of welfare state drift. 
While noting that overall welfare spending is rising, and core programme generosity and universality 
have remained relatively stable, he argues that when a frozen policy equilibrium combines with 
significant societal change this delivers a transformation in the impact of the welfare state. Popular 
existing welfare programmes crowd out emerging welfare need as existing policy takers dominate 
provision and limit the opportunities for newly emerging, and potentially more worthy claimants. 
UK earnings-related pensions, German social care and English social care are three cases where 
significant levels of additional need developed in non-core welfare areas after the golden age of 
welfare had passed. The cases demonstrate that when need emerges in marginal welfare areas and 
history has put alternative, sustainable funding solutions into the policy garbage can, post golden age 
policymakers have been willing and able to use them to engineer well-funded welfare outcomes.  
Pierson’s analysis evolved from arguing that welfare state retrenchment has been unexpectedly 
modest to suggesting that a frozen welfare state can leave emergent need in marginal policy areas 
unmet. The research undertaken in this thesis suggests that when faced with the welfare gaps 
predicted by Pierson, policymakers have sought to create paths to more sustainable welfare funding 
in emerging areas of welfare need without recourse to greater taxation. This approach relies upon 
history having left a politically viable, reasonably complete, non-taxation funding solution in the policy 
garbage can that policymakers can repurpose and then ‘encourage’ citizens to use. While German 
policymakers punctuated the inadequate care funding equilibrium in the 1990s by re-engineering 
existing health insurance schemes, the lack of an existing alternative care funding approach is a 
fundamental block in the English policy stream. The SERPS pension reform comparator case might 
however suggest a possible route to transform how English social care is funded. While the unadopted 
reform options discussed in chapter six all suggest single stage solutions, a reform implementation 
strategy that mimics the unplanned evolution of SERPS over time (public care insurance first followed 
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by gradual privatisation)108 might allow policymakers to negotiate two significant blocks in the 
sustainable care funding policy stream: a failed private social care insurance market (a potential 
additional funding approach) and a long-standing institutional unwillingness to introduce and persist 
with public hypothecation. 
 
 
  
 
108 Chapter six argues that auto-enrolled, social care insurance might offer policymakers a new voluntary (but 
‘encouraged’) welfare funding approach at minimal public (general taxation funded) cost that avoids the political 
damage associated with past ‘dementia’ and ‘death’ taxes. The SERPS comparator case also suggests that ring-
fenced public care insurance (while politically problematic) could be introduced relatively quickly and might then 
be followed by a move to hybrid public / private (or fully private) care insurance once an insurance market had 
been established. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
191 
 
8. Bibliography 
Abrahamson, P. (1999). The Welfare Modelling Business, Social Policy & Administration, 33(4), pp.394-
415. 
Adema, W., Fron, P. and Ladaique, M. (2014). How much do OECD countries spend on social protection 
and how redistributive are their tax/benefit systems? International Social Security Review, 67(1), pp.1-
25. 
Age UK (2014). Care in Crisis – 2014, Report. London: Age UK. 
Altmann, R. (2015). A New Vision for Older Workers: Retain, Retrain, Recruit, Report to Government 
by Ros Altmann, Business Champion for Older Workers. 
Anttonen, A. and Sipilä, J. (1996). European social care services: Is it possible to identify models? 
Journal of European Social Policy, 6(2), pp. 87–100. 
Arnold, S. and Stirling, A. (2019). Councils in Crisis: Local government austerity 2009/10 to 2024/25. 
New Economics Foundation. 
Available at: https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/NEF_Local_Government_Austerity_2019.pdf 
[18 September 2019]. 
Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2002). Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-art report, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 12(2), pp.137-158. 
Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2010). Models of the Welfare State, in Castles, F.G., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., 
Obinger, H. and Pierson, C. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 569-83. 
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (2016). ADASS budget survey 2016, ADASS. Available 
at: http://www.adass.org.uk/budget-survey-2016 [05 July 2019]. 
Asthana, A. and Elgot, J. (2017). Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 'dementia tax' U-turn. 
Guardian, 22 May 2017. 
Audit Commission (1986). Making a reality of Community Care, London: HMSO. 
Auster, R. (1974). The GPITPC and Institutional Entropy, Public Choice, 19(Fall), pp. 77-83. 
Auster, R. (1983). Institutional Entropy, Again, Public Choice, 40(2), pp. 211-216. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
192 
 
Bäcker, G. (2016). Reform of the long-term care insurance in Germany, ESPN Flash Report 2016/43, 
European Social Policy Network. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=16074&langId=en [05 July 2019]. 
Bahrdt, D. and Lenz, J. (2015). Germany – 2015 Brings New Social Security Rates, Thresholds, KPMG 
Flash Alert, KPMG Global Mobility Services Practice. Available at: 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/02/fa15-022.pdf [05 July 2019]. 
Baldock, J. (2003). On being a Welfare Consumer in a Consumer Society. Social Policy and Society, 2(1), 
pp. 65-71. 
Baldwin, P. (1990). The politics of social solidarity: class bases of the European welfare state, 1875 - 
1975. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Barker, K. (2014). A new settlement for health and social care, Independent Commission on the Future 
of Health and Social Care in England, London: King’s Fund. 
Barr, N. (2001). The welfare state as piggy bank: information, risk, uncertainty, and the role of the 
state. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barr, N. (2011). Long-Term Care: A Suitable Case for Social Insurance, in Costa-Font, J. (ed). Reforming 
long-term care in Europe. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Baumgartner, F. and Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Baumol, W. (2012). The cost disease: why computers get cheaper and healthcare doesn't. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Baumol, W. and Bowen, W. (1966). Performing arts, the economic dilemma: a study of problems 
common to theatre, opera, music, and dance. New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 
Beckett, A. (2018). The death of consensus: how conflict came back to politics. Guardian, 20 
September 2018. 
Beesley, L. (2006). Informal care in England. Background Paper, Wanless Social Care Review. London: 
King’s Fund. 
Béland, D., Blomqvist, P., Andersen, J., Palme, J. and Waddan, A. (2014). The Universal Decline of 
Universality? Social Policy Change in Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Social Policy and 
Administration, 48(7), pp. 739–756. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
193 
 
Belfield, C., Cribb J., Hood, A. and Joyce, R. (2015). Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 
2015. IFS R107. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Bendor, J, Moe, T. and Shotts, K. (2001). Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research 
Program, American Political Science Review, 95(1), pp. 169-190.  
Berry, C. and Stanley, N. (2013). Third time lucky: building a progressive pensions consensus. 
Touchstone Extra Publications. Available at: https://www.tuc.org.uk/publications/third-time-lucky 
[05 July 2019]. 
Beveridge W. (1948). Voluntary Action. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Beveridge, W. (1942). Social Insurance and Allied Services. The Beveridge Report, London: HMSO. 
Blair, T. (1997). Speech as Prime Minister and Leader of the Labour Party. Labour Party Annual 
Conference, Brighton. 
Blake, D. (2003). Pension schemes and pension funds in the United Kingdom. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Blaug, M. (1964). The Poor Law Report Re-examined. The Journal of Economic History, 24(2), pp. 229-
245. 
Bode, I. (2008). The Culture of Welfare Markets: The International Recasting of Pension and Care 
Systems. New York: Routledge. 
Bonoli, G. (1997). Classifying Welfare States: A Two-dimension Approach. Journal of Social Policy, 
26(3), pp. 351-372. 
Bonoli, G. and Palier, B. (1998). Changing the politics of social programmes: Innovative change in 
British and French welfare reforms, Journal of European Social Policy, 8(4), pp. 317-330. 
Bonoli, G. (2000). The politics of pension reform: institutions and policy change in Western Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Booth, P. and Niemietz, K. (2014), Privatising pensions in the UK: How to restore contracting out. 
Economic Affairs, 34(2), pp. 139–153. 
Bottery, S., Varrow, M., Thorlby, R. and Wellings, D. (2018). A fork in the road: Next steps for social 
care funding reform, London: King’s Fund. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
194 
 
Bozio, A., Crawford, R and Tetlow, G. (2010). The history of state pensions in the UK: 1948 to 2010. IFS 
Briefing Note BN105. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Brady, D. (2019). Details delay social care green paper, Public Finance website. Available at: 
https://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2019/04/details-delay-social-care-green-paper [05 July 
2019]. 
Braithwaite, J. (2011). The Regulatory State? in Goodin, R. E. (ed). The Oxford handbook of political 
science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bridgen, P. and Meyer, T. (2009). The Politics of Occupational Pension Reform in Britain and the 
Netherlands: The Power of Market Discipline in Liberal and Corporatist Regimes, West European 
Politics, 32(3), pp. 586-610. 
Brindle, D. (2009). Taking the long view, an interview with Lord Sutherland. Guardian, 25 February 
2009. 
Brittan, S. (1975). The Economic Contradictions of Democracy, British Journal of Political Science, 5(2), 
pp. 129-159. 
Brooks, R., Regan, S. and Robinson, P. (2002). A New Contract for Retirement, London: Institute for 
Public Policy Research. 
Brooks, S. (2008). Social protection and the market in Latin America: the transformation of social 
security institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Budd, A. and Campbell, N. (1998). The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in the UK Pension System 
in Feldstein, M. (ed.). in Privatizing Social Security. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bunn, J. (2019) Care minister – Brexit has left DHSC fighting to deliver green paper, Local Government 
Chronicle, 30 April 2019. 
Burchardt, T., Obolenskaya P. and Polly Vizard, P. (2015). The Coalition’s Record on Adult Social Care: 
Policy, Spending and Outcomes 2010-2015, CASE Working Paper, LSE, London. 
Butler, P. (2018). Adult social care services on brink of collapse, survey shows. Guardian, 12 June 2018. 
Butler, P. (2019). Labour to announce it would reverse austerity cuts to adult social care. Guardian, 22 
September 2019. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
195 
 
Cairney, P. and Jones, M. (2016). Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What Is the Empirical Impact 
of this Universal Theory? Policy Studies Journal, 44(1), pp. 37 – 58. 
Cairney, P. and Zahariadis, N. (2016). Multiple streams approach: a flexible metaphor presents an 
opportunity to operationalize agenda setting processes in Handbook of Public Policy Agenda Setting, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Cameron, D. (2010). Big Society Speech as Prime Minister. Liverpool, 19 July 2010. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/big-society-speech [05 July 2019]. 
Campbell, D. (2019). Pledges to fix social care could cost Boris Johnson dearly. Guardian, 1 August 
2019. 
Capoccia, G. (2016). Critical Junctures, in Fioretos, K.O., Falleti, T.G., and Sheingate, A. D. (eds.). The 
Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carstensen, M. (2017). Institutional bricolage in times of crisis. European Political Science Review, 9(1), 
pp. 139-160. 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (2018). Published written evidence submitted 
to the Communities and Local Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term 
funding and provision of adult social care (FSC 0060). Available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/communities-
and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-
care-17-19/publications/ [05 July 2019]. 
Chwalisz, C. and Diamond, P.  (2015). The Pre-distribution Agenda Tackling Inequality and Supporting 
Sustainable Growth. London: Tauris Academic Studies. 
Clayton, R. and Pontusson, J. (1998). Welfare-State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public 
Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies, World Politics, 51(1), 
pp. 67-98. 
Cohen, M., March, J. and Johan P. Olsen, J. (1972). A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), pp. 1-25. 
Collier, D. (1993). The Comparative Method, in Finifter, A. (ed.), Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline II, Washington DC: American Political Science Association. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
196 
 
Collier, R. and Collier, D (1991). Shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labor movement, and 
regime dynamics in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Colombo, F., Llena-Nozal, A., Mercier, J. and Tjadens, F. (2011). Help Wanted? Providing and Paying 
for Long-Term Care, OECD Health Policy Studies, OECD Publishing: Paris. 
Comas-Herrera, A., Wittenberg, R., Costa-Font, J., Gori, C., Di Maio, S., Patxot, C., Pickard, L., Pozzi, A. 
and Rothgang, H. (2006). Future long-term care expenditure in Germany, Spain, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, Ageing & Society, 26(2), pp. 285–302. 
Comas-Herrera, A., Wittenberg, R. and Pickard, L. (2010). The Long Road to Universalism? Recent 
Developments in the Financing of Long-term Care in England, Social Policy & Administration, 44(4), pp. 
375–391. 
Comas-Herrera, A., Wittenberg, R. and Pickard, L. (2011). From Commission to Commission: Financing 
Long-Term Care in England in Costa-Font, J., and Courbage, C. (eds). Financing long-term care in 
Europe: Institutions, markets, and models. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Competition and Markets Authority. (2017). Care homes market study. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/care-homes-market-study  [05 July 2019]. 
Conservative Party. (1979). Conservative Party Manifesto, 1979. The Conservative Party. Available at: 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con79.htm [09 May 2017]. 
Conservative Party. (1983). Conservative Party Manifesto, 1983. The Conservative Party. Available at: 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con83.htm [09 May 2017]. 
Conservative Party. (2015). Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015. The Conservative Party. Available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto2015 [16 May 2019]. 
Conservative Party. (2017). Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017. The Conservative Party. Available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto  [16 May 2019]. 
Corlett, A. (2017). As time goes by – Shifting incomes and inequality between and within generations, 
Resolution Foundation.  
Costa-Font, J. (2010). Family ties and the crowding out of long-term care insurance, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 26(4), pp. 691–712. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
197 
 
Costa-Font, J. and Courbage, C. (2011). Financing long-term care in Europe: Institutions, markets, and 
models. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
County Councils Network (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local 
Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision of adult 
social care (FSC 0118). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
a-z/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-
2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-care-17-19/publications/ [13 June 2019]. 
CQC – Care Quality Commission (2017). The state of healthcare and adult social care in England - 
2016/17. Available at: 
https://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20171123_stateofcare1617_report.pdf [14 February 
2019]  
Crawford, E. and Read, C. (2015) The Care Collapse: The imminent crisis in residential care and its 
impact on the NHS, Report. London: Respublica Trust. 
Crawford, R., Keynes, S. and Tetlow, G. (2013). A Single-Tier Pension: What Does It Really Mean? IFS 
Report R82. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Cribb, J., Disney, R. and Sibieta L. (2014). The public-sector workforce: Past, present and future. IFS 
Briefing Note BN145. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Cribb J., Hood, A., Joyce, R. and Norris Keiller, A. (2017). Living standards, poverty and inequality in the 
UK: 2017. IFS R129. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Cutright, P. (1965). Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social Security Programs, 
American Journal of Sociology, 70(5), pp. 537-550. 
Dale, G. (2010). Karl Polanyi: the limits of the market. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Demos (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local Government and 
Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision of adult social care (FSC 
0190). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/long-term-
funding-of-adult-social-care-17-19/publications/ [08 July 2019]. 
Department of Health and Social Care. (2018). Press release – Prime Minister sets out 5-year NHS 
funding plan. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-sets-out-5-year-
nhs-funding-plan [05 July 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
198 
 
DHSS – Department of Health and Social Security (1985a). Reform of social security: A programme for 
action, White paper, London: Stationery Office, Cmnd 9691. 
DHSS – Department of Health and Social Security (1985b). Reform of social security, Green paper, 
London: Stationery Office, Cmnd 9517-9. 
DHSS – Department of Health and Social Security. (1981). Growing Older. London: HMSO. 
Dickson, N. (2019). Most MPs agree there’s a crisis in social care – so why aren’t they solving it? New 
Statesman, 5 June 2019. 
Dilnot, A. (2011). Fairer Care Funding – The Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), pp. 147-160. 
Disney, R. and Whitehouse, E. (1992). The personal pensions stampede, IFS Report R40. Institute for 
Fiscal Studies. Available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/r40.pdf [05 July 2019]. 
Dobson, F. (1997). Speech and paper presented to NHS Confederation Annual Conference, June 1997. 
Dodd, L. and Jillson, C. (1994). The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, 
New York: Routledge. 
DSS - Department of Social Security (2000). The pensioners’ incomes series, 1997/8, Analytical 
Services Division, DSS, London. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130513214236/http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd6/
PI-1997-98.pdf [05 July 2019]. 
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions (2013). The pensioners’ incomes series, United Kingdom, 
2011/12, DWP, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/pensioners-
incomes-series-201112--2 [05 July 2019]. 
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions (2016). Pensioners’ incomes series: An analysis of trends 
in pensioner incomes: 1994/95-2014/15, United Kingdom, DWP, London. Available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/pensioners-incomes-series-financial-year-201415 [05 
July 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
199 
 
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions (2018a). Benefit expenditure and caseload tables, DWP. 
London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/benefit-expenditure-and-
caseload-tables-2014 [05 July 2019]. 
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions (2018b). State Pension expenditure by country of 
residence, 1995/96 to 2017/18, DWP. London. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2018 [05 
July 2019]. 
DWP - Department for Work and Pensions (2018c). Pensioners’ incomes series: Financial year 
2016/17, DWP, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/pensioners-
incomes-series-financial-year-201617 [05 July 2019]. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Gronwald, M. (2011). The Changing Public Private Pension Mix in Europe: From 
Path Dependence to Path Departure in Ebbinghaus, B. (ed.). The varieties of pension governance. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 23 – 53. 
Economist, The (2019). Who cares? Social care, the problem Britain keeps putting off. The 
Economist, 2 May 2019. 
Emmenegger, P., Kvist, J and Marx, P. (2015). Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: The making of a 
classic, Journal of European Social Policy, 25(1), pp. 3–13. 
Espadinha, M. (2018). Govt considers auto-enrolment solution for social care. FT Advisor, 17 
September 2018. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
European Commission. (2007). Health and long-term care in the European Union, Special 
Eurobarometer 283, Brussels: Directorate General for Communication. 
Fabian Society (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local 
Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision of adult 
social care (FSC 0190). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
a-z/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-
2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-care-17-19/publications/ [05 July 2019]. 
Fallon, M. (2017). Speech given at Conservative Party Conference, 2017. 
Available at: http://www.ukpol.co.uk/michael-fallon-2017-speech-at-conservative-party-
conference/ [05 July 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
200 
 
Federal Health Monitoring System. Available at: http://www.gbe-bund.de/ [05 July 2019]. 
Federal Ministry of Health (2014), The First Long Term Care Strengthening Act (PSG I), Federal 
Ministry of Health Briefing. Available at: https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/en/long-
term-care/first-act-to-strengthen-long-term-care.html [08 December 2016]. 
Ferrera, M. (1996). The southern model of welfare in social Europe, Journal of European Social Policy, 
6(1), pp. 17-37. 
Firth Committee. (1987). Public Support for Residential Care: Report of a Joint Central and Local 
Government Working Party, London: Department of Health and Social Security. 
Fowler, N. (1984). Speech to Joint Social Services Annual Conference, 27 September, Buxton. 
Fowler, N. (1991). Ministers decide: a personal memoir of the Thatcher years. London: Chapmans. 
Fraser, D. (2009). The evolution of the British welfare state: a history of social policy since the Industrial 
Revolution. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Frisina-Doetter, L. and Rothgang, H. (2015). Long-term care policy above the fray? The case of 
German LTC expansion in the face of austerity, LSE International Workshop, June 22, 2015. Available 
at: http://ilpnetwork.org/presentations/long-term-care-policy-above-the-fray-the-case-of-german-
ltc-expansion-in-the-face-of-austerity/ [05 July 2019]. 
Gash, T. and Roos, T. (2012). Choice and competition in public services: learning from history, London: 
Institute for Government. 
Geraedts, M., Heller, G. and Harrington, C. (2000). Germany’s Long-Term-Care Insurance: Putting a 
Social Insurance Model into Practice. Milbank Quarterly, 78(3), pp.375-401. 
Gilbert, N. (2002). Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Giles, C. (2015). Higher wage will not compensate for tax credit cuts, IFS says. Financial Times, 9 July 
2015. 
Gingrich, J. R. (2011). Making Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of Varying Market Reforms. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Glendinning, C. and Wills, M. (2018a). What can England learn from the German social insurance 
approach to long-term care funding? LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, March 2018. Available at: 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
201 
 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/german-approach-to-long-term-care-funding/ [09 July 
2019]. 
Glendinning, C. and Wills, M. (2018b). German long-term care insurance briefing for members of the 
Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee and Health and Social Care Committee, 9 
May 2018. 
Goodin, R. E. (1988). Reasons for welfare: the political theory of the welfare state. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Gorsky, M. (2012). Creating the Poor Law Legacy: Institutional Care for Older People before the 
Welfare State, Contemporary British History, 26(4), pp. 441–465. 
Götting, U., Haug, K. and Hinrich, K. (1994). The long road to long-term care insurance in Germany. 
Journal of Public Policy, 14(3), pp. 285-309. 
Grant Thornton. (2018). Adult Social Care Funding Model – Model outputs and distributional analysis 
report. London: Grant Thornton. 
Gray, M. and Barford, A. (2018). The depths of the cuts: the uneven geography of local government 
austerity, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 11(3), pp. 541–563. 
Green, D. (2017). Social Care Update. House of Commons written statement, HC Deb 16 November 
2017, HCWS258. 
Green, D. (2019). Fixing the care crisis, Centre for Policy Studies. 
Available at: https://www.cps.org.uk/research/fixing-the-care-crisis [05 July 2019]. 
Griffiths R. (1988) Community care: agenda for action. London: HMSO. 
Hacker, J. S. (2002). The divided welfare state: the battle over public and private social benefits in the 
United States. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hacker, J.S. (2008). The welfare state, in Binder, S., Rhodes, R. and Rockman, B. (eds.). The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P. (2016). Politics as a process structured in space and time, in Fioretos, K.O., Falleti, T.G., and 
Sheingate, A. D. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hands, G. (2014). Letter to the Economist. Economist, 6 December 2014. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
202 
 
Harrop, A. and Hall, S. (2017). Saving for the Future: Extending the consensus on workplace pensions, 
Bright Blue and the Fabian Society. Available at: https://fabians.org.uk/publication/saving-for-the-
future/ [05 July 2019]. 
Haynes, L. (2019). Minister moves to dampen expectations of social care green paper after two-year 
delay, Community Care website. Available at: 
https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2019/05/03/minister-moves-dampen-expectations-social-care-
green-paper-two-year-delay/ [05 July 2019]. 
Hill, A. (2019). Matt Hancock: social care green paper held up by 'partisan politics'. Guardian, 4 July 
2019. 
Hills, J. (2004). Heading for retirement? National Insurance, state pensions, and the future of the 
contributory principle in the UK. Journal of Social Policy, 33(3), pp. 347–371. 
HM Treasury. (2017). Consolidated Fund (2016/17). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-fund-account-2016-to-2017 [05 July 
2019]. 
House of Commons Health Committee. (2009). Written evidence – Social Care (HC 2009-10, HC1021), 
London: The Stationery Office. 
House of Commons Health and Social Care and Housing, Communities and Local Government 
Committees. (2018). First joint report – Long-term funding of adult social care (HC 2017-18, HC768), 
London: House of Commons. 
House of Lords Public Service and Demographic Change Committee. (2013). Report - Ready for Ageing? 
(HL 2012-13, HL140), London: The Stationery Office. 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Long-term Sustainability of the NHS. (2017). Report - The 
Long-term Sustainability of the NHS and Adult Social Care. (HL 2016-17, HL151), London: The 
Stationery Office. 
Howard, C. (1997). The hidden welfare state: tax expenditures and social policy in the United States, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hudson, B. (2016). The failure of privatised adult social care in England, London: Centre for Health and 
the Public Interest. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
203 
 
Hunt, J. (2018). We need to do better on social care. Speech given to the British Association of Social 
Workers Conference, 2018. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-need-to-
do-better-on-social-care [05 July 2019]. 
Hunter, T. (2015). A turbulent history of British pensions since 1874, Daily Telegraph, 9 April 2015. 
Independent Age (2017). COMRES Care Homes Market Study, November 2017. CMA website. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/care-homes-market-study [05 July 2019]. 
Innes, A. (2017). Draining the swamp: understanding the crisis in mainstream politics as a crisis of the 
state. Slavic Review, 76(S1), pp. S30-S38. 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities 
and Local Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision 
of adult social care (FSC 0126). Available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/communities-
and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-
care-17-19/publications/ [05 July 2019]. 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2015). Incomes in the UK - Relative poverty rates (After Housing Costs). 
Available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/incomes_in_uk [06 March 2017]. 
Institute of Fiscal Studies (2018). BN240 – Changes in councils’ adult social care and overall service 
spending in England, 2009-10 to 2017-18. Available at: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN240.pdf 
[05 July 2019]. 
Interviewee 020 (2017), Residential care provider manager, Interviewed by Wills, M. (30 November 
2017 with follow up on 05 December 2017). 
Interviewee 021 (2017), Housing association manager, Interviewed by Wills, M. (5 September 2017). 
Interviewee 022 (2018), NHS trust director, Interviewed by Wills, M. (14 September 2017). 
Interviewee 023 (2018), Social care consultant who focuses on the interface relationships between 
health and social care, Interviewed by Wills, M. (17 January 2018). 
Interviewee 024 (2018), Local councillor and former member of council executive board, Interviewed 
by Wills, M. (3 February 2018 with follow up). 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
204 
 
Interviewee 026 (2018), Former senior civil servant at Department of Health, Interviewed by Wills, M. 
(29 January 2018). 
Interviewee 027 (2018), Operational manager adult social care commissioning, Interviewed by Wills, 
M. (24 January 2018). 
Interviewee 028 (2018), Voluntary, community and social enterprise staff, Discussions with Wills, M. 
(31 January 2018). 
Interviewee 029 (2018), Social care funding commentator, Interviewed by Wills, M. (2 March 2018 
with follow up). 
Interviewee 030 (2018), Local government finance staff at ‘fair funding’ review session, Discussions 
with Wills, M. (20 February 2018). 
Interviewee 031 (2018), MP with an interest in adult social care, Interviewed by Wills, M. (12 April 
2018). 
Involve (2018), Citizens Assembly on Social Care. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcomloc/citizens-assembly-report.pdf 
[05 July 2019]. 
Jacobs, A.M. (2008). The Politics of When: Redistribution, Investment and Policy Making for the Long 
Term, British Journal of Political Science, 38(2), pp. 193-220. 
Jann, W. (2015). Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice, in Lodge, M., Page, E. and Balla, S. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in 
Public Policy and Administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jarrett, T. (2017) Social care: Government reviews and policy proposals for paying for care since 1997 
(England). House of Commons Library Briefing Paper no. 8000. London: House of Commons Library. 
Jarrett, T. (2018a) Social care: care home market – structure, issues, and cross-subsidisation (England). 
House of Commons Library Briefing Paper no. 8003. London: House of Commons Library. 
Jarrett, T. (2018b) Latest progress on Government social care and child support policy changes and 
consultations. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper no. 8303. London: House of Commons 
Library. 
John, P. (1998). Analysing Public Policy. London, UK: Continuum. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
205 
 
John, P. (2015). Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 
in Lodge, M., Page, E. and Balla, S. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and 
Administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Johnson, J., Rolph, S. and Smith, R. (2010). Residential Care Transformed: Revisiting ‘The Last Refuge’, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Johnson, P. (2019). Spring Statement 2019: IFS Analysis. Available at: https://www.ifs.org.uk/spring-
statement-2019 [05 July 2019]. 
Jordan, G. and Cairney, P. (2013). What is the ‘dominant model’ of British policymaking? Comparing 
majoritarian and policy community ideas. British Politics, 8(3), pp. 233–259. 
Just (2019). Care reform. What reform? Care report 2019, seventh edition. Available at: 
https://www.justgroupplc.co.uk/~/media/Files/J/JRMS-IR/news-
doc/2019/2019%20Care%20Report%20-%20what%20reform.pdf [05 July 2019]. 
Kalecki, M. (1943). Political aspects of full employment. The Political Quarterly, 14(4), pp. 322–330. 
Kerslake, B. (2018). Speech given at the CIPFA Councillors' Conference, 2018. Available at:  
https://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2018/09/westminster-ignoring-councils-because-brexit-
says-bob-kerslake [05 July 2019]. 
King’s Fund (2015). How serious are the pressures in social care? Available at: 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/verdict/how-serious-are-pressures-social-care [05 July 
2019]. 
King’s Fund (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local Government 
and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision of adult social care (FSC 
0174). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/long-term-
funding-of-adult-social-care-17-19/publications/ [05 July 2019]. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Kirby, J. (2006). The Nationalisation of Childhood. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 
Knapp, M, Wistow, G. (1996). Social Care Markets in England: Early Post-reform Experiences, Social 
Service Review, 70(3), pp. 355-377. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
206 
 
Knapp, M., Hardy, B. and Forder, J. (2001). Commissioning for Quality: Ten Years of Social Care 
Markets in England. Journal of Social Policy, 30(2), pp 283-306. 
Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle, London: Routledge. 
Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998). The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State 
Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries, American Sociological Review, 63(5), 
pp. 661-687. 
Kotlikoff, L. and Spivak, A. (1981). The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, Journal of Political 
Economy, 89(2), p.372-391. 
Labour Party. (1997). Labour Party Manifesto, 1997. The Labour Party. Available at: 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm [20 June 2018]. 
Labour Party. (2017). Labour Party Manifesto, 2017. The Labour Party. Available at: 
https://labour.org.uk/manifesto/healthcare-for-all/ [05 July 2019]. 
Laferrère, A. (2011). Housing Wealth as Self-insurance for Long-Term Care in Costa-Font, J., and 
Courbage, C. (eds). Financing long-term care in Europe: Institutions, markets, and models. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Laing Buisson. (2015). Fee erosion for care homes as council payments fail to keep up with costs. 
Available at: http://www.laingbuisson.co.uk [28 June 2016]. 
Laing Buisson. (2016). UK homecare services in need of a new business model as shrinking demand, 
falling profitability and variable quality undermines confidence in the sector. Available at: 
http://www.laingbuisson.co.uk [28 June 2016]. 
Laing W. (2017). Care of Older People - UK Market Report, Twenty-Eighth Edition, London: Laing 
Buisson. 
Laing, W. (2008). Calculating a fair market price for care – Joseph Rowntree Foundation Report, Third 
Edition, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Lasswell, H. (1936). Politics: who gets what, when, how, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Later Life Ambitions (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local 
Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding and provision of adult 
social care (FSC 0178). Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
207 
 
a-z/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-
2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-care-17-19/publications/ [05 July 2019]. 
Lees, L. (1998). The solidarities of strangers: The English poor laws and the people, 1700-1948. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Leibfried, S. (1992). Towards a European welfare state? On integrating Poverty Regimes into the 
European Community, in Ferge, Z. and Kolberg, J. (eds) Social Policy in a Changing Europe, Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus Verlag. 
Lent, A. (2017). Social care has taken a beating in the elections too, The Municipal Journal, 9 June 2017. 
Levi-Faur, D. (2011). The odyssey of the regulatory state, Jerusalem papers in regulation and 
governance, Working paper 39. 
Levy, J.D. (2010). Welfare Retrenchment, in Castles, F., Leibfried, Lewis, S., Obinger, H. and Pierson, 
C. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com [12 April 2019]. 
Lewis, J. and Glennerster, H. (1996). Implementing the new community care. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
Lievesley, N., Crosby, G, Bowman, C. and Midwinter, E. (2011). The changing role of care homes. CPA 
Report, London: Centre for Policy on Ageing. Available at: http://www.cpa.org.uk [30 April 2019]. 
Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, American Political Science 
Review, 65(3), pp. 682-693. 
Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one 
countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Local Government Association (2018). The lives we want to lead. The LGA green paper for adult 
social care and wellbeing. Available at: https://futureofadultsocialcare.co.uk/downloads/ [05 July 
2019]. 
Local Government Association (2019). Joint letter on adult social care. Available at: 
https://www.local.gov.uk/joint-letter-adult-social-care [Accessed 05 July 2019]. 
Lynch, J. (2006). Age in the Welfare State: The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers, and 
Children. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
208 
 
Lynch, J. and Rhodes, M. (2016). Historical Institutionalism and the Welfare State, in Fioretos, K.O., 
Falleti, T.G., and Sheingate, A. D. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Maarsea, J. and Jeurissenb, P. (2016). The policy and politics of the 2015 long-term care reform in the 
Netherlands, Health Policy, 120(3), pp.241–245. 
Mabbett, D. (2012). The Ghost in the Machine: Pension Risks and Regulatory Responses in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, Politics & Society, 40(1), pp.107-129. 
Mabbett, D. (2013a). The governance of welfare markets – how to cope with mobility and diversity 
Available at:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bIYEqrLciwQ. [12 April 2019]. 
Mabbett, D. (2013b). The regulatory rescue of the welfare state. In: Levi-Faur, D. (ed.) Handbook on 
the politics of regulation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (2010). Explaining institutional change: ambiguity, agency, and power. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Majone, G. (1994). The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. West European Politics, 17(3), pp.77–
101. 
Majone, G. (1997). From the Positive to the Regulatory State. Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), pp.139–
67. 
Malnick, E. (2018). Tax on age to pay for social care being considered for the over-40s, Daily Telegraph, 
10 November 2018. 
Mann, K. (2006). Three Steps to Heaven? Tensions in the Management of Welfare: Retirement 
Pensions and Active Consumers. Journal of Social Policy, 35(1), pp. 77-96. 
Marsh, D., Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2003). Unequal Plurality: Towards an Asymmetric Power Model 
of British Politics. Government and Opposition, 38(3), pp.306-332. 
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class, and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Marshall, T. H. (1970). Social Policy in the Twentieth Century, Hutchinson: London. 
Means, R. and Smith, R. (1998). From Poor Law to community care: the development of welfare 
services for elderly people 1939-1971. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
209 
 
Means, R., Morbey, H. and Smith, R. (2002). From community care to market care? The development 
of welfare services for older people. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Ministry of Defence. (2018). UK steps up commitment to a modernised NATO. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-steps-up-commitment-to-a-modernised-nato [05 July 
2019]. 
Moran, M. (2003). The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper Innovation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mucciaroni, G. (1992). The Garbage Can Model & the Study of Policy Making: A Critique, Polity, 24(3), 
pp. 459-482. 
Mudge, R. (2019). UK's Brexit bubble spells domestic gridlock. Deutsche Welle, 9 February 2019. 
Myles, J.  and Pierson P. (2001). The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform, in P. Pierson 
(ed.). The new Politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 305–333. 
Myles, J. and Quadagno, J. (2002). Political Theories of the Welfare State, Social Service Review, 76(1), 
pp.34-57. 
National Audit Office. (2018). Financial sustainability of local authorities 2018. Available at: 
https://www.nao.org.uk/report/financial-sustainability-of-local-authorities-2018/ [05 July 2019]. 
Neild, R. (2012). The ‘1981 statement by 364 economists’ revisited, Royal Economic Society 
Newsletter, 159, pp. 11-14. 
Nesbitt, S. (1995). British pensions policy making in the 1980s: the rise and fall of a policy community. 
Aldershot:  Avebury. 
NEST (2015). NEST insight 2015 - Taking the temperature of auto enrolment, NEST Corporation, 
London. 
Netten, A., Williams, J. and Darton, R. (2005). Care-home closures in England: Causes and implications, 
Journal of Social Policy, 25(3), pp. 319-338. 
NHS Confederation. (2019). Health for care coalition report – Crisis is care: what do MPs think? 
Available at: https://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2019/06/crisis-in-care [6 June 2019]. 
NHS Digital. (2018). Adult Social Care Activity and Finance: England 2017-18. Available at: 
http://digital.nhs.uk/pubs/ascactfin1718 [12 February 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
210 
 
OECD (2015). Pensions at a Glance 2015: OECD and G20 indicators. OECD Publishing, Paris. Available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2015-en [05 July 2019]. 
OECD (2018), OECD Health Statistics 2018. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/els/health-
systems/long-term-care.htm [05 July 2019]. 
OECD Statistics. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/ [05 July 2019]. 
OECD (2011), Progressivity of Pension Benefit Formulae, in Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-
income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-24-en [05 July 2019]. 
OECD. (2005). Long-term care policies for older people, Paris: OECD. 
Oesterle, A. and Rothgang, H. (2010). Long-Term Care, in Castles, F.G., Leibfried, S., Lewis, J., Obinger, 
H. and Pierson, C. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 569-83. 
ONS (2016). Labour disputes in the UK: 2015. Office for National Statistics, Newport. Available at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket [05 July 2019]. 
ONS (2016a). Household satellite accounts – 2015 and 2016. Office for National Statistics, Newport. 
Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/householdsatelliteaccounts2015and2016 [05 July 
2019]. 
ONS (2017a). Analysis of real earnings: May 2017. Office for National Statistics, Newport. Available 
at:  http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket [05 July 2019]. 
ONS (2017b). What has happened to the income of retired households in the UK over the past 40 
years? Office for National Statistics, Newport. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/whathashappenedtotheincomeofretiredhouseholdsoverthepast40
years [05 July 2019].  
ONS (2019a). Public service productivity: adult social care, England, financial year ending 2018. Office 
for National Statistics, Newport. Available at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/publicservicesproductivity/artic
les/publicserviceproductivityadultsocialcareenglandfinancialyearending2018/2019-02-06 [14 May 
2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
211 
 
ONS (2019b). Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2019. Office for National Statistics, Newport. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-2019 
[7 September 2019].  
ONS. The Office for National Statistics (UK). Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ [01 March 2019]. 
Orenstein, M. A. (2008). Privatizing pensions: the transnational campaign for social security reform. 
Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  
Ormston, R. and Curtice, J. (2015). British Social Attitudes: the 32nd Report, London: NatCen Social 
Research.  
Orren, K., and Skowronek, S. (1994). Beyond the iconography of order: notes for a “new 
institutionalism” in Dodd, L. and Jillson, C. (eds.), The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and 
Interpretations, New York: Routledge, pp. 311-330. 
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1993). Reinventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming the public sector. London, Plume Penguin. 
Pavolini, E. and Costanzo Ranci, C. (2008). Restructuring the welfare state: reforms in long-term care 
in Western European countries, Journal of European Social Policy, 18(3), pp. 246-259.  
Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (2019). Available at: https://www.plsa.co.uk/about-us [23 
April 2019]. 
Pickard, L. (2015). A growing care gap? The supply of unpaid care for older people by their adult 
children in England to 2032, Ageing and Society, 35(1), pp. 96-123. 
Pickard, L., Wittenberg, R., Comas-Herrera, A., King, D. and Malley, J. (2007). Care by Spouses, Care by 
Children: Projections of Informal Care for Older People in England to 2031. Social Policy and Society, 
6(3), pp. 353-366. 
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher, and the politics of retrenchment. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. The American 
Political Science Review, 94(2), pp.251–267. 
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: history, institutions and social analysis. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
212 
 
Pierson, P. (2011). The welfare state over the very long run, ZeSArbeitspapier, No. 02/2011. 
Pierson, P. (2016). Power in historical institutionalism, in Fioretos, K.O., Falleti, T.G., and Sheingate, A. 
D. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Plimmer, G. (2015). Fears of crisis in UK care homes as capacity shrinks. Financial Times, 11 November 
2015. 
Plimmer, G. (2019). Britain’s biggest care homes rack up debts of £40,000 a bed. Financial Times, 14 
July 2019. 
Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. 
Powell, M. A., and Hewitt, M. (2002). Welfare state and welfare change. Buckingham: Open University 
Press. 
Pratley, N. (2017). A shocking way to fund UK care homes. Guardian, 12 December 2017. 
Quigley, R. (2018). Government hints at further delay to social care paper. FT Advisor, 6 September 
2018. 
Quilter-Pinner, H. and Hochlaf, D. (2019). Social care: free at the point of need, Institute for Public 
Policy Research. Available at: https://www.ippr.org/research/publications/social-care-free-at-the-
point-of-need [20 June 2019]. 
Reddin, M. (1984). Pensions Cost and Portability, in Social security: the real agenda. London: Fabian 
Society. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007). Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, Organization Studies, 28(8): pp. 
1243-1264. 
Rhodes, R. (2008). Policy Network Analysis in Goodin, R., Moran, M. and Rein, M. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Richards, D., & Smith, M. J. (2002). Governance and public policy in the United Kingdom. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ridley, N. (1988). The local right: enabling not providing. London: Centre for Policy Studies. 
Riedel, H. (2003). Private Compulsory Long-term Care Insurance in Germany. The Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice, 28(2), pp. 275-293. 
Rose, R. and Shiratori, R. (1986). The Welfare State East and West. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
213 
 
Rothgang, H. (2011). Social Insurance for Long-Term Care: An Evaluation of the German Model in 
Costa-Font, J. (ed). Reforming long-term care in Europe. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Rozbicka, P. and Spohr, F. (2016). Interest groups in multiple streams: specifying their involvement in 
the framework, Policy Sciences, 2016, 49(1), pp. 55-69. 
Sandford, M. (2018) Local government in England: structures. House of Commons Library Briefing 
Paper no. 7104. London: House of Commons Library. 
Schmidt, V.A. (2009). Comparative Institutional Analysis, in T. Landmann and N.Robinson. (eds.). The 
Sage handbook of comparative politics. London: Sage, pp. 125-143. 
 
Schulze, I. and Moran, M. (2006). United Kingdom: Pension politics in an adversarial system, in 
Immergut, E., Anderson, K. and Schulze, I. (2006). The handbook of West European pension politics. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 49-96. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers. 
Schut, F. and Van Den Berg, B. (2010). Sustainability of Comprehensive Universal Long-term Care 
Insurance in the Netherlands, Social Policy & Administration, 44(4), pp.411–435. 
Scruggs, L. and Allan, J. (2006). Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a replication 
and revision, Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), pp. 55–72. 
Seebohm Report (1968). Report of the committee on local authority and allied personal social services, 
Cmnd 3703, London: HMSO. 
Seebohm-Rowntree, B. (1947). Old People: Report of a Survey Committee on the Problems of Ageing 
and the Care of Old People, London: Oxford University Press. 
Simmons, L. (2002). Unions and Welfare Reform: Labor's Stake in the Ongoing Struggle over the 
Welfare State, Labor Studies Journal, 27(2), pp.65-83. 
Simpson, P. (2017). Public spending on adult social care in England. IFS Briefing Note BN200. Institute 
for Fiscal Studies. 
Slasberg, C and Beresford, P. (2018), Weak leadership exposes social care to worst green paper risks, 
Adults Blog, 19 September 2018, Community Care website. Available at: 
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2018/09/19/weak-leadership-exposes-social-care-worst-green-
paper-risks/ [05 July 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
214 
 
Slater, D. and Simmons, E. (2010). Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics, 
Comparative Political Studies, 43(7), pp. 886-917. 
Social Security Act (1980). London: The Stationary Office. 
Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/30/contents [05 July 2019]. 
Soifer, H. (2012). The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures, Comparative Political Studies, 45(12), pp. 1572-
1597. 
Spohr, F. (2016). Explaining Path Dependency and Deviation by Combining Multiple Streams 
Framework and Historical Institutionalism: A Comparative Analysis of German and Swedish Labour 
Market Policies, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 18(3), pp. 257-272. 
St. Louis, C. (2011). Negotiating change: Approaches to and the distributional implications of social 
welfare and economic reform, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 
Steinmo, S. (2008). Historical Institutionalism in Della Porta, D., & Keating, M. (eds). Approaches and 
methodologies in the social sciences: a pluralist perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stewart, H. (2018). Councils used as human shields for cuts says John McDonnell. Guardian, 8 February 
2018. 
Sutherland Report (1999). With Respect to Old Age: A Report by the Royal Commission on Long Term 
Care, London: The Stationery Office. 
Swenson, P. A. (2002). Capitalists against markets: the making of labor markets and welfare states in 
the United States and Sweden. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tansey, O. (2007). Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A case for non-probability sampling, Political 
Science and Politics, 40(4), pp. 765-772. 
Tarrow, S. (2010). The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice, Comparative 
Political Studies, 43(2), pp.230-259. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2002). The Silver Age of the Welfare State: Perspectives on Resilience, Journal of 
Social Policy, 31(4), pp.597 – 621. 
Thane, P. (1996). Foundations of the welfare state. London: Longman. 
Thelen, K. A. (2004). How institutions evolve: The political economy of skills in Germany, Britain, the 
United States, and Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
215 
 
Thelen, K. and Conran, J. (2016). Institutional Change, in Fioretos, K.O., Falleti, T.G., and Sheingate, A. 
D. (eds.). The Oxford handbook of historical institutionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thurley, D. (2018) Pensions: automatic enrolment 2010 onwards. House of Commons Library Briefing 
Paper no. 6417. London: House of Commons Library. 
Timonen, V. (2005) Policy paradigms and long-term care: convergence or continuing difference in P. 
Taylor-Gooby (ed.) Ideas and Welfare State Reform in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, pp. 30–53. 
Tinson, A., Ayrton, C. and Petrie, I. (2018). A Quiet Crisis – Local government spending on 
disadvantage in England, London: New Policy Institute. Available at: 
https://www.npi.org.uk/publications/local-government/quiet-crisis/ [05 July 2019]. 
Townsend, P. (1964). The Last Refuge. A survey of residential institutions and homes for the aged in 
England and Wales, Abridged edition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
UNISON. (2018). Unison’s Ethical Care Charter. Available at: 
http://www.savecarenow.org.uk/ethical-care-charter/ [05 July 2019]. 
United Kingdom Homecare Association. (2018). Published written evidence submitted to the 
Communities and Local Government and Health Committees Joint inquiry on the long-term funding 
and provision of adult social care (FSC 059). Available at: 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/communities-
and-local-government-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/long-term-funding-of-adult-social-
care-17-19/publications/ [13 June 2019]. 
Walker, A. (1990). The economic burden of ageing and the prospect of intergenerational conflict, 
Ageing and Society, 10(4), pp. 377 – 396. 
Walker, A. (2010). Ageing and Generational Politics – Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University 
Press. Available at: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com [05 July 2019]. 
Wanless, D., Forder, J., Fernandez, J. (2006). Securing Good Care for Older People: Taking a Long-term 
View, London: King’s Fund. 
Warburton, J. and Jeppsson-Grassman, E. (2011). Variations in older people's social and productive 
ageing activities across different social welfare regimes, International Journal of Social Welfare, 20(2), 
pp.180–191. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
216 
 
Watt, N. (2010). Spectre of 'death tax' haunts Andy Burnham's care revolution. Guardian, 30 March 
2010. 
Wenzel, L., Bennett, L., Bottery, S. Murray, R. and Sahib, B. (2018). Approaches to social care funding 
- Social care funding options, Health Foundation Working Paper 2, London: King’s Fund. 
Wesley, J. (2014). The qualitative analysis of political documents in Kaal, B., Maks, I. and Elfrinkhof, A. 
(eds.). From text to political positions: text analysis across disciplines. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing. 
Whiteside, N. (2006). Adapting private pensions to public purposes: historical perspectives on the 
politics of reform, Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), pp.43-54. 
Wiener, J., Illston, L. and Hanley, R. (1994). Sharing the burden: strategies for public and private long-
term care insurance. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
Willetts, D. (2011). The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers took their Children's Future - And why they 
should give it back. London: Atlantic Books. 
Willis Towers Watson (2017). Global Pension Assets Study 2017. Available at: 
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-GB/insights/2017/01/global-pensions-asset-study-2017 
[30 June 2018]. 
Wilsford, D. (1994). Path dependency or why history makes it difficult but not impossible to reform 
health care systems in a big way. Journal of Public Policy, 14(3), pp. 251-283. 
Wincott, D. (2013). The Golden Age of the Welfare State: Interrogating a Conventional Wisdom, Public 
Administration, 91(4), pp. 806–822. 
Wistow, G., Knapp, M., Hardy, B. and Allen, C. (1992). From providing to enabling – local authorities 
and the mixed economy of social care. Public Administration, 70(1), pp.25–47. 
Wittenberg, R., Sandhu, B., and Knapp, M. (2002). Funding long-term care: The public and private 
options, in Mossialos, E., Dixon, A., Figueras, J. and Kutzin, J. (eds.), Funding Health Care – Options for 
Europe. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp.226–49. 
World Bank. (1994). Averting the old age crisis: policies to protect the old and promote growth. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
World Bank. (2018). World Bank Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org [05 July 2019]. 
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
217 
 
Zahariadis, N. (2007), The multiple streams framework in P. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy 
Process, Cambridge MA: Westview. 
Zuchandke, A., Reddemann S. and Krummaker, S. (2011). Financing Long-Term Care in Germany in 
Costa-Font, J., and Courbage, C. (eds). Financing long-term care in Europe: Institutions, markets, and 
models. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Zuchandke, A., Reddemann, S., Krummaker, S., Von Der Schulenburg, J. (2010). Impact of the 
Introduction of the Social Long-Term Care Insurance in Germany on Financial Security Assessment in 
Case of Long-Term Care Need. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. Issues and Practice, 35(4), 
pp.626-643. 
  
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
218 
 
  
Sustainably funding a marginal welfare programme 
Why does English social care for older people face a persistent funding crisis? 
 
 
219 
 
9. Glossary 
ADASS  Association of Directors of Adult Social Services 
CDU  Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union) 
CQC  Care Quality Commission 
CSU   Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern) 
DDR   German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) 
DHSS  Department of Health and Social Security 
DSS  Department of Social Security 
DWP  Department of Work and Pensions 
EU  European Union 
FDP   Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IFS  Institute for Fiscal Studies 
ISA  Individual Savings Account 
LGA  Local Government Association 
NASCIS  National Adult Social Care Intelligence Service   
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NEST  National Employment Savings Trust 
NHS  National Health Service 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ONS  Office for National Statistics 
PQM  Pension Quality Mark 
S2P  State Second Pension 
SERPS  State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
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SPD  Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
UN  United Nations 
UNISON A UK public service trade union 
VCSE  Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise 
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10. Appendix – Explanatory variables 
The nineteen potential funding reform explanatory variables considered in the thesis are listed below. 
Global explanatory variables 
 Social trends 
 Economic trends 
 Technological trends 
 Demographic trends 
National explanatory variables 
 Constitutional structure 
 Political system type (Lijphart, 1984) 
 Ideational environment 
 Welfare state type (Andersen, 1990) 
 Preferred welfare funding approach 
Institutional funding explanatory variables 
 Pre-reform funding institutions 
 Pre-reform institutional maturity 
 Pre-reform risk approach 
 Programme benefit type 
 Programme structure 
 Programme salience 
 Availability of an existing alternative funding institution 
Political calculus / multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984) explanatory variables 
 Problem stream – broad relevant policymaker consensus that there is a problem 
 Policy stream – broad relevant policymaker consensus on how to solve the problem 
 Political stream – political focus on the problem and a policymaker majority in favour of reform 
 
